

# Fair and unfair income inequalities in Europe

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## Abstract

This paper proposes an estimate of the extent of income inequality and opportunity inequality in a sample of European countries. The present work contributes to understanding the origin of standard income inequality, helping to identify potential institutional setups that are associated to opportunity inequality. We distinguish between ex ante and ex post opportunity inequality. We also find that ex ante equality of opportunity exhibits positive correlation with pre-primary education and de-tracked secondary school systems, whereas ex post equality of opportunity is also positively associated to union presence and to fiscal redistribution.

JEL Classification: D31, D63, J62

Keywords: Inequality of opportunity, income inequality.

## 1 Introduction

This paper analyzes the extent and the features of economic inequalities in 24 European countries. We propose a methodology to measure the degree of inequality of opportunities and to decompose overall income inequality into two components: *unfair inequalities*, *i.e.*, income inequality due to initial and exogenous circumstances and *fair inequalities*, *i.e.*, income inequality due to individual effort and responsibility. We apply this methodology to measure inequalities in 24 European countries and make an attempt to correlate the extent of opportunity inequality to institutional aspects of such countries.

Measuring the degree of inequality of opportunity is interesting *per se*, if one believes that "leveling the playing field", rather than equalizing the final results, is the objective of a "just society". This position has been put forward in the last decades by philosophers such as Dworkin (1981a,b), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989) and by economists such as Roemer (1993, 1998) and Fleurbaey (1995, 2009). These authors have defended the idea that differences in outcomes due to exogenous circumstances are ethically unacceptable and should be compensated (Compensation Principle); while

differences due to effort are to be considered ethically acceptable and do not need any intervention (Reward Principle<sup>1</sup>).

In addition to normative reasons, the evidence we propose can have an important instrumental value. First, social attitudes towards redistributive policies may be affected by the knowledge, or the perception, of the origin of income inequalities (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005): existing surveys show that most people judge income inequalities arising from different levels of effort as less objectionable than those due to exogenous circumstances as race, family origin, etc.. Hence, by showing that a large amount of existing inequalities is due to unequal ex-ante opportunities may increase the support for redistributive policies. Second, opportunity inequality, rather than income inequality, can be strongly related to aggregate economic performance: it has been suggested (Bourguignon et al. 2007 and World Bank, 2006) that the existence of strong and persistent inequalities in the initial opportunities open to individuals can generate true *inequality traps* that, by preventing entire groups from participation into economic and social life, represent severe constraints to future perspectives of growth of an economy<sup>2</sup>. Finally, the analysis of opportunity inequality might help to understand the genesis of income inequality and to identify the priorities of public intervention: the knowledge of the factors explaining income inequality can help to identify the more deprived groups in a society, thereby revealing new points of emphasis in social and redistributive policies.

For example, two countries A and B may exhibit the same level of overall income inequality and still being in need of very different public interventions if in country A there is a much larger fraction of inequality which is based on, say, ethnic or geographical factors. While in the first case income redistribution, via the tax system, and universal social protection may be the adequate policy measures, in the latter case more tailor-made, categorical interventions are needed.

We believe that these considerations are relevant for many European countries and for the debate on social protection and social policies in Europe.

Nevertheless, the literature on the measurement of inequality of opportunity, both at the methodological and the empirical level, is still in its infancy. See among others, Bourguignon *et al.* (2003), Checchi and Peragine (2009), Dardanoni *et al.* (2006), Ferreira and Gignoux (2008), Goux and Maurin (2003), Lefranc *et al.* (2006), Moreno-Terner (2007), Paes de Barros et al. (2009), Peragine (2002, 2004a,b), Peragine and Serlenga (2008), Pistoiesi (2007), Villar (2006), World Bank (2006).

This literature has developed two main approaches to measuring oppor-

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<sup>1</sup>We refer here to the utilitarian version of the reward principle. A different "liberal" version could also be formulated (see Fleurbaey 2009).

<sup>2</sup>Indeed, an empirical analysis of the relation between opportunity inequality and growth is an interesting task for future research.

tunity inequality, namely the ex-ante and the ex-post approach. According to the ex-ante approach, there is equality of opportunity (EOp) if the set of opportunities is the same for all individuals, regardless of their circumstances. This approach consists of partitioning the population in types formed by individuals endowed with the same circumstances: the income distribution within a circumstance class is interpreted as the opportunity set open to individuals in that class. Hence, in order to measure opportunity inequality, one focuses on the inequality between types.

On the other side, according to the ex-post approach, there is EOp if and only if all those who exert the same effort end out with the same outcome. This means that opportunity inequality within this approach is measured as inequality within responsibility classes, i.e. within the set of individuals at the same effort level.

Although these two approaches converge on the same equitable allocation, the equality of opportunity allocation, the rankings they generate may be different; in fact they express different and sometimes conflicting views on equality of opportunity<sup>3</sup>. Now, with the exception of Checchi and Peragine (2009), all the existing empirical analysis of opportunity inequality have adopted an ex ante approach. In this paper we explore both the ex ante and the ex post approach and we offer some insights on the different results they generate. In the estimation of opportunity inequality we compare parametric models *vis a vis* with non parametric methods of decomposition. Each method has pros and cons: the non parametric models avoids the arbitrary choice of a specific functional form on the relationship between outcome, circumstances and effort; on the other hand, parametric models allow to study partial effects of circumstances on outcome, other things constant (i.e. they make it easier building and studying counterfactuals).

The empirical application is divided in two parts. First, we provide estimates of income inequality and opportunity inequality in 24 European countries available in the EU-SILC database. Our results show that although the expected ranking among Northern European and Mediterranean countries is generally respected, our measures of inequality of opportunities shed new light on the distributional patterns of European countries. It is possible to identify roughly three groups of countries: formerly centrally planned economies (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia, plus Portugal as outlier) that reach higher levels of total inequality, and intermediate levels of opportunity inequality; most of continental Europe exhibits relatively high levels of inequality of opportunity, despite moderate levels of total inequality (Austria being the most extreme case). A third group of countries can be identified, where both types of inequality obtain the lowest values (Nordic countries plus Slovenia and Slovak Republic).

