



BANCA D'ITALIA
EUROSISTEMA

Questioni di Economia e Finanza

(Occasional Papers)

Universalism vs. particularism: a round trip from
sociology to economics

by Guido de Blasio, Diego Scalise and Paolo Sestito

January 2014

Number

212



BANCA D'ITALIA
EUROSISTEMA

Questioni di Economia e Finanza

(Occasional papers)

Universalism vs. particularism: a round trip from
sociology to economics

by Guido de Blasio, Diego Scalise and Paolo Sestito

Number 212 – January 2014

The series Occasional Papers presents studies and documents on issues pertaining to the institutional tasks of the Bank of Italy and the Eurosystem. The Occasional Papers appear alongside the Working Papers series which are specifically aimed at providing original contributions to economic research.

The Occasional Papers include studies conducted within the Bank of Italy, sometimes in cooperation with the Eurosystem or other institutions. The views expressed in the studies are those of the authors and do not involve the responsibility of the institutions to which they belong.

The series is available online at www.bancaditalia.it.

ISSN 1972-6627 (print)

ISSN 1972-6643 (online)

Printed by the Printing and Publishing Division of the Bank of Italy

UNIVERSALISM VS. PARTICULARISM: A ROUND TRIP FROM SOCIOLOGY TO ECONOMICS

by Guido de Blasio*, Diego Scalise** and Paolo Sestito*

Abstract

Social scientists, in particular sociologists, claim that the distinction between universalistic and particularistic values is relevant to explaining the social behaviour of individuals (and societies). This paper provides preliminary empirical evidence that supports the claim. It first defines a number of proxies for the degree of particularism embedded into long-celebrated dimensions of social behaviour (trust, political awareness, and associational activities). Then, it shows that the particularistic measures are positively correlated to each other and negatively correlated to some established generalist measures for all dimensions of social behaviour considered, both across and within countries and regions. Moreover, the paper relates that the various proxies for particularism share the same set of covariates (such as low education and income), which are neatly distinguishable from the determinants of the generalist measures.

JEL Classification: A13, Z13.

Keywords: particularism, social capital.

Contents

1. Introduction.....	5
2. Related literature.....	7
3. Measuring particularism across different social capital dimensions	10
4. International evidence from the World Value Survey	11
5. The determinants of general and particularistic values: evidence from Italy	13
5. Conclusions.....	18
References	20
Statistical appendix.....	23

* Bank of Italy, Structural Economic Analysis Department.

** Bank of Italy, Economic Research Unit, Milan Branch.

“Timothy McVeigh and his co-conspirators in the Oklahoma City bombing were members of a bowling league: they were not, unfortunately, “bowling alone” and Osama Bin Laden was not acting as an isolated mad man, but was firmly embedded in a well-functioning network of internationally acting terrorists...” (Baurmann, 2008, p. 169).

1. Introduction¹

Is the distinction between particularistic and generalistic² social values relevant for the socio-economic sciences? Are the determinants of particularistic values different from those of generalistic ones? Is the distinction a latent factor crossing all social behaviours?

Since Aristotle, if not before, philosophers and social scientists have claimed that the distinction between universalistic and particularistic values is a useful key to interpreting the social behaviour of individuals and entire cultures. Surprisingly, economic studies have almost completely neglected this dichotomy. Instead, they have focused, on the two main conceptualizations of social capital: civiness and the endowment (and use) of networks (see, for instance, Righi and Scalise, 2013). In the first case, social capital is interpreted both as Machiavelli’s civic virtue and as a sense of duty and respect for the rules, including informal and non-institutionalized ones. Along these lines, Guiso et al. (2006) define social capital as “those persistent and shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities.” In the second meaning, which originates from the sociological approach, social capital is conceptualized as a relational resource that can “accrue to an individual or group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 2).

In this paper we explore the dichotomy between universalism and particularism across the different dimensions of social behaviour. Indeed, both civiness and networks are far from being universal: they define a partition of the world between *us* (i.e. people with whom interactions are more frequent, with whom empathy is higher, and who are considered more trustworthy) and *them* (the rest of the world). Potentially, the analysis of this divide might inform the role of cultural norms

¹ The views and the opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions they are affiliated with. We thank Guglielmo Barone, Luca Stanca, Antonella Magliocco, Alessandra Righi, Luca Zarri and the participants at the Workshop on Social Capital (Bank of Italy, Rome, November 2012) for suggestions and comments. Remaining errors are our own. Part of this work was undertaken when Diego Scalise was visiting the Structural Economic Analysis Department of the Bank of Italy.

² In this paper the terms “universalism” and “generalism” are used interchangeably as are the terms “social behaviour” and “social capital”.

for socio-economic behaviour. As hinted by Sestito (2011, p. 55) in the analysis of the importance of social capital for the misfortunes of the Italian *Mezzogiorno*: “the main problem of the social infrastructure in the South of Italy might not be the absence of trust or networks *per se*, but their highly particularistic features, as both trust and the breadth of social networks rapidly shrinks outside the family’s boundaries.”

Building upon these considerations, the paper offers two main contributions. First, it develops a set of proxies for the degree of particularism embedded into different social capital dimensions: trust, political awareness (which is usually used as a proxy for civicness), and participation in associations (which is commonly linked to the concept of network endowment) using data from both an Italian source (the 2010 wave of the “Multi Purpose Survey on Italian Households” conducted by the Italian National Institute of Statistics, Istat) and from international data (the 2005-09 wave of the World Value Survey). Second, on the basis of Italian data, the paper provides SUR (System of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) estimates of the individual determinants of particularistic and generalistic attitudes. This estimation strategy allow us to test whether: *i*) all the proxies for particularism, calculated for the different dimensions of social capital, share a similar set of covariates; and *ii*) these covariates are different from those related to generalistic attitudes.

Our results show that our measures for particularism are positively correlated to each other and negatively correlated to some established generalist proxies for all dimensions of social behaviour considered, both across and within countries and regions. A microeconomic analysis on Italian data confirms that all particularistic measures share a similar set of covariates (such as low education and income), which are neatly distinguishable from the determinants of the generalist proxies. Thus, the generalistic/particularistic dichotomy crosses the different social capital dimensions, while particularistic values seem to be very different from generalistic ones. These results, which are robust to a number of sensitivity checks, point towards a novel perspective: they suggest that the dichotomy between universalism and particularism seems to be a promising taxonomy to better understand social behaviour.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section gives an overview of some of the related literature. Section 3 introduces our approach to measuring particularism across various dimensions of social behaviours. Section 4 provides some international evidence. Section 5 contains the main econometric evidence, based on Italian data, on the covariates of particularistic and generalistic social capital. It also presents a number of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.

2. Related literature

The dichotomy between universalism and particularism has informed the discussion on social norms for a very long time. Rather surprisingly, however, it has not been significantly dealt with in economics.

The view of the social sciences

Since Aristotle, if not before, the concept of particularism has been treated by philosophers as a key to interpreting social behaviours. In the Greek philosopher's political theory the *polis* can be thought of as the equilibrium point between particularistic and generalistic tendencies in the human soul: people contribute to the well-functioning of political institutions, overcoming the naturally particularistic nature of family ties, and cooperating with other citizens; however, according to Aristotle, this mechanism works only among citizens, people of the same kind and with the same rights but it does not work with foreigners (Ross, 1957).

