





# Resilienza e prosperità nell'era quantistica


*Michele Mosca*  
*6 ottobre 2022*

evolution 




# qubits	#classical numbers to store
3	$8=2^3$
4	$16=2^4$
10	$1024=2^{10}$ ~Kilo
20	$1048576=2^{20}$ ~Mega
30	$1073741824=2^{30}$ ~Giga
40	$1099511627776=2^{40}$ ~Tera
50	$1125899906842624=2^{50}$ ~Peta
60	$1152921504606846976=2^{60}$ ~Exa
70	$1180591620717411303424=2^{70}$ ~Zetta
128	$340282366920938463463374607431768$ $211456=2^{128}$ ~ $3.4 \times 10^{38}$
230	$172543658669764094685868896556925$ $636311277724304259663879063105594$ $9824=2^{230}$ ~ $10^{100}$

# New paradigm brings new possibilities



Designing  
new  
materials,  
drugs, etc.



Optimizing



Sensing and  
measuring



Secure  
communication



What  
else???

# What sorts of practical applications?

Possibilities include:

- Optimizing the design of new materials


*For example, next generation materials could allow more efficient energy capture or transport or storage.*

- Simulating chemical reactions at the quantum level

*Potential applications include more efficient yields for chemical processes like the production of fertilizers.*

- Optimization of designs or allocation of resources

*For example, optimizing in the insertion of dampers in buildings to protect against earthquakes.*



What  
else???

# Exploring a range of optimization problems in industry



# Impact on any specific problem/sector?

Possibilities include:

- None at all.
- *10% improvement*
- *1000% improvement*
- *Transformational*

Can unexpectedly and rapidly jump from one category to another.

Detailed and ongoing assessment is needed for each sector.


Are you a provider of technology impacted by quantum? And/or a user?

For users: do you want to depend on vendors who are not ready?


## IBM Unveils Breakthrough 127-Qubit Quantum Processor

- Delivers 127 qubits on a single IBM quantum processor for the first time with breakthrough packaging technology
- New processor furthers IBM's industry-leading roadmaps for advancing the performance of its quantum systems
- Previews design for IBM Quantum System Two, a next generation quantum system to house future quantum processors

Nov 16, 2021



## How Universal Quantum is rising to the million-qubit challenge



# Honeywell Quantum Solutions

Honeywell Quantum Solutions and Cambridge Quantum have combined to form Quantinuum – the world's largest integrated quantum computing company.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.


SUBSCRIBE

SIGN IN

Forbes

EDITORS' PICK | 4,873 views | Aug 17, 2020, 09:00am EDT

## Intel Advances On The Road To Quantum Practicality



**rigetti** Rigetti Computing Announces Commercial

Rigetti Computing Announces Commercial Availability of 80-Qubit Aspen-M System and Results of CLOPS Speed Tests

February 15, 2022 09:00 ET | Source: [Supernova Partners Acquisition Company II](#)

COLLEGE PARK, MD — FEBRUARY 23, 2022

IonQ Aria Furthers Lead As World's Most Powerful Quantum Computer.

CIO JOURNAL

## Google Aims for Commercial-Grade Quantum Computer by 2029

Tech giant is one of many companies racing to build a business around the nascent technology



# China claims quantum leap with machine declared a million times greater than Google's Sycamore

- Physicist Pan Jianwei says his team achieved quantum supremacy but 'further verification' is necessary
- Pan's team has received generous and consistent financial support from the Chinese government

 **Stephen Chen in Beijing**  
Published: 10:00pm, 11 Sep, 2020

 **South China Morning Post**

**POPULAR SCIENCE**  
- WANT MORE?

Get Rogers Unison... and stop paying for lines you don't use.