Our results also highlight the difference between the ex ante and ex post

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<sup>3</sup>Fleurbaey and Peragine (2009) study the clash between ex ante and ex post EOp.

approaches: these approaches do capture different aspects of opportunity inequality and our results confirm such theoretical premise.

Second, we focus on institutional characteristics that might influence the degree of opportunity inequality in the countries under analysis. Our figures show that equality of opportunity, in the ex ante version, is positively correlated with pre-primary education and de-tracked secondary school systems. Equality of opportunity, when measured ex post, is also positively associated to labour market regulation (with respect to gender differences only), to union density and to wage centralization whereas is positively related to fiscal redistribution.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our methodology for measuring opportunity inequality and decomposing overall income inequality. Section 3 contains our empirical analysis: the data description, the estimating procedure and the discussion of the results. Section 4 concludes with some final remarks and some directions for future research.

## 2 Measuring opportunity inequality: a simple model

Each individual in our society is completely described by a list of traits, which can be partitioned into two different classes: the first class includes traits beyond the individual responsibility, represented by a person's set of circumstances  $\mathbf{c}$ ; examples of circumstances are race, gender, family background, etc. The individual sets of circumstances belong to a finite set  $\Omega = \{\mathbf{c}_1, \dots, \mathbf{c}_n\}$ . Circumstances include a vast list of income generating inputs that are out of control of the individual, like gender, age, ethnicity, region of residence or parental background: various notions of equality of opportunity correspond to different choices of which of these variables are to be regarded as circumstances. In the sequel, on the basis of the data available, we will treat only gender and parental background, which will be proxied by the level of parents' education, as circumstances. If the only circumstances were gender, which can only take values in the set  $\{\text{male}, \text{female}\}$ , and parental education, that only takes values in the set  $\{\text{graduate parents}, \text{non graduate parents}\}$ ; in this case the set  $\Omega$  would be the following:  $\Omega = (\{\text{female}, \text{non graduate parents}\}, \{\text{female}, \text{graduate parents}\}, \{\text{male}, \text{non graduate parents}\}, \{\text{male}, \text{graduate parents}\})$ .

The second class includes factors for which the individual is fully responsible and is represented by a scalar variable, *effort*,  $e \in \Theta$ . We assume that effort is one-dimensional. It is important to stress that by effort in this paper we mean not only the extent to which a person exerts himself, but all the other background traits of the individual that might affect his success, but that are excluded from the list of circumstances. This amounts to say that any other factors, as native ability, talent, luck, and so on, are implicitly classified as within the sphere of individual responsibility. This

assumption may lead us to overestimate the portion of inequality which is ethically acceptable<sup>4</sup>.

Income is generated by a function  $g : \Omega \times \Theta \rightarrow \mathbf{R}_+$ , that assigns individual incomes to combinations of effort and circumstances:

$$x = g(\mathbf{c}, e)$$

To save notation, we may also write  $x(\mathbf{c}, e)$  and refer to it as both the individual income and the relevant income distribution.

Hence, this is a pure deterministic model, where for any given existing circumstances all variations in individual income is attributed to personal effort. We therefore deviate from standard Mincerian models of income generation, where incomes are explained by circumstances, proxies for effort and a random component which is typically assumed to be i.i.d.. In our analysis, the individual is held responsible for any random component that may affect his/her income (included native ability or talent, as long as they are not included in the set of circumstances).

Effort is unobservable. Unobservable is also the function  $g$ , hence we do not make any assumption about the degree of substitutability or complementarity among the circumstances in order to keep the approach as general as possible. We assume, however, that the function  $g$  is fixed and identical for all individuals. Moreover, we assume that the function  $g$  is monotonically increasing in effort  $e$ .

We now propose two different partitions of the total population. First, for  $\mathbf{c}_i \in \Omega$ , we call *type  $i$*  the set of individuals whose set of circumstances is  $\mathbf{c}_i$ . The type income distribution represents the set of outcome levels which can be achieved - by exerting different degrees of effort - starting from the same circumstance  $\mathbf{c}_i$ . That is to say, the type distribution is a representation of the *opportunity set* - expressed in outcome terms - open to any individual endowed with circumstances  $\mathbf{c}_i$ .

The second partition is based on the effort variable: for  $e \in \Theta$ , we call *tranche  $e$*  the set of individuals whose effort is  $e$ . However, as we are considering the case of non observability of effort, we need to deduce the *degree* of effort from some observable behavior. More precisely, we need a *proxy* in order to measure it in an ordinal sense and to compare the effort of different individuals. Given the monotonicity of the income function and the independence of effort from circumstances, this will correspond to the quantile in the income distribution of the type. Following Roemer (1993, 1998) we say that all individuals at the  $p^{th}$  quantile of their income distributions, across types, have tried equally hard.

Thus, we define the tranche  $p$  in a population as the subset of individuals whose incomes are at the  $p^{th}$  rank of their respective type income

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<sup>4</sup>On the effect of partial observability of the circumstances on the estimates of opportunity inequality see Fleurbaey, Luongo and Peragine (2009).

distributions. The two partitions suggest two different approaches to measure opportunity inequality.

The first approach focuses on ex post inequalities in classes of individuals with identical effort. Consequently, it looks at the tranches distributions.

**Definition The ex post approach.** *There is EOp if all those who exerted the same degree of effort have the same outcome. Inequality of opportunity decreases if outcome inequality decreases among the individuals at the same degree of effort.*

Thus, the tranches approach emphasizes inequalities within effort groups: it is therefore an expression of the principle of compensation. On the other hand, differences between the tranches are interpreted as due to individual effort, and are not considered as unfair.