Hume (1740) and Kant (1788), just to name two main contributors, highlight how the distinction between particularistic and generalistic values is crucial in explaining the process that generates justice and civiness: it constitutes a strong moral divide. In the *Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume (1740) argues that there is no natural sentiment of justice, that benevolence springs from sympathy, and that the force of sympathy depends on the closeness of the relationship between the people involved. As he wrote, "we are benevolent to our family and friends, and to those whose happiness or misery is brought near to us, and represented in lively colours" (Hume, 1740, p. 481). According to Hume, the sense of justice and civiness is not governed by innate sentiments but arise as the result of a repeated interaction between self-interested individuals in a well characterized group. He thought that "self-interest would generate civiness if any person's failure to respect other people's property has a significant chance of bringing down the society-wide convention of mutual restraint" (Hume, 1740, p. 499). In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant (1788) envisages universalism as one of the most important criteria to evaluate the degree of morality of any action. According to Kant the ultimate principle of morality must be a moral law conceived so abstractly that it is capable of guiding us to the right action when applied to every possible set of circumstances: so the only relevant feature of the moral law is its generality, the fact that it has the formal property of universalizability, by virtue of which it can be applied at all times to all moral agents.

Singer (1981) interprets the evolution of humankind through history as a progressive enlargement of empathy to more general categories of beings (animals included): he characterizes moral reasons as "somehow universal", specifically in the injunction to "love thy neighbour as thyself", interpreted by him as demanding that one give weight to the interests of others in decision making, and made possible by "putting ourselves in the place of others", tracing this universalizing step from Kant. Smith associates the development of universalistic behaviours in society to the diffusion of commerce and economic prosperity.³

Sociologists have made a general distinction between universalistic and particularistic social values since at least the early 1950s. Parsons and Shils (1951) characterize this distinction as a standard that guides the behaviour of persons or societies: universalism implies that correct behaviour can be defined and always be applied, while particularism suggests that relationships come ahead of abstract social codes. The taxonomy has gained increased visibility and importance with the development of new economic sociology, which, since the late 1980s, has been attempting to unify the sociological and economic disciplines, stressing the importance of the borders within which values are created and operate (see Granovetter, 1985). Hollis (1998), in constructing a theory of rational trust, suggests that it is possible to understand the type of rationality behind this taxonomy as "philosophical egoism in the first person plural": the idea is to develop a conception of rationality in which individuals can have a reason to identify with the common interests of the social groups to which they belong (the possibility of what Hollis defines as the "we rationality" or "team thinking"). In this context it becomes crucial to characterize the borders defined by the division of the world between "us" and "them" and how these borders change, that is the degree of universalism/particularism across different social behaviours.

In this framework, Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1993, 1996 and 1998) developed a model of culture defining a set of seven cultural dimensions, which they referred to as the "seven dilemmas of culture" and which they believed explained distinctions between national cultures. Among these dimensions, the dichotomy between universalism and particularism appears crucial in describing the way in which the members of a society relate to each other: this "dilemma"

³ Smith (1759) explains that during the Middle Ages, the order and good government of the towns gradually spread to the surrounding areas, undermining the previous feudalism. Feudal societies began to decay when the landed proprietors diverted their surplus from the maintenance of retainers to the purchase of luxuries that were manufactured in towns. As an unintended consequence, the proprietors lost the basis of their former power and authority. Because of the division of labour in the market economy, purchasing power does not translate into political power as it does under feudalism. Thus, the extension of the market creates a society of horizontal relationships, a society in which relationships between people are based on equality and reciprocity.

distinguishes between societies based on the relative importance they place on rules and laws as opposed to personal relationships. The members of universalistic societies tend to focus more on rules and codes, values and standards and believe that they take precedence over the needs and the claims of friends and other personal relationships; they believe that laws can be generally applied and that they should be the only criterion to determine what is right and ethically acceptable. Instead, members of more particularistic societies tend to focus more on human friendships and personal relationships than on formal rules and laws; they tend to look at the situation to determine what is right. In the spirit of Adam Smith (1759), social researchers have usually associated universalism with modernization and sophisticated business practice, and particularism with less developed rural societies in which everyone knows everyone personally: Germany and the US would be examples of strongly universalistic societies, while China, Russia and Thailand would be examples of strongly particularistic societies (Trompenaars and Hampden Turner, 1998). In addition, particularistic attitudes have usually been interpreted as being conducive to corruption and low civicness (Lumby, 2006). Portes (1998) highlights the fact that particularistic mechanisms of social enforcement, generated by closed network structures, can lead to the exclusion of individuals considered to be outsiders and can create punishment mechanisms for deviations from social norms, which may lower civic standards: Borgois (1995) reports that in many ghettos individuals who try "acting white" are often ostracized by the rest of the community. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) regard the United States as an example of a universalistic culture: egalitarian, impersonal and task oriented. On the other hand, Mediterranean countries (such as Italy or Turkey) clearly represent the concept of cultures based on the family, in which people are valued before roles, relationships are close, and the leader is regarded as a caring "father", consistent with a particularistic value system.

The view of economics

Surprisingly, economic studies have almost completely neglected the dichotomy between universalistic and particularistic behaviours. The focus, instead, has been on two main conceptualizations of social capital: civicness and network endowment and use. Scholars have concentrated on the mechanisms of accumulation of these different types of social capital (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002, Glaeser et al., 2002 and de Blasio and Nuzzo, 2010) and on the effects of these on economic variables (for example, Saxenian, 1994, Putnam, 1995, Knack and Keefer, 1997, Hall and Jones, 1999 and Sacco and Vanin, 2000). The results of the empirical literature can be summarized as follows (see Righi and Scalise, 2013): increasing civicness always turns out to be beneficial for economic growth, while evaluating the impact of larger and denser networks requires considering the balance between the positive and negative externalities generated, some of which

would generate a negligible amount of negative externalities spurring economic development, while others could even be detrimental.

There is a very limited number of studies trying to measure particularism in social behaviour. These are mainly confined to an experimental setting: for example, Fong and Luttmer (2009) measure the role of racial-group loyalty on generosity to hurricane Katrina victims. A notable exception is Alesina and Giuliano (2007), who show that the strength of family ties is crucial in determining many individual economic behaviours: with strong family ties, participation in housework activities is higher, families are larger, the labour force participation of women and youngsters is reduced, and geographical mobility is lower. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) show that the more individuals rely on the family as a provider of services, insurance and transfer of resources, the lower is civic engagement and political participation. Note, however, that these studies focus on the impact of strong family ties; that is on the extreme case of particularistic networks. More recently, Albanese et al. (2012) adopt a behavioural approach and distinguish between general trust and trust in known people, showing that (risk and time) preferences have different effects on the two measures.

3. Measuring particularism across different social capital dimensions

To measure particularism we adopt the definition proposed by Baurmann (1997) (see also Baurmann and Lahno, 2002), according to which: “A group is all the more particularistic, the more its networks, its norms of reciprocity and trust and its aims are confined to the members of the group, whereas a group is all the more universalistic, the more its networks, its norms of reciprocity and trust and its aims transgress the boundaries of the group and encompass other citizens and groups in a society” (Baurman, 1997, p.173). According to this definition, on the hypothetical *continuum* between amoral familism (Banfield, 1958) and “Kantian” universalism, particularism is taken to be as the incremental part of a social behaviour, which does not transgress the confines of the group to which the individual belongs.

