

The EU Miracle: When 75 Million Reach High Income

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
Banca D'Italia

06/03/2025

Introduction

- The European Union was founded in 1957 in order to brought peace and prosperity to a continent that experienced war for at least 11 centuries.
- In 2024, it represents a population of 450 million people and 1/6 of world GDP.
- In 2004, 75 Millions people over 10 countries have joined the EU.
- The GDP per capita of these countries was 18,314 USD in 2004 and 34,753 USD in 2019.


The EU in 1995 and the New Member States




EU2004 (yellow): Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta.

EU15 (blue): France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Ireland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece

GDP per Capita of New Member States



GDP per Capita relative to EU15



What is the effect of joining the EU?

- **Question:** What is the (causal?) effect of joining the EU on GDP per capita?
- **Challenge:** No control group available.
- **Synthetic Control Method:** construct a control group as a weighted average of donor countries.
- **Mechanism?** Is there convergence? Role of labor, capital, trade, FDI, regulation, misallocation, technology?

This paper

- Use Synthetic Control Method (SCM) to evaluate the role of EU on the EU2004's GDP per capita.
- Use SCM to evaluate the role of EU enlargement in the EU15's GDP per capita.
- Counterfactual Growth Accounting.
- Explore the mechanism: consumption, investment, govt spending, regulation, employment, capital, trade, FDI, regulations, misallocation and TFP.
- Run SCM on simulated data from a Neo-Classical Growth Model with distortion

Preview of the Results

- The EU2004's GDP per capita is 8,400 USD higher in 2019 thanks to joining the EU ($\approx 33\%$ higher).
- No robust evidence of an effect on EU15's GDP per capita.
- The contribution to growth of TFP would have been 3 time smaller.
- Evidence of convergence in $\frac{C}{Y}$, $\frac{I}{Y}$, $\frac{G}{Y}$, $\frac{N}{L}$, $\frac{Ex}{Y}$, $\frac{Imp}{Y}$, $\frac{FDI}{Y}$, and regulation while TFP keep growing.
- Misallocation seems to have declined after 2004.
- SCM captures change in distortion in a Neo-Classical Growth Model

Why do we care?

- **Role of institution for growth:** Is the EU a perfect laboratory?
- **Middle-income to high-income:** does the EU has a recipe? A Challenge soon face by China and India.
- **Washington consensus:** The EU reforms still great for growth!

Litterature Review

- **Institutions and Growth:** Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005) Rodrik, Subramanian, Trebbi (2004), etc...
- **European Union** Alesina, Tabellini, Trebbi (2017), Head and Mayer (2021), Artis, Banerjee and Marcelino (2006), many work on the monetary union.
- **Brexit:** Sampson (2017), Broadbent, Di Pace, Drechsel, Harrison, Tenreyro (2024), Alabrese, Edenhofer, Fetzer, Wang (2024)
- **Washington Consensus vs Industrial Policy:** Rodrik (2008) , Liu (2019), Juhász, Lane, Rodrik (2023)
- **Synthetic Control:** Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie, Diamond, Hainmueller (2010), Abadie (2021), Funke, Schularick and Trebesch (2023).
- **Macro Development:** Cheremukhin, Golosov, Guriev, and Tsyvinski (2017), Dauth, Findeisen, Lee, Porzio (2021), Fernández-Villaverde, Ohanian, Yao (2023)

The Adhesion Process and Accession Criteria

- **Maastricht Treaty, 1 November 1993:** Possibility of Enlargement to Former Communist Countries, Cyprus and Malta.
- **Copenhagen Criteria, 1993-1995:**
 - ① Stability of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities
 - ② Functioning market economy
 - ③ Effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law
- **Agenda 2000, March 1999:** New Financial Framework for the period 2000-2006
- **Adhesion, 1 May 2004:** Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta formally joined the EU.

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Data

- **Cross-country data:** Penn World Table 10.0 for all aggregate GDP, Population, Consumption, Investment, etc..
- **FDI:** UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
- **Regulation:** Product Market regulation (PMR) from OECD measure the regulatory barriers to firm entry and competition.
- **Misallocation:** CompNet which gives moments of firm-level distribution for some countries.