This is the approach proposed by Roemer (1993, 1998) and defended by Fleurbaey (2008).

In contrast, the second approach focuses on the types distributions and is based on the following definition of equality of opportunity.

**Definition The ex ante approach.** *There is EOp if the set of opportunities is the same, regardless of the circumstances. Inequality of opportunity decreases if inequality between individual opportunity sets decreases.*

Thus, the ex ante approach puts special emphasis on the differences in the outcome prospects for classes of individuals with identical circumstances. Accordingly, it focuses on inequality between types, and is instead neutral with respect to inequality within types. By stating the irrelevance of the effort based inequalities within each types, the ex ante approach is an expression of a reward-focused approach to equality of opportunity (see Fleurbaey 2008, ch. 9).

This is also the approach proposed, in a different framework, by Van de gaer (1993), Kranich (1996), Peragine (2004a).

Both approaches appear as relevant and plausible, and it is difficult to give priority to one or another. Therefore, we now develop each of them in turn, and for each of them we provide a measure of opportunity inequality.

## 2.1 The ex-post approach

In the ex post approach opportunity inequality is given by inequality within tranches. To capture such inequality we may construct an hypothetical *standardized distribution* obtained after the following transformation:

$$x(\mathbf{c}, e) \rightarrow \frac{x(\mathbf{c}, e)}{x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, \bar{e})} x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, \bar{e})$$

where  $x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, e)$  is the artificial distribution obtained by using a constant reference value of circumstances  $\bar{\mathbf{c}}$ , and  $x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, \bar{e})$  is obtained by using reference values of both circumstances and effort.

Note that for every scale invariant inequality measure  $I$ :

$$I \frac{\mu}{x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, \bar{e})} x(\mathbf{c}, e) = I \frac{\mu}{x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, e)} x(\mathbf{c}, e).$$

Hence, in the ex post approach inequality of opportunity is given by a (scale invariant) inequality index  $I$  applied to the artificial distribution<sup>5</sup>  $\frac{x(\mathbf{c}, e)}{x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, e)}$ :

$$OI^{ex-post} = I \frac{\mu}{x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, e)} x(\mathbf{c}, e)$$

or, in relative terms:

$$OI_{relative}^{ex-post} = \frac{I \frac{x(\mathbf{c}, e)}{x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, e)}}{I(x(\mathbf{c}, e))}.$$

What is the meaning of the reference value  $x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, e)$ ? This depends on the specific measurement approach one decides to adopt<sup>6</sup>: in a non parametric approach:  $x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, e)$  may be interpreted as the average income of a given tranche identified by  $e$  (call it  $\mu_e$ ), and  $x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, \bar{e})$  as the grand mean of the overall distribution (call it  $\mu$ ).

If we opt for a non parametric approach, then for any *path independent* measure of inequality<sup>7</sup> (Foster and Shneyrov, 2000) we have that

$$\begin{aligned} I(x(\mathbf{c}, e)) &= I \frac{\mu}{x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, e)} x(\mathbf{c}, e) + I(x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, e)) \\ I(x(c, e)) &= I \frac{\mu}{\mu_e} x(c, e) + I(\mu_e) \end{aligned}$$

The distribution  $x(c, e)$  is the original income vector;  $\mu_e$  is a hypothetical smoothed distribution in which each person's income is replaced with the

<sup>5</sup> $OI^{ex-post}$  corresponds to the *fairness gap approach* of Fleurbaey and Shokkaert (2009) and in fact Condition 2 of Fleurbaey and Shokkaert (2009) corresponds to Ex post inequality. On the other hand,  $OI^{ex-ante}$  corresponds to the *direct unfairness approach* of Fleurbaey and Shokkaert (2009) and in fact Condition 1 of Fleurbaey and Shokkaert (2009) corresponds to Ex ante inequality. They use an absolute approach to inequality, while we use a relative one.

<sup>6</sup>Other interpretations are possible: for instance, in a normative approach,  $x(\bar{\mathbf{c}}, e)$  could be represented by the equally distributed equivalent income of a given tranche identified by  $e$ .

<sup>7</sup>In particular, we need to use the *mean logarithmic deviation (MLD)*, which is the only index which has a path-independent decomposition using the arithmetic mean as the representative income. For a distribution  $X = (x_1, \dots, x_N)$  with mean  $\mu_X$  the *MLD* is defined as:

$$MLD(X) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \ln \frac{\mu_X}{x_i}$$

mean income of the tranche to which she belongs. This smoothing process removes all inequality within the tranches, hence  $I(\mu_e)$  captures the inequality only due to individual responsibility;  $\frac{x(c,e)}{\mu_e}$  is a standardized distribution obtained by proportionally scaling each tranche distribution until it has the same mean as the overall distribution. Standardization suppresses between-tranche inequality while leaving within tranche inequality unaltered. Hence  $I \frac{x(\mathbf{c},e)}{x(\bar{\mathbf{c}},e)}$  fully captures the income inequality only due to circumstances, i.e., the inequality of opportunity.

Hence the decomposition above can be interpreted as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{total inequality} &= \text{within tranches} + \text{between tranches} \\ \text{total inequality} &= \text{opportunity inequality} + \text{effort inequality} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, we have a measure of opportunity inequality and a decomposition of overall inequality into an ethically acceptable and an ethically offensive part.

In a parametric analysis this procedure corresponds to estimate, for each tranche ( $p$ ), the following equation

$$\ln x_i = \beta_p c_i + \varepsilon_i, \forall p, \quad (1)$$

where  $c_i$  is the all set of circumstances, and obtaining a counterfactual distribution of income as  $\hat{x}_p = \exp \hat{\beta}_p \bar{c}_p$ , where  $\bar{c}_p$  is the average value of characteristics in each tranche. Inequality of opportunity can be therefore calculated parametrically by  $I \frac{x_i}{x_p}$ .