Operationally, this definition seems to have a clear empirical counterpart: the degree of particularism can be measured by the difference between the intensity of a social behaviour provided with respect to those with whom interactions are frequent and the one provided with respect to unknown others. In view of this, our measure for particularism in trusting behaviour is

taken to be the difference between the trust respondents place in their family members and neighbours (the inner circle of acquaintances) and the trust they place in strangers. By the same token, we measure particularism in political consciousness by differentiating between the intensity of using general sources of information from that of referring only to family and friends as a way of acquiring information. Finally, we proxy particularism in associational activity by subtracting the amount of participation in associations with general goals from participation in associations centered around people of the same kind/type/social group.⁴ Alesina and Giuliano (2010) also adopt a measure based on algebraic differences when measuring the strength of family ties across countries.

Two aspects of our measures have to be highlighted. First, in the spirit of Baurmann (1997), our measures of particularism are *relative* measures. Individuals belonging to a group that places a high trust both in the members and the non-members of the group display a small level of particularism exactly like persons who do not trust anybody (not even their set of acquaintances!). Second, the information content of the proxies for particularism obtained by using the difference operator is very similar to that referring to alternative ways to compute the measures. Section 5 presents some evidence based on principal component techniques.

To explore their merits, we compare our proxies for particularism with some established measures for generalistic social behaviour. This allows us to put our findings in the perspective of previous literature. As for trust, we consider the standard question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?”. Generalistic civic awareness is elicited by the answers to the question: “Do you get information about politics at least once a week?”. As for associational activity, we refer to the question on whether the respondent has financed some associational activity. Note that the questions used to construct the measure for particularism are different from those used to identify generalistic social behaviours. This is purposely done to avoid spurious correlation.

4. International evidence from the World Value Survey

We start by providing some cross-country evidence on the importance of the division between particularism and universalism. We use individual responses taken from the 2005-09 wave of the

⁴ Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) make a neat distinction between different types of social behaviours according to their particularistic nature. They consider professional associations and unions as particularistic forms of social participation.

World Value Survey (WVS).⁵ The sample consists of 57 countries with a broad variety of income levels, religions and geography. We are able to construct our measures for particularism along the approach given above and for which details are provided in Table A1. Note, however, that the WVS does not provide a suitable variable to proxy generalistic participation in associations. In Table 1 we report the correlation coefficients, calculated at the country level, between universalistic and particularistic measures. The table documents systematic positive correlations among particularistic (generalistic) dimensions; each dimension tends to correlate negatively with the other ones.

Table 1: Country-level correlations between particularistic and generalistic values

	GenTrust		PartTrust		GenCivic		PartCivic		PartAss
GenTrust	1								
PartTrust	-0.63	***	1						
GenCivic	0.51	***	-0.49	***	1				
PartCivic	-0.54	***	0.35	**	-0.01	***	1		
PartAss	-0.10	**	0.39	***	-0.31	**	0.01	1	

Source: WVS, ***significant at 99 per cent level of confidence, ** significant at 95 per cent level of confidence.

As we know, comparing social behaviours across countries could be problematic because of the heterogeneity in the institutions and the macro environments which might spur omitted variable bias. Table 2 provides the within-country counterparts of Table 1, calculated by using country fixed effects. These correlations constitute a lower bound to the extent that individual social behaviours have been absorbed in the national culture (in this case they are differentiated away by the country fixed-effects). Our results show that, despite the inclusion of country fixed effects, particularistic behaviours are still positively correlated with each other and the same holds for generalistic ones; again, particularistic and generalistic dimensions tend to be negatively correlated with each other.

Table A2 documents some interesting correlations between our measures of social behaviour and other socio-economic behaviours. It shows that universalism is associated with higher GDP per capita, strengthened political participation, higher interest in politics and trust in institutions such as the parliament or in the head of state. The opposite holds for particularism. The ranking of the 57 WVS countries (Table A3), in terms of our proxies of social behaviour, seems to

⁵ The WVS is a compilation of national surveys on values and norms that covers a wide variety of topics (for instance, attitudes, religion and preferences); it also includes information on standard demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, labour market status, income, etc.). The WVS has been carried out five times (1981–1984, 1990–1993, 1995–1997, 1999–2004, and 2005–2009). Country coverage varies depending on the wave (starting with 22 countries in 1980).

be broadly consistent with the insights contained in the sociological and political science literatures. For example, Northern European countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, and Northern American countries appear to be characterized by higher levels of generalistic trust, while African and Latin American countries lie in the lowest range. Among the OECD countries, we find that Turkey, Korea, China and Italy are among the countries with the highest degree of particularism.

Table 2: Within country correlations between particularistic and generalistic values

	GenTrust		PartTrust		GenCivic		PartCivic		PartAss
GenTrust	1								
PartTrust	-0.09	***	1						
GenCivic	0.04	***	-0.10	***	1				
PartCivic	-0.02	***	0.01	***	-0.07	***	1		
PartAss	-0.01	***	0.02	***	-0.02	***	0.04	***	1

Source: WVS, ***significant at 99 per cent level of confidence, ** significant at 95 per cent level of confidence

5. The determinants of general and particularistic values: evidence from Italy

We now turn to analyse the individual determinants of universal and particularistic components of different social capital dimensions. We focus on Italy, which is a paradigmatic case of asymmetric distribution of social capital within a country (Banfield, 1958; Putnam, 1993). Since the publication of the seminal study on the Italian regions carried out by Putnam et al. 1993, the Italian case has become particularly popular as a “laboratory” to study informal norms (de Blasio and Sestito, 2011). In addition, the availability of micro-data drawn from an ad hoc survey, designed by Istat to capture individual social behaviours,⁶ makes it possible to extract a good number of measures of particularism for the different social capital dimensions, covering both the civicness and the network concepts. In addition the dataset appears particularly suited for individual level analyses, thanks to the high number of individual observations (more than 48,000) and to the

⁶ The multipurpose survey system consists of the annual survey on “Aspects of daily life”, the quarterly survey on “Trips and holidays” and five thematic surveys: these are each conducted once every five years and are entitled: “Health conditions and the use of health services”, “Citizens and leisure time”, “Citizens and safety”, “Households and social subjects”, and “Time use”. The multipurpose survey, which has been carried out every year starting from 1993, covers a wide range of aspects: household relationships, living conditions, political and social participation, general trust, health conditions and lifestyle, leisure time, culture, readiness for IT and approach to old and new media, and opinions about public services. The design of the survey takes into account the demographic, social and territorial characteristics of the respondents, in order to depict the complexity of the Italian scenario. More than 19,000 households, with a total of 48,336 individuals were interviewed. Two-stage sampling has been employed, with Italian municipalities as primary sampling units and randomly extracted families as second stage units. See Righi and Scalise (2013) for a detailed description of the dataset.

numerous characteristics of individuals (recorded in interviews), which allows us to take into account different individual factors (such as education, income, job responsibilities). Table A4 describes the variables used: the proxies for generalistic and particularistic social behaviours are built along the lines described in Section 3.