SCIENCE TECH DIY GOODS VIDEO ROLL THE DICE **SUBSCRIBE**

## China is opening a new quantum research supercenter

The country wants to build a quantum computer with a million times the computing power presently in the world.

by Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer October 10, 2017



Lithium's Big

**siliconANGLE** [the voice of enterprise and emerging tech]

CLOUD AI SECURITY INFRA BLOCKCHAIN POLICY BIG DATA APPS EMERGING TECH

UPDATED 20:20 EDT / SEPTEMBER 23 2020



**EMERGING TECH**

**Baidu announces Quantum Leaf, a cloud-based quantum infrastructure service**

BY MIKE WHEATLEY

**yahoo/finance** Search for news, symbols or companies

## Origin Quantum Brings Superconducting Quantum Cloud to Serve Users Worldwide

September 15, 2020

## Tencent Quantum Laboratory is under construction, the next three major laboratories will provide a wealth of AI scenarios

via: 博客园 time:2017/12/29 20:31:04 readed:878

"SNG is putting a lot of effort into the layout of artificial intelligence. At present, SNG has excellent labs, audio and video labs, and quantum labs." Tang Dao-sheng, senior executive vice president of Tencent Group and president of the Social Networking Group (SNG), said in his opening speech.



**DAMO**  
ALIBABA DAMO ACADEMY

X Laboratory

## Quantum Lab

The goal of Quantum Lab is to realize the potential of quantum computing.





## Quantum is years away, but business case can be made today

Business leaders are being urged to start thinking about how their organisations could solve complex problems with quantum technology

The Amazon Quantum Solutions Lab will help you get ready for quantum computing.

## INTEL'S QUANTUM EFFORTS TIED TO NEXT-GEN MATERIALS APPLICATIONS

January 9, 2019 Nicole Hemsoth



### THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

English Edition • January 13, 2020 • Print Edition • Video

Home World U.S. Politics Economy Business Tech Markets Opinion Life & Arts Real Estate WS

GO JOURNAL

## IBM's Quantum-Computing Service Tops 100 Customers



THE QUANTUM DAILY  
QUANTUM COMPUTING AND BEYOND

NEWS ▾ INSIGHTS ▾

## JP Morgan Chase Unleashes Honeywell's Quantum Computer on Tough Fintech Problems

July 2, 2020

Build quantum solutions today

Solving the world's most urgent challenges requires computational power that exceeds that of today's most powerful computers. Azure Quantum computing may take a billion years to address some of these challenging problems, quantum computing has the power to solve these problems in weeks, days, or even hours.

## IT WORLD CANADA



Image of a D-Wave quantum computer system

EMERGING TECH


## Canadian quantum computing firms partner to spread the technology



Howard Solomon @howarditwc  
Published: October 6th, 2020

www.quantumindustrycanada.ca

## CDL Quantum Incubator Stream



UPDATED 10:45 EDT / SEPTEMBER 29 2020

## D-Wave doubles its cloud quantum computing power to 5,000 qubits

BY MIKE WHEATLEY



DESIGNING QUANTUM SOFTWARE

etaq: A full-stack quantum processing toolkit

Matthew Amy<sup>1</sup> and Vlad Chongkrap<sup>1,2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>softwareQ Inc., Richmond BC, Canada

<sup>2</sup>Department of Mathematics & Statistics, Dalhousie University, Halifax NS, Canada

<sup>3</sup>Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo ON, Canada

<sup>4</sup>Department of Combinatorics and Optimization, University of Waterloo, Waterloo ON, Canada

Version of December 11, 2019

## Quantum++: A modern C++ quantum computing library

PLoS ONE 13(12): e0208073 (2018)

# Cyber attacks

[www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-the-quantum-threat-to-cybersecurity-danger-meets-opportunity/](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-the-quantum-threat-to-cybersecurity-danger-meets-opportunity/)



OPINION

## The quantum threat to cybersecurity: Danger meets opportunity

TIFF MACKLEM, MICHELE MOSCA, BRIAN O'HIGGINS

CONTRIBUTED TO THE GLOBE AND MAIL

PUBLISHED MAY 6, 2019





Cloud computing, Sistemi di Pagamento,  
Internet, IoT, etc...