## 2.2 The ex-ante approach

In the ex ante approach opportunity inequality is given by inequality between types. To capture such inequality we may construct an hypothetical *smoothed distribution* obtained after the following transformation:

$$x(\mathbf{c}, e) \rightarrow x(\mathbf{c}, \bar{e})$$

where  $x(\mathbf{c}, \bar{e})$  is the artificial distribution obtained by using a constant reference value of effort  $\bar{e}$ .

Hence, in the ex ante approach inequality of opportunity is given by a (scale invariant) inequality index  $I$  applied to the distribution  $x(c_i, \bar{e})$ :

$$OI^{ex-ante} = I(x(\mathbf{c}, \bar{e}))$$

or, in relative terms:

$$OI_{relative}^{ex-ante} = \frac{I(x(\mathbf{c}, \bar{e}))}{I(x(\mathbf{c}, e))}.$$

The meaning of  $x(c_i, \bar{e})$  depends again on the specific measurement approach one decides to adopt.



In a non parametric descriptive approach  $x(c, \bar{e})$  can be represented by the average income of a given type identified by  $\mathbf{c}$  (call it  $\mu_c$ ).

If we opt for a non parametric approach, then for any *path independent* measure of inequality (Foster and Shneyrov, 2000) we have that

$$\begin{aligned} I(x(\mathbf{c}, e)) &= I\left(\frac{x(\mathbf{c}, e)}{x(\mathbf{c}, \bar{e})}\right) + I(x(\mathbf{c}, \bar{e})) \\ I(x(c, e)) &= I\left(\frac{x(\mathbf{c}, e)}{\mu_c}\right) + I(\mu_c). \end{aligned}$$

The interpretation is as follows: by measuring the inequality in the artificial vector  $\mu_c$ , obtained by replacing each income with its type mean income, we capture only and fully the between-types inequality, which, in turn, reflects the opportunity inequality. On the other hand, by rescaling all type distributions until all types have the same mean income, hence obtaining the distribution  $\frac{x(\mathbf{c}, e)}{\mu_c}$ , we are left with an income vector in which the only inequality present is the within-types inequality, to be interpreted as inequality due to individual responsibility. Hence the decomposition above can be interpreted as:

total inequality = within types + between types

total inequality = effort inequality + opportunity inequality

Thus, again, we have a measure of opportunity inequality and a decomposition of overall inequality into an ethically acceptable and an ethically offensive part.

As in the previous case, inequality of opportunity by the ex ante approach can also be computed parametrically<sup>8</sup>. In this case we need to estimate (1) for the whole population such that

$$\ln x_i = \beta c_i + \varepsilon_i,$$

and derive the following counterfactual distribution  $\hat{x}_i = \exp(\hat{\beta}c_i)$ . Hence, inequality of opportunity according to the ex ante approach will be given by

$$I(\hat{x}_i).$$

In the following empirical analysis we will compare our estimates of  $OI^{ex-post}$  (parametric and non parametric) and  $OI^{ex-ante}$  (parametric and non parametric) and use them for our an analysis of relationship between the extent of opportunity inequality and some relevant policy or institutional variables.

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<sup>8</sup>This is the approach followed by Ferreira and Guignoux (2008).

## 3 The empirical analysis: income inequality and opportunity inequality in Europe

### 3.1 Data description

We use data from the 2005 wave of the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EUSILC) which is annually conducted by the national Central Statistics Offices (CSOs) in order to obtain information on the income and living conditions of different household types. The survey contains information on a large number of individual and household characteristics as well as specific information on poverty and social exclusion. Representative random samples of households throughout a large number of European countries are approached to provide the required information. We consider 24 countries in our analysis, namely Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.

Differently from other sources of data EUSILC provides a common data source with comparable individual and household level micro-data on income and living conditions in the EU countries, allowing for significant improvements in the comparability of country-specific measures. EUSILC is expected to become the EU reference source for comparative statistics on income distribution and social exclusion at European level. Indeed, our study has become possible because the 2005 EUSILC comprehends a special data module which provides data for attributes of each respondent's parents during her childhood period when aged 14-16. This additional module reports family composition, number of siblings, the educational attainment, occupational as well as the labour market activity status of each respondent's mother and father and the presence of financial problems in household. In what follows parental education is measured by the highest educational attainment in the couple of parents. Individuals are therefore divided in three groups: group 1 refers to individuals having both parents with no education; 2 corresponds to individuals who have at least one parent completing primary or secondary (lower or upper) school degree, while group 3 corresponds to individuals who have at least one of the parents with post-secondary or tertiary degree. Parental occupation is also divided in three categories: category 1 corresponds to individuals having both parents employed in elementary occupations (such as plant and machine operator and assembler - groups 8000 and 9000 according to the ISCO88 classification); category 2 refers to individuals who have at least one parent employed in semi-skilled occupations (occupied as service worker, shop and market sales worker, skilled agricultural and fishery worker or as craft and related trades workers - groups from 5000 to 7000 in the ISCO88 classification); finally, category 3 refers to individuals who have at least one of the parents working

in top-rank occupations (like legislator, senior official, manager, professional, technician, associate professional or clerk - groups from 1000 to 4000 in the ISCO88 classification). In the empirical analysis we also consider some additional individual characteristics as circumstances. This set comprehends gender, nationality (distinguishing those who declare the country of birth to be the same of the country of residence) and geographical location (distinguishing people living in densely populated area from others).