To study the individual determinants of the various proxies for social behaviour, we adopt a SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) methodology (Zellner, 1962).⁷ This technique assumes the error terms to be correlated across equations, as might well be the case for proxies of underlying latent universalistic and particularistic dimensions. Moreover, SUR allows us to test the correlations of residuals and the equality of the coefficients across equations. The system is specified as follows:

$$(1) \quad \text{SUR:} \begin{cases} \text{generalism}_{trust} = \sum \alpha_{1i} X_i + \varepsilon_1 \\ \text{particularism}_{trust} = \sum \alpha_{2i} X_i + \varepsilon_2 \\ \text{generalism}_{politi} = \sum \alpha_{3i} X_i + \varepsilon_3 \\ \text{particularism}_{politi} = \sum \alpha_{4i} X_i + \varepsilon_4 \\ \text{generalism}_{associations} = \sum \alpha_{5i} X_i + \varepsilon_5 \\ \text{particularism}_{associations} = \sum \alpha_{6i} X_i + \varepsilon_6 \end{cases}$$

where X_i are the individual level covariates described in Table A5. They include basic demographic characteristics (such as sex, marital status, and household structure), educational attainments, professional characteristics and proxies for income.⁸ Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A6, while Table A7 details the regional representativeness of the survey.

Table 3 reports the correlation among residuals, and Breusch-Pagan tests of independence: the null hypothesis of joint independence between residuals is rejected. This confirms that SUR appears to be the appropriate estimator. It also has to be noted that the residuals from the regressions where universalistic proxies are taken to be the dependent variables tend to be positively correlated with each other (the same holds for particularistic ones) and negatively correlated with particularistic ones.

⁷ The SUR method estimates the parameters of all equations simultaneously, so that the parameters of each single equation also take into account the information provided by the other equations. This results in greater efficiency of the parameter estimates, because additional information is used to describe the system. These efficiency gains increase with increasing correlation among the error terms of the different equations (Judge et al. 1988), as well as with larger sample size and higher multi-collinearity between the regressors (Yahya, Adebayo, Jolayemi, Oyejola, and Sanni 2008).

⁸ The survey does not collect data on income. In the analysis, income is therefore proxied by the following variables: digital, house_maid e house_insu (see Table A5 for the definition of these variables).

Table 3: Correlations between residuals, and Breusch-Pagan tests of independence

	GenTrust	PartTrust	GenCivic	PartCivic	GenAss	PartAss
GenTrust	1.000					
PartTrust	-0.25	1.000				
GenCivic	0.10	-0.12	1.000			
PartCivic	-0.15	0.15	-0.35	1.000		
GenAss	0.10	-0.06	0.26	-0.22	1.000	
PartAss	-0.12	0.11	-0.06	0.04	-0.18	1.000

Breusch-Pagan test of independence: $\chi^2(6) = 5124,27$, Pr = 0.0000

Table 4 provides the main SUR estimation results. Crucially, the estimated coefficients for the individual covariates of particularistic behaviours are broadly the same; they are neatly different from those of generalistic ones. These findings have also been formally tested in that we checked whether the coefficients on the main covariates were equal for the three particularistic (generalistic) proxies. Bold coefficients in the table are those for which the test of equality passed with a confidence level of at least 90 percent.

The results for the bunch of variables capturing the strength of family ties suggest that women, married respondents and individuals with larger families tend to be more particularistic (less generalistic). This seems to confirm the prevalent view in sociology (Parsons and Shils, 1951), according to which particularism tends to prevail where the importance of personal relationships challenges the social codes of duty and morality. Our result also relates to the previous psychological and economic research that has shown that females trust less⁹ (see, for instance Simpson, 2007 and Glaeser et al., 2000).

⁹ The gender effect can be due to the different perception of risks, fairness and opportunities of the two sexes (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Simpson, 2003). Further, the fact that women tend to associate less seems to be mirrored by their lower level of generalized trust (Mighelli, 2007).

Table 4: Baseline SUR estimates

	ParTrust		PartCivic		PartAss		GenTrust		GenCivic		GenAss	
age	0.01	***	-0.04	***	0.00		0.00	***	0.02	***	0.01	***
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
agesq	0.00	***	0.00	***	0.00		-0.00	***	0.00	***	-0.00	***
	0.00						(0.00)					
sex	0.04	***	0.20	***	-0.01		-0.01	***	-0.16	***	-0.02	***
	0.01		0.01		0.01		0.00		0.01		0.00	
married	0.03	*	0.04**		0.05	***	-0.03	**	0.00	*	-0.01	**
	0.01		0.02		0.01		0.01		0.00		0.01	
separatedwid	0.03	*	0.05	***	0.05	***	-0.02	***	-0.04**		-0.02	***
	0.02		0.02				0.01		0.01		0.01	
ncomp	0.00		0.02	***	0.00		-0.00	*	0.00	*	0.00	*
	0.01		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	
years of schooling	-0.22	***	-0.20	***	-0.24	***	0.16	***	0.18	***	0.15	***
	0.05		0.04		0.05		0.02		0.01		0.02	
job responsibilities	-0.08	***	-0.10	***	-0.10	***	0.10	***	0.12	***	0.09	***
	0.01		0.02		0.01		0.01		0.02		0.01	
not_empl	0.01	*	0.09	**	0.21	***	-0.04	**	0.00		-0.02	***
	0.02		0.01		0.01		0.00		0.01		0.01	
urban	0.13	**	-0.01		0.05	***	0.00	*	0.04	***	-0.06	***
	0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01	
house_maid	-0.05	*	-0.05	*	-0.06	**	0.06	***	0.01	*	0.04	
	0.01		0.00		0.01		0.01		0.00		0.05	
house_insu	0.05	*	0.04		0.05		0.01	*	0.03		0.03	
	0.03		0.02		0.03		0.00		0.02		0.02	
Constant	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Observations	30,085		30,085		30,085		30,085		30,085		30,085	
R2	0.05		0.15		0.10		0.03		0.11		0.06	

* Significant at the 10% level; ** 5% Level; *** 1% level. Regressions weighted to population proportions.

Education appears to be an important factor for the intensity of non-generalistic attitudes: particularism decreases with years of schooling, while the opposite holds for universalism. Recent research (see for instance Heyneman, 1998) indicates that not only is social capital a critical input for education, but it is also one of its valuable by-products. For instance at school, students practice social skills, such as reciprocity and participation, outside the family setting, and learn how to participate responsibly within society. Wilson (1987, 1996) and Fernandez-Kelly (1995), studying the urban ghettos in Chicago and Baltimore, show that children's academic achievement is lower where their community do not value education and see it as irrelevant because the informal, closed network appears to be of more use in finding a job or improving one's standard of living. The coefficients on the variables capturing income status (job responsibilities, employment status, presence of a housemaid and house insurance) confirm that particularism decreases with income.

Interestingly, as discussed in the previous section, cross-country evidence points in the same direction. Finally, no clear patterns emerge with regard to the age and the urban residence of the respondents (this is in line with most of the previous literature, see for example de Blasio and Nuzzo, 2010).