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Synthetic Control Method

- Let us call Y_{1t} for all t , the variables of interest (ex: GDP per capita) of the treated unit (EU2004 or EU-15).
- Let us call Y_{ct} for $c \geq 2$ for all t , the variables of interest of the untreated donor pool.
- Y_{ct} can take two value $Y_{ct}(0)$ if untreated and $Y_{ct}(1)$ if treated.
- I observe these for $T_0 + T_1$ years. Country $c = 1$ is treated from $T_0 + 1$, the other country are never treated.
- $Y_{1t}(0)$ is the counterfactual untreated values of the variables of interest.
- With some weights w_c , we can construct the synthetic control estimator of the untreated unit for all periods:

$$\forall t, \quad \hat{Y}_{1t}(0) \equiv \sum_{i=2}^{N+1} w_c Y_{ct}(0).$$

Synthetic Control Method

- Y a vector of covariates for the treated country (ex: GDP per capita in the pre-treatment period).
- X the matrix of covariates for the countries in the donor pool.
- The synthetic control method is choosing a vector of weights W which minimizes

$$(Y - X'W)'V(Y - X'W)$$

subject to $w_c \geq 0$ and $\sum_{c=2}^{N+1} w_c = 1$.

Where the positive semi-definitive symmetric matrix V are chosen in a data-driven way.

- Abadie, Diamond and Hainmuelle (2010) shows that this estimator is unbiased when $Y_{1t}(0)$ is a VAR, and, provide a bias bound for a linear factor model.


Baseline Specification

- Match on GDP per capita from 1991 to 2003.
- Donor pool: OECD countries that never joined the EU

Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Turkey, and, United States

- Explore alternative specification (with investment rate, trade share, GDP growth, etc..)
- Standard-Errors (Cattaneo et al. 2021, 2022) constructed from in-sample and out-of-sample uncertainty. (MonteCarlo - 200 reps)

Results: EU2004 [More](#)



Results: EU2004


Synthetic control results:

Covariate	V	Treated	Synthetic Control	Bias	Average Donor	Bias
GDP per Capita in..						
1991	0.0612	11533.0596	11082.0146	-3.91%	23190.9247	101.08%
1992	0.0596	11388.6465	11716.4494	2.88%	23535.6076	106.66%
1993	0.0596	11764.3584	12341.1939	4.90%	24119.9876	105.03%
1994	0.0620	12359.5957	12891.0506	4.30%	24790.4758	100.58%
1995	0.0630	13118.0664	13490.8219	2.84%	25587.6576	95.06%
1996	0.0667	13707.8486	13843.0256	0.99%	26439.0512	92.88%
1997	0.0734	14164.7422	14343.6993	1.26%	27442.9589	93.74%
1998	0.0798	14558.5430	14457.0190	-0.70%	27862.2649	91.38%
1999	0.0884	14995.0449	15012.2190	0.11%	28796.9457	92.04%
2000	0.0966	15541.6777	15803.9351	1.69%	29908.6620	92.44%
2001	0.0972	16264.1855	16081.9852	-1.12%	30101.6537	85.08%
2002	0.0957	16849.3047	16321.7311	-3.13%	30181.2751	79.12%
2003	0.0967	17419.2266	16698.5434	-4.14%	30449.7200	74.81%

The synthetic EU2004 composition:

Country	Weights
Costa Rica	0.772
Republic of Korea	0.126
Norway	0.102

Results: EU15 [More](#)



Results: EU15

Synthetic control results:

Covariate	V	Treated	Synthetic Control	Bias	Average Donor	Bias
GDP per Capita in..						
1991	0.0611	26282.3945	26282.4317	0.00%	23190.9247	-11.76%
1992	0.0591	26759.1191	26440.9700	-1.19%	23535.6076	-12.05%
1993	0.0589	26707.2695	26852.8946	0.55%	24119.9876	-9.69%
1994	0.0613	27439.8594	27565.7262	0.46%	24790.4758	-9.66%
1995	0.0624	28554.9199	28353.2997	-0.71%	25587.6576	-10.39%
1996	0.0660	29064.7246	29218.9952	0.53%	26439.0512	-9.03%
1997	0.0729	30660.3262	30906.4337	0.80%	27442.9589	-10.49%
1998	0.0799	32254.3242	32263.6002	0.03%	27862.2649	-13.62%
1999	0.0886	33572.7422	33681.2250	0.32%	28796.9457	-14.23%
2000	0.0969	34788.8750	34759.5526	-0.08%	29908.6620	-14.03%
2001	0.0980	35331.0000	35357.4331	0.07%	30101.6537	-14.80%
2002	0.0968	35494.7734	35299.8881	-0.55%	30181.2751	-14.97%
2003	0.0981	35473.7422	35404.1858	-0.20%	30449.7200	-14.16%