Navigazione sicura, Update automatici, VPN,  
Email sicura, Blockchain, etc...

Crittografia: RSA, DSA, ECDSA, ..., SHA, AES

# Ma ci sono così tante vulnerabilità!

- Fundamentally vulnerable cryptography
- Cryptography implementation errors
- User errors
- Platform implementation errors
- Platform design errors
- Admin errors
- Corrupt users
- Corrupt admin

## Classificati, da male a peggio?


- User errors
  - Corrupt users
  - Admin errors
- Corrupt admin
- Platform implementation errors
  - Platform design errors
- Crypto implementation errors
- **Fundamentally vulnerable cryptography**

# Ma dobbiamo preoccuparci *adesso*?


Depends on\*:

- *security shelf-life* (x years)
- *migration time* (y years)
- *collapse time* (z years)

“Theorem”: If  $x + y > z$ , then worry.



\*M. Mosca: e-Proceedings of 1<sup>st</sup> ETSI Quantum-Safe Cryptography Workshop, 2013. Also <http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1075>




MUST READ [APPLE, GOOGLE TAKE SIMILAR PHONE ADDICTION APPROACHES WITH IOS, ANDROID](#)

## IBM warns of instant breaking of encryption by quantum computers: 'Move your data today'

Welcome to the future transparency of today as quantum computers reveal all currently encrypted secrets -- a viable scenario within just a few years.

By Tom Foremski for Tom Foremski (MHO) | May 18, 2018 -- 18:24 GMT (11:24 PDT) | Topic: Security


## Experts' estimates of likelihood of a quantum computer able to break RSA-2048 in 24 hours



<https://globalriskinstitute.org/download/quantum-threat-timeline-report-2021-full-report/>

## Opinion-based estimates of the cumulative probability of a digital quantum computer able to break RSA-2048 in 24 hours, as function of time

Quantitative estimates of the cumulative probability of a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer in time, based on an optimistic or, alternatively, pessimistic interpretation of the range estimates indicated by the respondents, averaged over the respondents.





In collaboration  
with Deloitte

WORLD  
ECONOMIC  
FORUM

# Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy

WHITE PAPER  
SEPTEMBER 2022



INTERNATIONAL  
CRYPTOGRAPHIC  
MODULE CONFERENCE 2022

September 14-16 | Westin Arlington Gateway, Virginia, USA

## THE COMMERCIAL NATIONAL SECURITY ALGORITHM (CNSA) SUITE 2.0

The Cybersecurity Advisory notifies National Security System owners, operators, and vendors of the future requirements for quantum-resistant algorithms. The following are the steps for implementing CNSA 2.0 into these systems.



1  
NIAP releases  
protection profiles



2  
New equipment  
complies; older  
equipment complies  
at next update



3  
Prefer CNSA 2.0 option



4  
Mandate legacy  
algorithm removal



5  
Require waiver and  
compliance plan  
for legacy  
implementations



For more information, review the advisory on  
[NSA.gov/cybersecurity-guidance](https://www.nsa.gov/cybersecurity-guidance).

<https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/3148990/nsa-releases-future-quantum-resistant-qr-algorithm-requirements-for-national-se/>

# Strumenti per crittografia *quantum-safe*



## Crittografia tradizionale quantum-safe

nota come **crittografia post-quantum**  
o Algoritmi Quantum-Resistant



## Crittografia quantistica

nota anche come **distribuzione di chiavi quantistica**  
(Quantum Key Distribution - QKD)



Courtesy of Qiang Zhang, USTC




<http://www.idquantique.com/p/hoton-counting/clavis3-qkd-platform/>




Questi strumenti possono essere adottati entrambi  
e lavorare bene assieme in un singolo sistema quantum-safe

# Risk vs convenience



# INT-UQKD DEMOS (Roberto Mazzolin)



**Demonstration 1:** Demonstrating a Pilot Use case over a fibre-based Terrestrial network between Belgium (ESEC ESA REDU) and Luxembourg

**Demonstration 2:** Demonstrating a Luxembourg-Canada-Singapore Pilot Use case employing a hybrid Space-Terrestrial network established through fibre-based and satellite communication infrastructures

**Demonstration 3:** Demonstrating a Pilot Use case over Belgium (ESEC ESA REDU) and United Kingdom (ESA ECSAT Harwell) considering a hybrid Space-Terrestrial network

**Demonstration 4:** Demonstrating Pilot use case considering Canada - United Kingdom (ESA ECSAT Harwell) using a hybrid fibre-based and satellite communication infrastructure.

