No. 270 - Maximization and the Act of Choice
The act of choosing can influence maximizing behaviour for at least two distinct reasons:
- process significance (preferences may be sensitive to the choice process, including the identity of the chooser), and
- decisional inescapability (choices may have to be made whether or not the judgemental process has been completed).
These influences can require systematic departures from the regularities assumed in standard models of rational choice, but they can be fully incorporated within the general approach of maximizing behaviour. The constructive programme of the paper is combined with critical appraisal of the implications of these concerns for rational decisions about actions and strategies, and their relevance for empirical studies of economic, social and political behaviour.
Presentation at a Seminar held by the author at the Research Department of the Bank of Italy, 18 March 1996.
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31 May 1996