The synthetic EU15 composition

Country	Weights
Australia	0.290
Iceland	0.247
Israel	0.215
Costa Rica	0.146
Norway	0.072
Canada	0.030

EU Effect in 2019


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Robustness

- **Leave-One-Out:** Remove iteratively countries with non-negative weights from the donor pool. [More](#)
- **In-Country Placebo:** Compare treatment effect for untreated countries and treated country. [More](#)
- **In-Time Placebo:** Change the treatment date. [More](#)
- **Alternative Donor Pool:** Geographical Europe, Above Median GDP per capita, ex-communist countries/non-EU G20 [More](#)

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Growth Accounting

Following, Solow (1957) and Baqaee and Farhi (2018):

$$g_Y = g_R + \frac{\overline{rK}}{\overline{Y}_{04-19}} g_K + \frac{\overline{wl}}{\overline{Y}_{04-19}} g_L$$

Using a synthetic control for each variables, we get

	g_Y GDP	g_R Residual	$\frac{\overline{rK}}{\overline{Y}_{04-19}} g_K$ Capital	$\frac{\overline{wl}}{\overline{Y}_{04-19}} g_L$ Labor
EU2004	3.98	2.53	1.62	0.49
Synthetic EU2004	2.04	0.88	1.05	0.30

Note: The variables used in PWT 10.0 are $K = \text{cn}$, $L = \text{emp}$, $rK = \text{irr} * \text{cn}$ and $\frac{wl}{Y} = \text{labsh}$.

Growth Accounting


The EU2004 versus the Synthetic Control:

- Almost 2pp GDP growth difference.
- Growth of the Residual almost 3 times larger.
- Around 60% larger contribution of capital and labor.


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Demand Component




Employment Rate




FDI Share

UNCTAD




Total Factor Productivity



Regulation: Product Market Regulation

OECD



Misallocation Measurement

CompNet

For each 2-digits industry, CompNet gives firm-level distribution on MRPK, TFPR, Solow Residual, Labor Productivity.

- In each industry*country, normalized standard-deviation by the mean.
- Aggregate at the country-level by weighted average of sector-level variance.
- For EU-2004, weighted average of country-level variance.
- Measure of standard-deviation of MRPK/TFPR/... relative to its industry average.

Misallocation

CompNet




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Neo-Classical Growth Model

- **Households:** consume and save.

$$\max_{\{C_t, K_{t+1}\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

$$\text{subject to: } C_t + K_{t+1} = w_t N_t + r_t K_t + (1 - \delta) K_t + T_t$$

- **Firms:** hire labor and rent capital **subject to frictions τ_y and τ_k**

$$\max_{\{K_t, N_t\}} (1 - \tau_y) K_t^\alpha (A_t N_t)^{1-\alpha} - w_t N_t - (1 + \tau_k) r_t K_t$$

- **Market clears and capital depreciate:**

$$K_{t+1} = I_t + (1 - \delta) K_t$$

$$A_t K_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha} = C_t + I_t$$

- **TFP** grows from A_0 : $A_{t+1} = (1 + g) A_t$

First-Order-Conditions

- **Households:** Euler equation

$$\beta \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\gamma} (1 + r_{t+1} - \delta) = 1$$

- **Firms:** marginal revenue product = rates

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha(1 - \tau_y) A_t^{1-\alpha} K_t^{\alpha-1} N_t^{1-\alpha} &= r_t(1 + \tau_k) \\ (1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau_y) A_t^{1-\alpha} K_t^{\alpha} N_t^{-\alpha} &= w_t \end{aligned}$$

- **LoM of capital:**

$$K_{t+1} = K_t^{\alpha} (A_t N_t)^{1-\alpha} - C_t + (1 - \delta) K_t$$

- **TFP** grows from A_0 : $A_{t+1} = (1 + g) A_t$

Stationary Equilibrium

with $N_t = 1$ and $\tilde{X}_t = X_t/A_t$

- **Households:** Euler equation

$$\beta \left(\frac{\tilde{C}_{t+1}}{\tilde{C}_t} \right)^{-\gamma} (1 + r_{t+1} - \delta)(1 + g)^{-\gamma} = 1$$

- **Firms:**

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha(1 - \tau_y)\tilde{K}_t^{\alpha-1} &= r_t(1 + \tau_k) \\ (1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau_y)\tilde{K}_t^\alpha &= \tilde{w}_t \end{aligned}$$