**Demonstration 5:** Assess the inter-connection of INT-UQKD Pilot Use case with other national and international QCI initiatives

# “Execution is 90% planning and 10% doing”



We don't get to call a “time-out” if we're not ready!

1. Perdita di riservatezza e di integrità dei dati
2. Infrastrutture critiche interrotte, senza possibilità di ripristino immediato
3. Tentativi affrettati di preparazione:
  - sono costosi
  - rischiano di fare danni
  - possono aprire nuove falle di sicurezza
4. Perdita di fiducia negli strumenti e nelle istituzioni alla base della nostra economia digitale

# Approaching “show-time”!



NIST IR 8413

[Third Round Status Report](#)

**Table 4.** Algorithms to be Standardized

<u>Public-Key Encryption/KEMs</u>	<u>Digital Signatures</u>
CRYSTALS–KYBER	CRYSTALS–Dilithium
	FALCON
	SPHINCS <sup>+</sup>

**Table 5.** Candidates advancing to the Fourth Round

<u>Public-Key Encryption/KEMs</u>	<u>Digital Signatures</u>
BIKE	
Classic McEliece	
HQC	
SIKE	

<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8413>




Bundesamt  
für Sicherheit in der  
Informationstechnik

Migration zu  
Post-Quanten-Kryptografie

Handlungsempfehlungen des BSI

Stand: August 2020

# E' possibile testare *ora* l'implementazione di algoritmi post-quantum



[openquantumsafe.org](https://openquantumsafe.org)

OPEN QUANTUM SAFE

OVERVIEW LIBOQS INTEGRATIONS TEAM

## OUR TEAM

**Project leaders**

- Douglas Stebila (University of Waterloo)
- Michele Mosca (University of Waterloo)

**Contributors**

[List of contributors to liboqs on GitHub](#)

Nicholas Allen (Amazon Web Services), Maxime Anvari, Eric Crockett (Amazon Web Services), Javad Doliskani, Nir Drucker (Amazon Web Services), Vlad Gheorghiu (evolutionQ), Shay Gueron (Amazon Web Services), Torben Hansen (Royal Holloway, University of London), Christian Paquin (Microsoft Research), Alex Parent (University of Waterloo), Tancrède Lepoint (SRI International), Shrahan Mishra (University of Waterloo), John Underhill, Sebastian Verschoor (University of Waterloo).

Altre implementazioni open-source:

<https://github.com/mupq/pqm4>

<https://libpqcrypto.org>

<https://github.com/safecrypto/libsafecrypto>

Sono disponibili anche tool-kit commerciali

# Encouragement and best-practices: DHS on Preparing for PQC

<https://www.dhs.gov/quantum>

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, DC 20528



Issue Date: 09/17/2021  
Expiration Date: (two years after issued date)

Policy Directive 140-15

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution  
FROM: Eric Hysen  
Chief Information Officer  
SUBJECT: Preparing for Post-Quantum Cryptography

**Purpose:** DHS has significant national security concerns across mission spaces including critical infrastructure, law enforcement, privacy, and counterintelligence that could be harmed by insufficient preparation for a transition to post-quantum cryptography. This memorandum provides guidance to Component Heads to begin preparing for a transition from current cryptography standards to post-quantum encryption now to mitigate risks to data and mission functions.