We restrict the sample to individuals working full-time or part-time, unemployed and those fulfilling domestic tasks and care responsibilities aged between 30 and 60.<sup>9</sup> Our reference variable is post-tax individual earnings; this variable is already available for 17 out of 24 countries under analysis, whereas for the remaining ones we imputed net income from gross income using information available on tax rates in 2004.<sup>10</sup> Being aware of the fact that welfare indicators estimated from micro-data can be very sensitive to the presence of extreme incomes (Cowell and Victoria-Feser, 1996a, 1996b, 2002) we censored the countries' income distributions by dropping the very extreme values.<sup>11</sup> Tables 5 and 6 show summary statistics of both individual and parental characteristics.

### 3.2 Income and opportunity inequality rankings in Europe

In this section we aim to provide a ranking of European countries with respect to EOp using both the ex ante and the ex post approach. Starting with the estimates of overall income inequalities, we notice that the ranking based on Gini index from our data is quite consistent with the ranking provided by OECD and Eurostat (see Table 1 and Figure 1).<sup>12</sup> In particular our evidence shows that Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Estonia obtain the highest values in all data sources. They are followed by the UK, Ireland and Mediterranean countries like Greece, Italy and Spain whereas Northern countries like Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden close the ranking with low values of both Gini and MLD (see also Figure 2).

Turning to the measurement of inequality of opportunity, our attention is confined to the MLD which is the only index that allows for a perfect decomposition of total income inequality in effort inequality and opportu-

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<sup>9</sup>We exclude pupils, students, those in an unpaid work experience, those in retirement or in early retirement, permanently disabled or/and unfit to work, those in compulsory military community or service and other inactive person.

<sup>10</sup>Tables 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 in the Appendix show the progressive tax rate used for the conversion. As for Slovakia we used a flat tax rate of 19% (source: <http://www.finance.gov.sk/>) whereas for Iceland a tax rate of 37.7% has been used for income higher than 1.191.000 ISK (source: <http://www.ministryoffinance.is>).

<sup>11</sup>Van Kerm (2007) discusses how ordinal comparisons of countries are found to be robust to variants of data adjustment procedures such as trimming and winsorizing.

<sup>12</sup>Spearman rank correlation between EUSILC Gini and the ones calculated by OECD and Eurostat are 0.9 and 0.84, respectively.

nity inequality; this index still exhibits a country ranking which is not very dissimilar from the one offered by Gini indexes (see again Figure 2). As a first insight we notice that inequality of opportunity generally accounts for a substantial share of income inequality in the EU countries under analysis (see Table (2)). Notice that both the Netherlands and Norway have very few observations on parental socio-economic background, hence results in those cases might not be fully interpreted (see Tables 5 and 6). Summary statistics on the characteristics of the sample also show that we could not take into consideration information on degree of urbanization for the Netherlands and Slovenia whereas in the case of Sweden, given few observations available on parental occupation, we choose not to consider this characteristic.<sup>13</sup> According to the ex ante approach inequality of opportunity explains from the 2% to the 22% of income inequality whereas considering the ex post definition we obtain much larger values, from the 13% to the 40%. As mentioned in the previous section, given the partial observability of circumstances, those values can only be considered as lower bound estimates.

Table (3) shows the ranking obtained by absolute measures of type and tranche approach, respectively. As expected the ex post values are higher than the ex ante ones. Interestingly enough, the ex ante and the ex post measures, although highly correlated, show different rankings of the countries under analysis. This evidence fulfills the theoretical expectations and confirms the importance of measuring EOp using both the ex ante and the ex post definitions. Going from the ex ante to the ex post approach we find significant rank-reversals, with Iceland, Estonia and Portugal yielding the largest upward shifts, whereas Germany and Norway worsening their position, achieving higher EOp (see Figure 3).

What is the meaning to be attributed to these different rankings? By construction, the ex ante approach is focused on the inequality between social types, therefore is less sensitive to inter-individuals inequalities within the same social type. Hence countries which show high level of ex ante opportunity inequality are characterized by bigger distances between social groups. On the other hand, the ex post measures are able to capture in a finer way the individual income gaps due to circumstances. Therefore one could expect the ex ante figures to be less correlated than the ex post figures to overall income inequality: this is in fact confirmed by the data (see Figures 4 and 4bis).

If we look at Figure 4, we clearly notice two patterns: formerly centrally planned economies (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia, plus Portugal as outlier) reach higher levels of total inequality, for given level of EOp; conversely, most of continental Europe exhibits relatively low

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<sup>13</sup>Few observations on parental occupation are also available for the UK. However, in this case we considered both parental characteristics in the calculation as the results on the restricted sample are qualitative similar to those obtained using the larger sample with only education as parental characteristic.

levels of EOp, despite moderate levels of total inequality (Austria being the most extreme case). A third group of countries can be detected in the south-west region of the graph, where both types of inequality obtain the lowest values (in addition to Nordic countries - Sweden, Denmark and Finland - we could count Slovenia and Slovak Republic). A more consistent grouping can be obtained by applying cluster analysis to the relevant variables (total inequality, ex ante inequality of opportunity and ex post inequality of opportunity). The corresponding dendrogram shown in Figure 5 indicates that there are similarities among a group of “high income inequality - low EOp” countries (on the right hand side: Estonia, Portugal, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania - average total inequality 0.23, ex post opportunity inequality 0.06, ex ante opportunity inequality 0.02) and another group of “intermediate income inequality - low EOp” (on the left hand side: Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Iceland - average total inequality 0.19, ex post opportunity inequality 0.06, ex ante opportunity inequality 0.03). In between we find two other groups characterised by “low inequality - high EOp”, though at different extent (on the left hand side: Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, France, Hungary, Finland, Slovak Republic exhibit an average total inequality 0.15, ex post opportunity inequality 0.04, ex ante opportunity inequality 0.02 - on the right hand side: Denmark, Sweden, Slovenia have an average total inequality 0.10, ex post opportunity inequality 0.02, ex ante opportunity inequality 0.01). While recent access to free market may have contributed to the rise in total inequality, it is interesting to notice that not all formerly planned economies correspond to the case of low EOp. Even within continental Europe, we observe differences among countries that are usually grouped together (like Norway or Finland with other Scandinavian countries, or France which typically goes with Germany - see Hall and Soskice 2001).