The results of Table 4 have been extensively double-checked. To verify whether non-linearities might be responsible for the findings, we have inserted dummy variables for the different educational attainments and job responsibilities. The results are reported in Table A8: all the findings remain undisputed. Note that in this specification “being member of the professions” decreases particularism for all dimensions except for participation in associations: this particularistic form of social participation could depend on lobbying activities for rent protection led by some professional associations.¹⁰

An important issue concerns our measures for particularism. The use of the difference operator could result in some spurious correlations with the generalistic measures (note, however, that, as explained in Section 3, we have always used different survey questions to construct the two types of measures). Moreover, the difference operator nets out any scale effect in individual answers (while a scale effect might still be present in the proxies for generalistic behaviours). To check the role of our measures for particularism for the findings, we applied principal component analysis (PCA) to the three domains of social behaviours analysed (trust, civic awareness and participation in associations).¹¹ Tables A9-A11 show that two main components can be identified for each type of social behaviour (taken together they always explain more than 75 per cent of the total variance of the social behaviour under investigation). The first component is positively and highly correlated (0.75 or more) with our proxies for universalism (while almost uncorrelated with the other measures). The other component is positively and highly correlated with the intensity of social behaviours provided with respect to those with whom interactions are frequent (such as the trust placed in family members and neighbours), and highly and negatively correlated with the social behaviours provided with respect to unknown others (such as the trust placed in unknown people): as a consequence of this, the other component is highly correlated with our (difference-based) proxies for particularism (0.80 or more).¹² Then, we have used as dependent variables these

¹⁰ This phenomenon appears to be particularly relevant to the Italian case, as documented, for example, by de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010).

¹¹ For a discussion of the advantages of PCA over other methods of constructing indices and aggregating information (such as weighted averages or factor analysis) see Righi and Scalise (2013).

¹² One drawback of the use of PCA is represented by the impossibility of studying correlation among components within each dimension, which is zero by construction.

PCA proxies in a SUR exercise that replicates that of Table 4. The results of this experiment are provided in Table A12: our findings are confirmed.

Finally, we re-estimated our baseline SUR system introducing region fixed-effects (the results are provided in Table A13, where Piedmont represents the excluded region). This experiment studies the co-variation within-region between our measure of social behaviour and the individual observables. Again, the results confirm those previously obtained. From this exercise we collect the estimated regional fixed-effects and show (see Table A14) that, in line with the previous literature, Southern regions are characterized by the highest intensity of particularism (and the lowest of universalism) in all social capital dimensions, while the opposite prevails for the regions of the North-East. Finally, Table 5 shows that at territorial level as well (and after controlling the observable characteristics of the individuals in the area), generalistic dimensions tend to strongly and positively correlate with each other and negatively correlate with the particularistic ones (which in turn show high and positive correlations with each other).

Table 5: Correlations among regional coefficients (scores)

	GenTrust	PartTrust	GenCivic	PartCivic	GenAss	PartAss
GenTrust	1.00					
PartTrust	-0.58	1.00				
GenCivic	0.57	-0.60	1.00			
PartCivic	-0.83	0.83	-0.74	1.00		
GenAss	0.85	-0.75	0.71	-0.87	1.00	
PartAss	-0.92	0.55	-0.58	0.75	-0.84	1.00

Source: “Multi Purpose Survey on Italian Households: aspects of daily life”, Istat.

6. Conclusions

This paper contributes to the current discussion on the way to define and measure social behaviours. In the social sciences a general distinction between universalism and particularism has existed for a long time. Economists have, instead, concentrated on the different types of social capital (mainly civic vs. relational).

Our findings suggest that measures of particularism - derived for different social behaviours- are positively correlated with each other and negatively correlated with established proxies for

generalistic social behaviours. Particularistic measures share a similar set of covariates, which are neatly different from those referring to generalistic proxies. All in all, these results emphasize that the universalism/particularism dichotomy might be a latent factor that crosses different social capital dimensions. This dichotomy seems to be a promising taxonomy to better understand social behaviour. Investigating its exact role for socio-economic outcomes is left to future research.

References

- Albanese, G., De Blasio, G. and Sestito, P. (2013), "Trust and Preferences: Evidence from Italy's Survey Data", Bank of Italy, mimeo.
- Andreoni, J. and Vesterlund, L. (2001), "Which is the Fair Sex: Gender Differences in Altruism", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 116(1), 293-312.
- Alesina, A. and Giuliano, P. (2011), "Family Ties and Political Participation", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 9 (5), 817-839.
- Alesina, A. and Giuliano, P. (2010), "The Power of the Family", *Journal of Economic Growth*, Vol. 15 (2), 93-125.
- Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005), "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance", *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. XLIII, 762-800.
- Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2002), "Who Trust others?", *Journal of Public Economics*, 85, 207-234.
- Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2000), "Participation into Heterogeneous Communities", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115, 847-904.
- Banfield, E. C. (1958), *The Moral Basis of a Backward Societ*, The Free Press, Illinois.
- Baurmann, M. (1997), "Universalisierung und Partikularisierung der Moral. Ein individualistisches Erklärungsmodell", in: R. Hegselmann/H. Kliemt (eds.), *Moral und Interesse. Zur interdisziplinären Erneuerung der Moralwissenschaften*, München, 65-110.
- Baurmann, M. and Lahno, B. (2002). "Vertrauen, Kooperation und große Zahlen", in: R. Schmalz-Bruns/R. Zintl (eds.), *Politisches Vertrauen*, Baden Baden, 191-220.
- Baurmann, M. (2008), *Political Legitimization without Morality?*, Springer.
- Bourdieu, P. (1980), "Le capital social", *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 31: 2-3.
- Bourgeois, P. (1995), *In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Crosson, R. and Buchan, N. (1999), "Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games", *American Economic Review*, 82(9), 386-91.
- De Blasio, G. and Nuzzo, G. (2010). "The Individual Determinants of Social Behaviour" *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 2010, Vol.39.,n.4, 466-473.
- De Blasio and G., Sestito, P. (2011), *Il capitale sociale*, Donzelli. Roma.
- Fernandez-Kelly, M.P., (1995), "Social and Cultural Capital in the Urban Ghetto: Implications for Economic Sociology of Immigration", in *The Economic Sociology of Immigration*, Russel Sage Foundation, New York.
- Glaeser, E.L., Laibson, D., Scheinkman, J.A. and Soutter, C.L. (2000), "Measuring Trust", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115, 811-846.
- Glaeser, E., Laibson, D. and Sacerdote, B. (2002), "The economic Approach to Social Capital", *Economic Journal*, vol. 112(8), 437-58.
- Granovetter, M. (1985), "Economic Action and Social Structure: the Problem of Embeddedness", *American Journal of Sociology*, no.78, 36-74.
- Guiso, L. (2011), "Che Cosa è il Capitale Sociale" in De Blasio, G., Sestito, P., (2011), *Il capitale sociale*, Donzelli. Roma.

- Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2011), "Civic Capital as the Missing Link", *Social Economics Handbook*, M. O. Jackson, vol. 1A.
- Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2006), "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20, 23-48.
- Hall, R.E., Jones Ch. I. (1999), "Why Do Some Countries Produce so Much More Output per Worker than Others?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, CXIV, 83-116.
- Hampden-Turner, C. (1991), *Charting the Corporate Mind*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford .
- Hampden-Turner, C. and Trompenaars, A. (1993), *The Seven Cultures of Capitalism*, Anchor, Doubleday, New York.
- Heyneman, S.P., (1998) "Transition from the Party/State to Democracy: the Role of Education", *International Journal of Education Development*, 18(1), 21-40.
- Hollis, M. (1998), *Trust within Reason*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hume, D. (1740), *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Oxford University Press.
- Kant, I. (1788), *The Critique of Practical Reason*, Hackett Publishing Company
- Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997), "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, 1251-1288.
- Lumby, A. (2006), "Conceptualizing Diversity and Leadership: Evidence from Ten Cases", *Journal of Educational Management and Administration* 18 (1).
- Migheli, M. (2007), "Exogenous Individual Characteristics and Social Capital in Western Europe", University of Turin WP.
- Parsons, T. and Shils, E. (1951), *The Social System*, Free Press, New York.
- Portes, A. (1998), "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology" *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24,1-24.
- Putnam, R., Leonardi, R. and Nanetti, R. (1993), *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton U.P., Princeton, NJ.
- Putnam, R.D., (1995) "The Case of Missing Social Capital", *Harvard University Working Paper*.
- Righi A. and Scalise D. (2013), "Social Capital Factors and New Evidence on Social Capital Endowments in Italian Regions", Bank of Italy, mimeo.
- Ross, W. D. (1957), *Aristotelis Politica*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Sacco, P.L. and Vanin, P. (2000), "Network Interaction with Material and Relational Goods: An Exploratory Simulation", *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 71(2), 229-259.
- Saxenian, A. (1994), *Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128*, Harvard U. P., Cambridge.
- Sestito, P. (2011), "I Diversi Concetti di Capitale Sociale: Differenze e Similarità" in De Blasio, G., Sestito, P., (2011), *Il capitale sociale*, Donzelli. Roma.
- Simpson, J. (2003), "Sex, Fear and Greed: a Social Dilemma Analysis of Gender and Cooperation", *Social Forces*, 82(1), 35-52.
- Simpson, J. (2007), "The Psychological Foundations of Trust", *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 16(5), 264-268.
- Singer, P. (1981), *The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology*, New York.
- Smith, A. (1759), *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, A. Millar, London.

- Trompenaars, A. and Hampden-Turner, C. (1998), *Riding the Waves of Culture*, McGraw-Hill, New York.
- Wilson, W.J. (1996), *When Work Disappear: the World of New Urban Poor*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Wilson, W.J. (1987), *The Truly Disadvantaged: the Inner City, the Under Class and Public Policy*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

7. Statistical Appendix

Table A1: Description of variables of generalism and particularism from the World Value Survey (WVS)

Area	Variable	Definition	
General trust	GenTrust	Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted?"	1=yes 0=no
Particularistic trust	PartTrust	Trust in family (answers are recorded on a scale from 1 to 4, increasing in the level of trust) - trust in people met for the first time (answers are recorded on a scale from 1 to 4, increasing in the level of trust)	From -3 to 3
General civic awareness	GenCivic	Do you get information about politics at least once a week? Sources used to get information about politics: a) daily newspapers b) news broadcast on radio/TV c) internet d) talk with family, friends or colleagues	1=yes 0=no 1=yes 0=no
Particularistic civic awareness	PartCivic	d) – a) –b) – c) Participation in associations: a) professional b) labour union c) private sports/recreational club d) humanitarian e) environmental f) consumer	From -3 to 3 2=active member 1=inactive member 0=do not support
Particularistic social participation	PartAss	a) + b) + c) –d) –e)- f)	From -6 to 6

Source: WVS

Table A2: Correlations between our measures of social behaviour and other socio-economic performances

	GenTrust		PartTrust		GenCivic		PartCivic		PartAss	
GDP p.c.	0.64	***	-0.45	***	0.70	***	-0.65	***	-0.66	***
Political Participation	0.70	***	-0.60	***	0.80	***	-0.68	***	-0.56	***
Interest in Politics	0.56	***	-0.38	***	0.80	***	-0.70	***	-0.48	***
Trust in Institutions	0.60	***	-0.44	***	0.75	***	-0.64	***	-0.39	***

Source: WVS, ***significant at 99 per cent level of confidence, ** significant at 95 per cent level of confidence

Table A3: The most generalistic and the most particularistic countries in the WVS sample

GenTrust	PartTrust	GenCivic	PartCivic	PartAss
Norway	Turkey	Finland	Peru	Mexico
Sweden	Trinidad and Tobago	Sweden	Burkina Faso	Mali
Finland	Rwanda	New Zealand	Turkey	Guatemala
USA	Peru	USA	Colombia	Ghana
Germany	Ghana	Switzerland	Egypt	Morocco
New Zealand	Malaysia	Germany	Brazil	Colombia
Switzerland	China	UK	Iran	Zambia
Australia	Brazil	Canada	Malaysia	China
Netherlands	Colombia	France	South Korea	South Korea
Canada	Mali	Japan	Cyprus	Peru

Source: WVS

Table A4: Dependent variables used in the regressions

Dependent variable	Definition
GenTrust	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent answers that generally speaking most people can be trusted
TrustNeighb	If you lost your wallet, do you think it is probable that a neighbour would give it back to you? 1 not probable; 4 highly probable
TrustUnkn	If you lost your wallet, do you think it is probable that a stranger would give it back to you? 1 not probable; 4 highly probable
PartTrust	Trustneighb- trustunkn
GenCivic	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent answers that she gets information about politics at least once a week
pparen	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent get information about politics from family members
pamici	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent get information about politics from friends
pradio	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent get information about politics from radio
ptelev	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent get information about politics from TV
pquot	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent get information about politics from newspapers
PartCivic	Pamici-pparen-pradio-ptelev-pquot
GenAss	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has given money to an association
Paspro	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has joined a meeting of a professional association
psind	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has joined a meeting of a union policy
paeco	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has joined a meeting of an ecological association
pcult	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has joined a meeting of a cultural association
pgrvo	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has joined a meeting of a an association of voluntary work
PartAss	Paspro+psind-paeco-pcult-pgrvo

Source: "Multi Purpose Survey on Italian Households: aspects of daily life".

Table A5: Covariates used in the regressions

Covariates	Definition
age	age
agesq	Age squared
sex	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is a female
married	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is married
ncomp	Number of components of the household
separatedwid	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is separated or widowed
noformaledu	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has not received any formal education
primary	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has primary school as the highest level of education
secondary	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has middle school as the highest level of education
highschool	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has high school as the highest level of education
bachelor	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has a bachelor's degree as the highest level of education
postgr	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has a postgraduate degree
manual	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is a manual worker
office_work	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is an office worker
jun_manager	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is a junior manager
manager	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is a manager
selfempl	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is a sole proprietor, entrepreneur
professionals	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is a member of the professions
urban	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent resides in a municipality with 50,000 inhabitants or more
not_empl	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is not employed
digital	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent owns a receiver dish or device
house_maid	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent employs a housemaid
house_insu	Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has house insurance
years of schooling	Years of schooling
job responsibilities	Variables that takes value of 0 if the respondent is a manual worker, 1 if he/she is an officeworker, 2 if he/she is junmanager, 3 if he/she is a manager

Source: "Multi Purpose Survey on Italian Households: aspects of daily life", Istat.