This memorandum provides Component Heads with an overview of some specific risks to the DHS mission, and a roadmap to take action against the quantum threat to current cryptographic systems. While there is no U.S. Government-approved post-quantum cryptographic standard as of the release of this Statement, these preparatory steps will significantly reduce the time required for transition once industry adopted and U.S. Government validated algorithms are available, resulting in continued mission success and a more secure homeland.

The threat posed to current cryptographic methods extends beyond the Department, affecting interagency, international, and private sectors partnerships critical to mission success. The roadmap below should be used by Components to encourage effective and consistent transition preparation among DHS partners. The potential costs of a slow or ineffective transition to post-quantum cryptography present significant threats to DHS operations and the security of the

**OCTOBER 2021**  
**PREPARING FOR POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY**

Through our partnership with NIST, DHS created a roadmap for those organizations who should be taking action now to prepare for a transition to post-quantum cryptography. This guide will help organizations create effective plans to ensure the continued security of their essential data against the post-quantum threat and prepare for the transition to the new post-quantum cryptography standard when published by NIST.

- 1 Engagement with Standards Organizations**
  - Organizations should direct their Chief Information Officers to increase their engagement with standards developing organizations for latest developments relating to necessary algorithm and dependent protocol changes.
- 2 Inventory of Critical Data**
  - This information will inform future analysis by identifying what data may be at risk now and decrypted once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer is available.
- 3 Inventory of Cryptographic Technologies**
  - Organizations should conduct an inventory of all the systems using cryptographic technologies for any function to facilitate a smooth transition in the future.
- 4 Identification of Internal Standards**
  - Cybersecurity officials within organizations should identify acquisition, cybersecurity, and data security standards that will require updating to reflect post-quantum requirements.
- 5 Identification of Public Key Cryptography**
  - From the inventory, organizations should identify where and for what purpose public key cryptography is being used and mark those systems as quantum vulnerable.
- 6 Prioritization of Systems for Replacement**
  - Prioritizing one system over another for cryptographic transition is highly dependent on organization functions, goals, and needs. To supplement prioritization efforts, organizations should consider the following factors when evaluating a quantum vulnerable system:
    - is the system a high value asset based on organizational requirements?
    - What is the system protecting (e.g. key stores, passwords, root keys, signing keys, personally identifiable information, sensitive personally identifiable information)?
    - What other systems does the system communicate with?
    - To what extent does the system share information with federal entities?
    - To what extent does the system share information with other entities outside of your organization?
    - Does the system support a critical infrastructure sector?
    - How long does the data need to be protected?
- 7 Plan for Transition**
  - Using the inventory and prioritization information, organizations should develop a plan for systems transition upon publication of the new post-quantum cryptographic standard. Transition plans should consider creating cryptographic agility to facilitate future adjustments and enable flexibility in case of unexpected changes. Cybersecurity officials should provide guidance for creating transition plans.

**2021-2023**  
Inventory and prioritize systems

**2024**  
NIST post-quantum cryptography standard published


**2024-2030**  
Transition of systems to NIST post-quantum cryptography standard

**2030**  
Cryptographically relevant quantum computer potentially available



Quantum Computing Cybersecurity

# How the world can prepare for quantum-computing cyber risks



Quantum computing is soon to become a technology of the present. Image: IBM Zurich Lab/Creative Commons

28 Sep 2021

**Colin Soutar**  
Managing Director, Cyber Risk, Deloitte


**Isaac Kohn**  
Partner, Deloitte

**Itan Baranes**  
Manager, Deloitte and Project Fellow, Quantum Security, World Economic Forum

**Filipe Beato**  
Lead, Centre for Cybersecurity, World Economic Forum

**Sean Doyle**

AUDIO LISTEN TO THE ARTICLE



This is an experimental feature. Some words or names may be mispronounced. Does it sound good? Yes / No

- Futuristic quantum computing will soon become the technology of the present.
- It will be a positive advancement for many disciplines, but the potential security impacts are generally not fully understood by citizens, organizations, or decision-makers.
- These different audiences need tailored messages to enable a collective and coordinated

LOYDYS

There are many insurance lines of business that will be impacted by the emergence of quantum computing. However, the largest potential impact arises from the cyber security risks posed by cryptographically relevant quantum computers. Cyber risks by their nature can have an influence on many lines of insurance business and practically all industries. In a scenario where the cryptographic threat from quantum computing precedes the full adoption of PQC or other quantum-secure protocols, the world and the insurance industry face a systemic cyber risk that can affect everything from the security of our text messages to state guarded secrets and access to military codes.