### 3.3 Accounting for opportunity inequality: descriptive evidence

In this section we analyze the potential association between institutional characteristics and opportunity inequality. We are perfectly aware that we cannot go beyond suggested correlations, given the limited number of cases in this cross-country analysis. Nevertheless some theoretical expectation can be confronted with the data. For example, we expect the ex ante measure of EOp to be mostly correlated with institutional features of the educational system, because acquired education shape the earning capability of individuals. On the contrary, fiscal redistribution and labour market variables, which are more related to overall income differentials among individuals, are expected to be more correlated to ex post EOp.

Institutional measures are themselves problematic, for they are mostly derived from categorical variable that describe procedures (presence/absence

of a provision, alternatives available, stages to be accomplished). However we may (partially) account for the role of institutions by resorting to proxy variables, obtained from observed behaviour of people acting under a given institution. To provide an example, we know that for historical/cultural/institutional reasons, countries differ in childcare availability. Counting the number of available kindergartens would be a possible candidate for this institutional feature, but data are difficult to collect on a comparable cross-country basis. Resorting to the fraction of children attending childcare constitutes a reasonable alternative, which is much simpler to be collected from international/national statistical offices. As with most of institutional measures, this variable is potentially endogenous, since we ignore whether children do not attend kindergartens because they are not available, because their mother prefer housewifery and/or because most of the population still live in enlarged families (where grandparents take care of nursing). Nevertheless, the literature suggests that early schooling may contribute to reducing the role of parental background in competence formation (for example Cunha and Heckman 2007). As a consequence, other things constant we expect that countries where children attend kindergarten more are also characterised by greater EOp, since income differences by types (ex-ante EOp) should be lower. In the same vein, we know that the stratification of the educational system may reinforce the impact of parents' education, since low educated parents may prevents their kids from aspiring to more academic oriented careers (see for example Brunello and Checchi 2007). The quality of education may also play a role, since it may compensate the disadvantage of students coming from poor environment. Unfortunately, data on school quality are not easily available (unless one is ready to consider students achievements as a proxy for "revealed" quality). More modestly, we have considered economic resources publicly invested in the educational system as proxies for quality of education.

The apparent correlation between our measure of EOp and educational variables is evident in Figures 6 and 7. We do expect that EOp being reinforced by kindergarten attendance<sup>14</sup> and by comprehensive secondary school systems<sup>15</sup>, because both designs reduces the impact of parental education. Figure 6 show that this is true for ex ante EOp, but not for the ex post measure. However, when both variables are taken into account, this weak

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<sup>14</sup>Source: OECD online database (<http://www.oecd.org/education/database>). Data are referred to 2002, and are obtained from Brunello and Checchi (2007). The enrolment in pre-primary schooling of 4-year-old children made available from Eurostat with reference to 2005 was discarded because it was reporting values at 100% for some countries, contradicting the figures contained in Education at a glance from OECD.

<sup>15</sup>Data from Eurostat 2005 ([http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search\\_database](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database)). This indicator provides information on the percentage of boys and girls in upper secondary education who are enrolled in the vocational stream. It is indicative in the importance of initial vocational education and training in a country, taking into account also the gender dimension.

association tends to vanish (as it can be grasped looking at the first two columns of 4). When considering educational resources, we find that better quality education (i.e. less student per teacher - we were forced to use primary education, as it was the only variable which was non missing<sup>16</sup> - and/or more expenditure in education over GDP<sup>17</sup>) is associated to greater ex ante EOp, while an analogous association does not appear with ex post EOp. The positive correlation between public expenditure in education and ex ante EOp is also statistically significant in multivariate regression (see columns 3-4 of 4 - see also Figure 7).

When we move to labour market institutions, we expect that wage compressing institutions may reduce within-group variance in earnings, thus affecting ex post EOp more than ex ante one. Here data availability, especially for new entrants in the EU, is scarce. We consider two indirect measures of the degree of institutionalisation: the presence of union (proxied by union membership over dependent employment<sup>18</sup>) and the degree of employment protection, computed by OECD<sup>19</sup>. In accordance with the literature, we expected that when the labour market is heavily regulated, wages are less related to individual features, since unions press for job-related pay scales. In addition, employment protection reduces labour turnover, reducing individual income variability (and therefore aggregate wage inequality). Both measures have been proved to reduce total income inequality in the aggregate (Cecchi and García Peñalosa 2008). Figure 8 shows that in bivariate correlation this is true for union presence, but not for employment protection. When considering multivariate OLS regressions (see columns 5-6 of 4), we find support to our expectation: union presence is positively correlated to EOp, while employment protection is statistically insignificant; moreover, the effect is stronger with respect to ex post EOp than with the ex ante one.

Eventually, we have considered the role of welfare provisions. In general we do not have a priori theoretical expectation on their correlation with EOp, since taxes and subsidies aim to contain income inequality (through taxation) and to provide income insurance against unforeseeable events (through subsidies), but in no case they include compensatory measures which atten-

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<sup>16</sup>Also from Eurostat 2005. The pupil-teacher ratio is calculated by dividing the number of full-time equivalent pupils by the number of full-time equivalent teachers teaching at ISCED level 1. Only teachers in service (including special education teachers) are taken into account.

<sup>17</sup>Also from Eurostat 2005. This indicator is defined as total public expenditure on education, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Generally, the public sector funds education either by bearing directly the current and capital expenses of educational institutions or by supporting students and their families with scholarships and public loans as well as by transferring public subsidies for educational activities to private firms or non-profit organisations. Both types of transactions together are reported as total public expenditure on education.

<sup>18</sup>Data were kindly made available by Jelle Visser (University of Amsterdam).