Table A6: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min.	Max.
GenTrust	41,117	0.22	0.41	0	1
TrustNeighb	41,000	2.04	0.96	1	4
TrustUnkn	40,922	1.34	0.72	1	4
PartTrust	40,869	1.32	1.01	-3	3
GenCivic	41,279	0.38	0.48	0	1
pparen	48,336	0.12	0.32	0	1
pamici	48,336	0.17	0.37	0	1
pradio	48,336	0.20	0.40	0	1
ptelev	48,336	0.59	0.48	0	1
pquot	48,336	0.52	0.49	0	1
PartCivic	48,336	-0.60	0.72	-3	2
GenAss	40,927	0.19	0.39	0	1
paspro	40,770	0.06	0.23	0	1
psind	40,890	0.07	0.26	0	1
paeco	40,796	0.01	0.13	0	1
pcult	40,872	0.10	0.30	0	1
pgrvo	40,874	0.08	0.27	0	1
partass	40,560	-0.07	0.50	-3	2
age	48,336	43.3	22.9	0	104
sex	48,336	0.51	0.49	0	1
married	48,336	0.54	0.49	0	1
ncomp	48,336	3.1	1.2	1	9
separatedwid	48,336	0.16	0.32	0	1
noformaledu	45,727	0.08	0.28	0	1
primary	45,727	0.19	0.39	0	1
secondary	45,727	0.30	0.45	0	1
highschool	45,727	0.32	0.46	0	1
bachelor	45,727	0.09	0.29	0	1
postgr	45,727	0.00	0.08	0	1
manual	31,836	0.37	0.48	0	1
office_work	31,836	0.29	0.45	0	1
jun_manager	31,836	0.04	0.20	0	1
manager	31,836	0.02	0.15	0	1
self_empl	31,836	0.02	0.15	0	1
professional	31,836	0.03	0.18	0	1
urban	31,836	0.27	0.44	0	1
house_maid	48,021	0.09	0.14	0	1
house_insu	48,021	0.75	0.35	0	1

Table A7: Regional representativeness

Region	Observations
Piemonte	3,143
Valle d'Aosta	1,076
Lombardia	4,088
Trento	1,426
Bolzano	1,328
Veneto	2,797
Friuli V.G.	1,735
Liguria	1,896
Emilia Romagna	2,496
Toscana	2,543
Umbria	1,479
Marche	2,067
Lazio	2,754
Abruzzo	1,928
Molise	1,442
Campania	3,976
Puglia	2,875
Basilicata	1,486
Calabria	2,483
Sicilia	3,314
Sardegna	2,004
Total	48,336

Table A8: Robustness checks checking for non linearities

	PartTrust		PartCivic		PartAss		GenTrust		GenCivic		GenAss	
age	0.01 (0.00)	***	-0.04 (0.00)	***	0.00 (0.01)		0.00 (0.00)	***	0.02 (0.00)	***	0.01 (0.00)	***
agesq	0.00 0.00	***	0.00	***	0.00		-0.00 (0.00)	***	0.00	***	-0.00	***
sex	0.04 0.01	***	0.20 0.01	***	-0.01 0.01		-0.01 0.00	***	-0.16 0.01	***	-0.02 0.00	***
married	0.01 0.02	*	0.04** 0.02		0.06*** 0.01		-0.03 0.00	***	0.00 0.00	*	-0.01 0.01	**
separatedwid	0.03 0.02	*	0.07 0.02	***	0.05***		-0.02 0.01	***	-0.04** 0.01		-0.02 0.01	***
ncomp	0.00 0.01		0.02 0.00	***	0.00 0.00		-0.00 0.00	*	0.00 0.00	*	0.00 0.00	*
primary	-0.13 0.03	**	-0.47 0.03	***	-0.05 0.02	***	0.02 0.01		0.11 0.02	***	0.05 0.01	***
secondary	-0.19 0.04	***	-0.73 0.03	***	-0.12 0.02	***	0.04 0.02	***	0.20 0.02	***	0.09 0.01	***
highschool	-0.13 0.04	*	-0.90 0.03	***	-0.16 0.02	***	0.09 0.02	***	0.29 0.02	***	0.15 0.01	***
bachelor	-0.21 0.04	***	-1.00 0.04	***	-0.18 0.02	***	0.16 0.01	***	0.39 0.02	***	0.21 0.02	***
postgr	-0.24 0.07	***	-1.92 0.06	***	-0.25 0.04	***	0.22 0.03	***	0.37 0.03	***	0.34 0.03	***
manual	0.03 0.02	**	0.12 0.01	***	0.06 0.01	***	-0.03 0.00	***	-0.06 0.01	***	-0.04 0.01	***
office_work	-0.02 0.02	**	-0.11 0.02	***	0.01 0.01		0.02 0.00	***	0.06 0.01	***	0.04 0.01	***
jun_manager	-0.07 0.03	**	-0.20 0.03	***	-0.03 0.02	*	0.07 0.01	***	0.12 0.02	***	0.11 0.01	***
manager	-0.16 0.04	***	-0.24 0.04	***	-0.07 0.02	***	0.10 0.02	***	0.13 0.02	***	0.12 0.02	***
selemp1	0.04 0.04		-0.11 0.03	***	0.07 0.02	***	0.00 0.01		0.09 0.02	***	0.07 0.02	***
professional	-0.03 0.03		-0.18 0.03	***	0.09 0.02	***	0.02 0.01		0.07 0.02	***	0.06 0.01	***
not_empl	0.01 0.02		0.09 0.01	***	0.21 0.01	***	-0.04 0.00	***	0.00 0.01		-0.02 0.01	***
urban	0.13 0.01	***	-0.01 0.01		0.05 0.01	***	0.00 0.01		0.04 0.01	***	-0.06 0.01	***
house_maid	-0.04 0.01	*	-0.05 0.00	*	-0.06 0.01	*	0.05 0.01	***	0.02 0.00	***	0.04 0.05	
house_insu	0.05 0.03	*	0.04 0.02		0.05 0.03		0.01 0.00	*	0.03 0.02		0.03 0.02	
Constant	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Observations	30,085		30,085		30,085		30,085		30,085		30,085	
R2	0.05		0.15		0.10		0.03		0.11		0.06	

* Significant at the 10% level; ** 5% Level; *** 1% level. Regressions weighted to population proportions.