Quantum computing also exacerbates the risk faced by AI technology, since quantum computing will improve ML capabilities, leading to a broader adoption of ML and AI solutions and products in all industries. The impacts of AI on insurance are further discussed in the Lloyd's report *Taking control: AI and insurance*.<sup>1</sup> The following are few examples of insurance lines of business that can be impacted by quantum computing.

- **Product liability and product recall.** Liability arises from AI-based machinery and products making a mistake. Whilst the risk of AI malfunction increases once more AI related products enter the market as a result of improved ML capabilities, quantum computing will also most likely improve the accuracy of AI as larger data sets can be processed to train ML algorithms. Therefore, the product liability and product recall risk landscape of robots and AI products will be changed with the emergence of quantum computing.
- **Third-party motor liability.** The liability complications arising from accidents involving autonomous vehicles will become a reality sooner than expected, with ML based quantum computing accelerating the arrival of driverless cars.
- **Political risks.** The power of quantum computing could lead to the creation of better deep fakes, be used to better distribute online propaganda and fake news and take advantage of human behaviour for social engineering. This increased capability to investigate political unrest can lead to more protests, followed by government crackdowns, which would have an impact on business interruption and property damage.
- **Property damage.** The expensive hardware and control systems employed in quantum computing mainframes will increase the property risk profile.

The impacts of quantum computing on insurance, 2021

## Insurance lines of business affected

### Systemic cyber risk

State sponsored cyber attacks using a quantum computer could be used to break RSA and forge digital signatures. This would allow adversaries access to private and public networks where they could spread malware to dismantle critical infrastructure. Falsified information could be spread using the accounts of high profile figures. Unlocked access to weaponry and nuclear codes could be used to wreak havoc. Classified data held by the military could be decrypted and all operations, whether on land, in sea or in space would be vulnerable as global networks would be compromised (systemic political risk impact).

Other nefarious adversaries, including fraudulent employees (**fidelity risk**), could access or alter personal, legal, operational or financial data. The PKI, used to distribute private keys and digital authentication certificates in military agencies and many large organisations including financial institutions, would come under attack. This would allow the forgery of common access cards (CAC) which are required to access classified networks and data.<sup>2</sup> Trade secrets and IP could be stolen (some nation states already use IP attacks as part of their economic strategy). The security behind robots and IoT devices, which are likely to be employed on a wider scale due to AI improvements offered by quantum computing, would be compromised. This would allow large scale supply chain disruptions (**contingent business interruption**). Autonomous vehicles could be hacked to divert their path and cause accidents (**third-party motor liability**). 3D printers and manufacturing machinery connected to the internet could be tampered with, leading to large scale **product liability** and **product recall** claims. The blockchain technology underpinning cryptocurrencies could be manipulated to alter or forge transactions and double spend money. The privacy of civilian messages, photos and medical data would also be compromised. Insurance institutions might be particularly targeted as they hold vast amounts of sensitive policyholder data, resulting in hefty **GDPR** fines.

As a result, quantum computing could pose one of the largest scale systemic risks in history. With the ever increasing interconnectedness of systems and our reliance on digital communications, a technology capable of breaking the very encryption system behind our cyber security protocols would have implications that affect every aspect of our lives, from state security, to the privacy of our text messages.