<sup>19</sup>It is the index of overall Employment Protection Legislation (version 2), referred to 2003 (OECD 2004).

uate the impact of circumstances. However, as long as fiscal redistribution sustains low incomes (that may be correlated to disadvantaged conditions), we could find some positive correlation with EOp. We have selected two proxies for the welfare state, which are shown in Figure 9. In the left panel we have computed the ratio between the Gini index computed over gross incomes and the Gini index computed over disposable incomes: the larger is the ratio, the stronger is the redistributive role of the state.<sup>20</sup> We observe a negative correlation with inequality of opportunities, which does not occur when we consider social expenditure in the bottom panels of Figure 9.<sup>21</sup> When we consider multivariate OLS regressions (see columns 7-8 of 4), once more we find stronger association of fiscal redistribution with ex post EOp than with ex ante EOp, while social expenditure remains statistically insignificant.

## 4 Concluding remarks

In this paper we have presented alternative approaches to measuring inequality of opportunities. We have shown both ex-ante and ex-post approaches, both parametrically and not. We have then applied these methods to European countries, providing alternative country rankings. We show that standard income inequality and inequality of opportunities do not necessarily offer the same type of rankings (especially when comparing formerly non market economies with coordinated market economies, like Nordic ones). We then speculate about which is the most favourable institutional environment with respect to maximising EOp. Our results suggest that ex ante equality of opportunity is enhanced by educational institutions that promote lower impact of family backgrounds onto educational attainments (like pre-primary education and comprehensive secondary school systems). Conversely ex post equality of opportunity is positively correlated to union presence in the labour market and to fiscal redistribution.

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<sup>20</sup>Data are from the OECD database (<http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=INEQUALITY>) and are referred to mid-2000.

<sup>21</sup>>From Eurostat 2005: Expenditure on social protection contains: social benefits (transfers, in cash or in kind, to households and individuals to relieve them of the burden of a defined set of risks or needs); administration costs (costs charged to the scheme for its management and administration); other expenditure (miscellaneous expenditure by social protection schemes).



Table 1: Inequality of income and comparable Gini calculations

country	OECD Gini	EUROSTAT Gini	EUSILC Gini	EUSILC Mld
AT	0.27	0.26	0.275	0.164
BE	0.27	0.28	0.266	0.145
DE	0.30	0.26	0.290	0.185
DK	0.23	0.24	0.217	0.083
EE			0.344	0.243
ES	0.31	0.32	0.314	0.216
FI	0.27	0.26	0.271	0.136
FR	0.28	0.28	0.285	0.163
GR	0.31	0.33	0.316	0.200
HU	0.30	0.28	0.305	0.161
IE	0.32	0.32	0.296	0.187
IS	0.29	0.25	0.279	0.188
IT	0.35	0.33	0.309	0.197
LT			0.356	0.228
LU	0.26	0.26	0.276	0.148
LV			0.357	0.229
NL	0.27	0.27	0.270	0.184
NO	0.28	0.28	0.262	0.145
PL	0.38	0.36	0.364	0.271
PT	0.38	0.38	0.354	0.247
SE	0.24	0.23	0.231	0.106
SI			0.239	0.104
SK	0.27	0.26	0.278	0.132
UK	0.34	0.34	0.319	0.204

Notes: EUSILC Gini and MLD are given by authors' calculations; OECD Gini on working age population and Eurostat Gini are taken from <http://stats.oecd.org> and OECD (2008).

Table 2: Inequality of opportunity as a percentage of total inequality

country	ex ante	ex post
AT	0.226	0.396
BE	0.159	0.372
DE	0.162	0.270
DK	0.120	0.241
EE	0.086	0.272
ES	0.176	0.329
FI	0.088	0.169
FR	0.104	0.258
GR	0.130	0.270
HU	0.043	0.211
IE	0.171	0.337
IS	0.122	0.372
IT	0.122	0.305
LT	0.070	0.215
LU	0.176	0.311
LV	0.087	0.214
NL	0.179	0.380
NO	0.172	0.276
PL	0.063	0.207
PT	0.089	0.312
SE	0.104	0.189
SI	0.019	0.135
SK	0.106	0.242
UK	0.181	0.314

Notes: The columns refer to MLD in relative terms calculated by the type approach and tranche approach.

Table 3: Inequality of opportunity in absolute term

country	ex ante	ex post
AT	0.037	0.065
BE	0.023	0.054
DE	0.030	0.050
DK	0.010	0.020
EE	0.021	0.066
ES	0.038	0.071
FI	0.012	0.023
FR	0.017	0.042
GR	0.026	0.054
HU	0.007	0.034
IE	0.032	0.063
IS	0.023	0.070
IT	0.024	0.060
LT	0.016	0.049
LU	0.026	0.046
LV	0.020	0.049
NL	0.033	0.070
NO	0.025	0.040
PL	0.017	0.056
PT	0.022	0.077
SE	0.011	0.020
SI	0.002	0.014
SK	0.014	0.032
UK	0.037	0.064


Notes: The columns refer to MLD in absolute terms calculated by the type approach and tranche approach.

Table 4: Estimated correlation between institutional measures and Inequality of opportunities (absolute measures)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	ex ante	ex post	ex ante	ex post	ex ante	ex post	ex ante	ex post
enrolment in preprimary over primary OECD 2002	-0.019 [1.47]	-0.0315 [1.46]						
percentage 2nd school male students vocational programmes Eurostat 2005	0.0001 [0.93]	-0.0001 [0.59]						
expenditure in education in terms of gdp Eurostat 2005			-0.0032 [2.23]**	-0.0057 [1.46]				
pupil teacher ratio in primary school Eurostat 2005			0.0007 [1.10]	-0.0004 [0.40]				
union density rate 2005					-0.0002 [1.80]*	-0.0006 [3.74]***		
OECD employment protection legislation version II 2003					-0.0018 [0.40]	0.0009 [0.14]		
Iversen centralisation index 2005								
gini before and after tax and transfer OECD mid 2000							-0.0251 [1.87]*	-0.0681 [3.14]***
expenditure in social protection in terms of gdp Eurostat 2005							0.0004 [1.05]	0.0002 [0.31]
Observations	20	20	23	23	17	17	17	17
R squared	0.12	0.1	0.21	0.12	0.17	0.48	0.21	0.46
Log likelihood	66.57	53.75	76.63	61.19	56.18	50.16	58.89	50.47

Robust t statistics in brackets - constant included - Columns 1-2 excludes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. Columns 3-4 excludes Norway. Columns 5-10 excludes Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%.


