The governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a crucial determinant of the efficiency and quality of the services they provide. Exploiting the changes brought about by the reforms that imposed gender quotas (the 'Golfo-Mosca' law) and limited the possibility of appointing individuals who had previously held political offices (the 'Severino' reform), the paper examines the effect of a change in the composition and quality of administrative bodies on the performance of SOEs in Italy.
As a result of these measures, the number of women on the boards of directors of SOEs has increased and the number of individuals with previous political appointments has decreased. The entry of new directors has led to a rejuvenation of the boards and an increase in their average quality. The improvement in corporate governance has had a positive effect on a number of economic and financial variables and has increased the quality of services provided.
Forthcoming in: The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.