Source: (1) Lloyd's (2) Lindebig, 2020

<https://lloydslab.com/wp-content/uploads/Quantum-Paper.pdf>

# Canadian National Quantum-Readiness Best Practices and Guidelines



Government  
of Canada

Gouvernement  
du Canada

## Canadian Forum for Digital Infrastructure Resilience (CFDIR)



<https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/eng/sf11618.html>

CFDIR working groups implement agreed-upon projects. Current focus areas include:



Cloud Security



Quantum Readiness



IoT Security




Supply Chain Assurance



Internet Resilience



Rapid Response  
(e.g. to the COVID-19 pandemic)



## FOREWORD

The Bank of Canada is committed to working with its public- and private-sector partners to promote and strengthen the resilience of Canada's financial sector in the face of risks to business operations, including cyber incidents.

That's why we were pleased to take part in the Quantum-Readiness Working Group (QRWG) launched in 2020 by the [Canadian Forum for Digital Infrastructure Resilience \(CFDIR\)](#). A team of subject matter experts from organizations responsible for core elements of Canada's financial critical infrastructure has been studying what it will take to make Canada "quantum ready" in the years ahead.

The key message I want to leave you with is that we all need to start preparing now. The encryption technologies that are securing Canada's financial systems today will one day become obsolete. If we do nothing, the financial data that underpins Canada's economy will inevitably become more vulnerable to cyber criminals.

While some still see quantum as a long way off—given that this advanced encryption technology is not yet available—we also know that it will take time to develop and implement the quantum-safe encryption systems to replace those we have now.

The information and recommendations you see in this document were assembled and developed by people who are responsible for making these kinds of changes in their own institutions. The concepts are fundamental—with application to both small and large organizations, in both the public and private sector settings.

It starts with assessing the potential impact of quantum on your own organization. In addition to risks, quantum may also present opportunities. But no matter what, we all need to prepare for this transition—including in my own organization, the Bank of Canada. The resilience of Canada's financial system depends on it.


We would like to thank our colleagues who took part in this initial pilot project. There is a long road ahead, and the Bank of Canada will be there alongside our partners as the quantum issue unfolds.

**Hisham El-Bihbety**

CISO – Bank of Canada


## Quantum-Readiness Program Elements

*Some Conceptual Building Blocks*



## Quantum-Readiness Program Timeline

*Initial Recommendations as of June 2021*



# Metodologia per la valutazione del rischio quantistico

<https://globalriskinstitute.org/publications/3423-2/>



- Fase 1** Identificare e documentare le risorse da proteggere e il loro presente grado di protezione crittografica
- Fase 2** Valutare lo stato di sviluppo delle tecnologie quantistiche, e l'orizzonte temporale per lo sviluppo dei computer quantistici
- Fase 3** Identificare e documentare le possibili minacce e l'orizzonte temporale **Z** in cui i malintenzionati potrebbero avere accesso alla necessaria tecnologia quantistica
- Fase 4** Identificare il tempo di conservazione **X** desiderato per le risorse/dati da proteggere, e il tempo di migrazione **Y** necessario per implementare la transizione dell'infrastruttura dell'organizzazione a una condizione di non-vulnerabilità (*quantum-safe state*)
- Fase 5** Determinare il rischio quantistico calcolando se le risorse da proteggere potrebbero diventare vulnerabili ad un attacco quantistico prima che la transizione sia implementata:

$$X + Y > Z ?$$


- Fase 6** Identificare e dare priorità alle attività necessarie per mantenersi informati su sviluppi tecnologici rilevanti, e per rendere la tecnologia dell'organizzazione quantum-safe



# Build greater resilience against cryptanalytic attacks



**Yesterday**



**Today**



**Tomorrow**

# Than ! Grazie!

Domande e commenti sono benvenuti!



@evolutionQinc

**Michele Mosca**

CEO, evolutionQ Inc.

[michele.mosca@evolutionq.com](mailto:michele.mosca@evolutionq.com)

Geschäftsführer, evolutionQ GmbH

[michele.mosca@evolutionq.de](mailto:michele.mosca@evolutionq.de)



<https://evolutionq.com>