- **LoM of capital:**

$$\tilde{K}_{t+1}(1 + g) = \tilde{K}_t^\alpha - \tilde{C}_t + (1 - \delta)\tilde{K}_t$$

- **TFP** grows from A_0 : $A_{t+1} = (1 + g)A_t$

Balance Growth Path

with $\forall t, \tilde{X}_t = \tilde{X}$

- **Households:** rental rate

$$r = \frac{(1+g)^\gamma}{\beta} + \delta - 1$$

- **Firms:** capital and wage rate


$$\tilde{K} = \left(\frac{r(1+\tau_k)}{\alpha(1-\tau_y)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}}$$
$$\tilde{w} = (1-\alpha)(1-\tau_y)\tilde{K}^\alpha$$

- **LoM of capital:** consumption

$$\tilde{C} = \tilde{K}^\alpha - (g + \delta)\tilde{K}$$

- **TFP** grows from A_0 : $A_{t+1} = (1+g)A_t$


Balance Growth Path and Distortion τ_k



Calibration: $\delta, g, \beta, \alpha = 0.2, 0.03, 0.96, 0.4$

Transition After Unexpected Reform


Start at BGP with $\tau_k = 0.5$ then $\tau_k = 0$ at time 13



Calibration: $\delta, g, \beta, \alpha = 0.2, 0.03, 0.96, 0.4$

Transition After Expected Reform

Start at BGP with $\tau_k = 0.5$, announcement at $t = 9$ of change to $\tau_k = 0$ at time $t = 13$




Calibration: $\delta, g, \beta, \alpha = 0.2, 0.03, 0.96, 0.4$

Synthetic Control on Simulated Data

- Simulate output for 1 treated country and 15 untreated countries as in the baseline specs.
- **Treated country:** starts at BGP with $\tau_k = 0.5$ until T_0 and transit to a new BGP with $\tau_k = 0$.
- **Untreated countries:** along their BGP with g and A_0 random.
- Run the synthetic control on the simulated data.


Synthetic Control on Simulated Data

Unexpected treatment



Synthetic Control on Simulated Data

Expected treatment: announcement 4-periods ahead



Conclusion

- Large gain of joining the EU: 32% higher GDP/capita in 2019.
- About half of the 2004-2019 increase.
- Large positive effect of new membership to the EU without cost to previous members.
- Main aggregate have converge, while TFP is still catching up.
- Mechanism? Evidence of better allocation of factors.
- In 2024, nine countries are currently candidates to join the EU including Ukraine.

Appendix

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
7 Robustness

- Leave-One-Out
- In-Country Placebo
- In-Time Placebo
- Alternative Donor Pool


8 Individual Countries

- Remove iteratively countries with non-negative weights from the donor pool.
- Re-compute weights estimation without the country.
- Plot the resulting synthetic control estimator.

Leave-One-Out: EU2004


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Leave-One-Out: EU15 [Back](#)




- Counterfactually assign the treatment to countries in the donor pool.
- Plot the resulting treatment effect $Y_{t1}(1) - \hat{Y}_{t1}(0)$.
- Evaluate the treatment vis-à-vis the distribution of placebo treatment.

In-Country Placebo: [Back](#)




- Assign a counterfactual treatment date: 2000 instead of 2004.
- Assess if the results holds with this new dates.


In-Time Placebo: EU2004

[Back](#)


In-Time Placebo: EU15 [Back](#)



- Choose an alternative donor countries pool.
- Baseline: OECD countries that never joined the EU
- Alternatives:
 - ① Geographical Europe that never joined the EU (robust to Norway),
 - ② Above median GDP per capita over the period 1991-2019,
 - ③ Ex-Communist countries/non-EU G20 countries




Alternative Donor Pool: EU15 [Back](#)




Alternative Donor Pool: EU2004 [Back](#)

Geographical Europe that never joined the EU [w/t Norway](#)




Alternative Donor Pool: EU15 [Back](#)

Geographical Europe that never joined the EU [w/t Norway](#)




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Above median GDP per capita



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
Above median GDP per capita



Alternative Donor Pool: EU2004


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Ex-Communist Countries




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Non-EU G20 countries




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Brexit Effect













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
- Leave-One-Out
- In-Country Placebo
- In-Time Placebo
- Alternative Donor Pool

8 Individual Countries










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






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
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