Table A9: PCA on variables of trust

Variable	1st component	2nd component
GenTrust	0.80	0.10
TrustNeighb	0.02	0.85
TrustUnkn	-0.05	-0.65
Var explained	0.68	0.24
Eigenvalue 1st comp.	2.01	
Eigenvalue 2nd comp.	1.29	
Eigenvalue 3d comp.	0.60	
Correlation with generalism (GenTrust)	0.75	
Correlation with particularism (PartTrust)		0.85

Table A10: PCA on variables of civic awareness

Variable	1st component	2nd component
GenCivic	0.88	0.14
pparen	-0.06	0.65
pamici	0.05	0.78
pradio	0.10	-0.56
ptelev	-0.20	-0.69
pquot	-0.13	-0.60
Var explained	0.62	0.25
Eigenvalue 1st comp.	2.05	
Eigenvalue 2nd comp.	1.56	
Eigenvalue 3d comp.	0.40	
Correlation with generalism (GenCivic)	0.82	
Correlation with particularism (PartCivic)		0.80

Table A11: PCA on variables of participation into associations

Variable	1st component	2nd component
GenAss	0.80	0.10
paspro	0.20	0.67
psind	0.14	0.80
Paeco	-0.08	-0.65
pcult	0.30	-0.70
pgrvo	0.31	-0.55
Var explained	0.58	0.20
Eigenvalue 1st comp.	1.81	
Eigenvalue 2nd comp.	1.25	
Eigenvalue 3d comp.	0.80	
Correlation with generalism (Gen Ass)	0.76	
Correlation with particularism (PartAss)		0.82

Table A12: SUR estimates with principal components as dependent variables

	1st component (Gentrust)		2nd component (Partrust)		1st component (GenCivic)		2nd component (PartCivic)		1st component (GenAss)		2nd component (PartAss)	
age	0.05	**	0.02	***	0.03	***	-0.04	***	0.01	***	0.00	
	(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.01)	
agesq	-0.00	***	0.00	***	0.00	***	0.00	***	-0.00	***	0.00	
	(0.00)		0.00									
sex	-0.05	***	0.04	***	-0.20	***	0.20	***	-0.06	***	-0.03	
	0.00		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.00		0.01	
married	-0.03	***	0.01	*	0.00	*	0.04**		-0.01	**	0.06***	
	0.00		0.02		0.00		0.02		0.01		0.01	
separatedwid	-0.02	***	0.03	*	-0.04**		0.07	***	-0.02	***	0.05***	
	0.01		0.02		0.01		0.02		0.01			
ncomp	-0.04	***	0.06	***	0.00	*	0.05	***	0.00	*	0.03	**
	0.00		0.01		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.01	
years of schooling	0.26	***	-0.34	***	0.19	***	-0.10	***	0.35	***	-0.20	***
	0.01		0.05		0.01		0.02		0.01		0.05	
job responsibilities	0.14	***	-0.18	***	0.24	***	-0.19	***	0.19	***	-0.15	***
	0.03		0.03		0.02		0.02		0.01		0.01	
not_empl	-0.04	***	0.01		0.00		0.09	***	-0.02	***	0.21	***
	0.00		0.02		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01	
urban	0.00		0.13	***	0.04	***	-0.01		-0.06	***	0.05	***
	0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01	
house_maid	0.15	***	-0.16	*	0.22	***	-0.13	*	0.04		-0.06	*
	0.01		0.01		0.00		0.00		0.05		0.01	
house_insu	0.01		0.04		0.03		0.04		0.03		0.05	
	0.05		0.03		0.02		0.02		0.02		0.03	
Observations	30,085		30,085		30,085		30,085		30,085		30,085	
R2	0.07		0.08		0.14		0.17		0.10		0.14	

* Significant at the 10% level; ** 5% Level; *** 1% level. Regressions weighted to population proportions.

Table A13: SUR estimates with regional fixed effects

	PartTrust		PartCivic		PartAss		GenTrust		GenCivic		GenAss	
age	0.01	***	-0.04	***	0.00		0.01	***	0.02	***	0.01	***
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
agesq	0.00	***	0.00	***	0.00		-0.00	***	0.00	***	-0.00	***
	0.00						(0.00)					
sex	0.03	*	0.31	***	-0.01		-0.02	***	-0.16	***	0.01	
	0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.00	
married	0.02		0.01	*	0.05	***	-0.02	***	0.00		-0.00	
	0.02		0.02		0.01		0.01		0.00		0.01	
separatedwid	0.03		0.05	***	0.04	***	-0.01	*	-0.04	***	-0.02	*
	0.02		0.02		0.00		0.01		0.01		0.01	
ncomp	-0.01		0.01	*	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	
	0.01		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	
years of schooling	-0.10	**	-0.05	**	-0.14	***	0.05	**	0.09	**	0.10	***
	0.01		0.00		0.02		0.01		0.01		0.01	
job responsibilities	-0.06	***	-0.10	**	-0.05	***	0.08	***	0.10	***	0.05	***
	0.03		0.03		0.00		0.01		0.02		0.00	
not_empl	0.01		0.07	***	0.22	***	-0.04	***	0.00		-0.01	*
	0.02		0.01		0.01		0.00		0.01		0.01	
urban	0.12	***	-0.04	***	0.04	***	0.01	*	0.04	***	-0.05	***
	0.01		0.01		0.01		0.00		0.01		0.01	
house_maid	-0.04	*	-0.04	***	-0.06		0.05		0.02	***	0.04	
	0.01		0.00		0.01		0.03		0.00		0.05	
house_insu	0.05		-0.03	*	0.05		0.01	*	0.03		0.03	
	0.03		0.01		0.03		0.00		0.02		0.02	
Observations	30,085		30,085		30,085		30,085		30,085		30,085	
R2	0.08		0.18		0.11		0.05		0.12		0.09	

* Significant at the 10% level; ** 5% Level; *** 1% level. Regressions weighted to population proportions. Regional fixed effects included. Excluded region: Piedmont.

Table A14: Regional dummies coefficients (scores)

	GenTrust	PartTrust	GenCivic	PartCivic	GenAss	PartAss
Valle d' Aosta	0.03	-0.06	-0.06	-0.13	0.02	0.02
Lombardia	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.02	0.05	-0.01
Trento	0.14	-0.11	0.01	-0.34	0.16	-0.19
Bolzano	0.15	0.00	0.04	-0.09	0.16	-0.16
Veneto	-0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.05	0.04	-0.01
Friuli	0.02	-0.00	0.04	-0.11	0.06	-0.03
Liguria	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.01
Emilia Romagna	-0.02	-0.04	0.03	-0.00	0.06	0.03
Toscana	-0.00	-0.07	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.01
Umbria	-0.01	0.10	-0.04	0.16	0.01	0.00
Marche	-0.02	0.09	-0.03	0.12	0.00	0.02
Lazio	-0.03	0.05	-0.04	0.13	-0.03	0.03
Abruzzo	-0.03	0.04	-0.05	0.18	-0.02	0.08
Molise	-0.05	0.08	-0.03	0.27	-0.02	0.01
Campania	-0.08	0.21	-0.02	0.33	-0.10	0.09
Puglia	-0.04	0.23	-0.08	0.27	-0.06	0.08
Basilicata	-0.05	0.15	-0.09	0.30	-0.00	0.05
Calabria	-0.08	0.05	-0.08	0.32	-0.05	0.05
Sicilia	-0.08	0.09	-0.09	0.36	-0.11	0.10
Sardegna	-0.02	-0.10	0.04	-0.11	0.06	0.04
North-West	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.00
North-East	0.05	-0.03	0.03	-0.12	0.10	-0.07
Centre	-0.02	0.04	-0.02	0.10	0.02	0.02
South and Islands	-0.05	0.09	-0.05	0.24	-0.04	0.06

Estimated regional fixed effects from regressions in Table A13