Fiscal rules are one of the building blocks of European Monetary Union (EMU). The Treaty of Maastricht and the Stability and Growth Pact set rules and monitoring procedures geared at restraining deficit and debt levels while allowing room for fiscal stabilisation.
This fact alone provides sufficient reason for a workshop on fiscal rules. However, further motivation is to be found in the recent debates taking place in several countries about the introduction of rules at the national or decentralised level and in the extensive literature about the rationale of rules.
The third Banca d’Italia workshop on public finance aimed at providing an overview of the theoretical and empirical problems involved in the design and in the implementation of fiscal rules. It examines the role of rules at different levels of government and offers indications about the experiences of some countries.
The analysis is particularly relevant as the policy debate is gradually moving from how to achieve fiscal consolidation to defining suitable medium and long-term objectives and also to designing institutions and rules that ensure the durability of sound fiscal positions.
The papers presented at the workshop were allocated in four sessions. The first session examines the pros and cons of fiscal rules from a general point of view.
In the second session, the focus narrows to the rules introduced in the European Union.
In the third session, the analysis is broadened to encompass not only numerical rules but also budgetary procedures and institutions.
In the fourth, the solutions experimented in different countries are analysed with reference to the specific institutional setting of fiscal federalism.
Attendance at the conference is by invitation only.
Organizer: Mr. Daniele Franco, Banca d’Italia
