No. 741 - Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy

Temi di discussione (Working papers)
by Massimiliano Affinito and Edoardo Tagliaferri
February 2010
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This paper investigates the ex-ante determinants of bank loan securitization by using different econometric methods on Italian individual bank data from 2000 to 2006. Our results show that bank loan securitization is a composite decision. Banks that are less capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and burdened with troubled loans are more likely to perform securitization, for a larger amount and earlier.

Published in 2010 in: Journal of Financial Stability, v. 6, 4, pp. 189-202

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  1. 05 February 2010
    No. 741 - Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy
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