Figure 1 - Income inequality according to different data source (OECD and EUSILC)



Sources: authors's calculations and <http://stats.oecd.org>


Figure 2 - Income inequality according to different indicators (Gini and

Mid) - EUSILC 2005



Sources: authors's calculations


Figure 3 - Absolute opportunity inequality: ex ante and ex post - EUSILC 2005



Sources: Authors's calculations

Figure 4 - Income inequality and ex ante opportunity inequality - EUSILC


2005



Sources: Authors's calculations

Figure 4bis - Income inequality and ex post opportunity inequality -

### EUSILC 2005



Sources: Authors's calculations  
 Figure 5 - Cluster analysis based on inequality




Figure 6 - Opportunity inequality and schooling




Figure 7 - Opportunity inequality and educational resources






Figure 8 - Opportunity inequality and labour market institutions




Figure 9 - Opportunity inequality and the role of fiscal redistribution

## 5 Appendix

Table 5: Summary statistics on main individual variables

country	m(x)	sd(x)	female	foreign	not densely pop	m(age)	sd(age)	education			N
								1	2	3	
AT	18237	8941	45.0	11.6	70.5	43.4	7.9		0.69	0.31	4256
BE	21310	12343	44.4	10.8	49.1	43.2	7.9	0.006	0.52	0.47	3601
DE	19508	9999	54.1	4.8	56.1	44.2	7.5		0.49	0.51	8296
DK	19601	8206	50.2	3.6	67.2	44.1	8.5		0.65	0.35	2796
EE	3807	2847	54.6	14.2	69.4	44.3	8.2		0.59	0.41	3730
ES	14062	8052	41.3	6.2	50.9	42.7	8.3		0.67	0.33	10012
FI	20915	10178	49.3	1.9	76.9	44.9	8.5		0.60	0.40	4535
FR	19368	10099	48.3	10.9	56.0	43.6	8.2		0.67	0.33	7164
GR	13870	8698	36.9	8.7	60.2	43.0	8.4		0.70	0.30	3980
HU	4353	4934	47.1	2.5	63.6	43.4	8.5	0.001	0.80	0.20	4591
IE	23938	12545	45.5	11.6	62.7	44.2	8.2		0.57	0.43	4072
IS	20466	10001	50.2	4.9	42.9	42.7	8.6		0.97	0.03	1248
IT	18654	13943	42.1	5.8	64.9	43.1	8.1	0.005	0.77	0.22	17151
LT	3022	2301	53.0	6.4	54.7	44.6	7.9		0.38	0.62	3659
LU	30034	14482	43.6	50.6	54.0	41.5	8.1		0.69	0.31	2498
LV	2871	2062	54.4	15.7	49.9	43.8	8.3	0.002	0.64	0.36	2706
NL	18198	8768	45.2	5.1		43.5	8.3		0.61	0.39	8441
NO	19809	9403	48.7	6.8	50.6	43.8	8.5	0.001	0.60	0.40	5674
PL	3690	2547	45.9	0.3	60.2	42.9	7.8	0.003	0.75	0.25	10347
PT	8997	6199	45.5	2.4	64.4	43.2	8.4		0.88	0.12	3375
SE	19453	8256	49.4	9.9	81.5	44.5	8.9		0.57	0.43	2435
SI	9557	4117	48.6	11.3		42.4	7.9		0.78	0.22	3011
SK	3748	3146	48.8	2.0	71.0	43.8	8.0		0.80	0.20	4461
UK	23861	13872	50.9	8.7	26.7	44.0	8.6		0.55	0.45	5421
Total	15129	11911	46.7	7.4	59.5	43.48	8.21	0.003	0.75	0.25	127460

The columns of this table show the following statistics: 1. average post tax individual income; 2 standard deviation of post tax individual incomes; 3 percentage of females; 4. percentage of foreign born; 5. percentage of individuals not living in a densely populated area; 6. average age; 7 age standard deviation; 8 percentage of individuals with no education; 9 percentage of individuals with primary or secondary school degree ; 10 percentage of individuals with higher degree. 11 number of observations.

Table 6: Summary statistics on main parental variables

country	occupation			N	education			N
	1	2	3		1	2	3	
AT	0.59	0.32	0.09	3845	0	0.94	0.06	4025
BE	0.47	0.25	0.28	2995	0.11	0.67	0.22	3601
DE	0.52	0.23	0.25	7421	0	0.66	0.34	8296
DK	0.48	0.30	0.22	2649	0	0.78	0.22	2796
EE	0.75	0.10	0.15	3029	0.01	0.72	0.27	3730
ES	0.60	0.28	0.12	9496	0.20	0.69	0.11	10012
FI	0.52	0.32	0.17	3810	0.03	0.81	0.16	4535
FR	0.55	0.29	0.16	6562	0.04	0.86	0.10	7164
GR	0.35	0.51	0.14	3817	0.25	0.66	0.09	3980
HU	0.66	0.22	0.12	3986	0.00	0.84	0.16	4591
IE	0.47	0.14	0.39	2612	0.01	0.83	0.15	2792
IS	0.38	0.37	0.25	1083	0	0.76	0.24	1248
IT	0.58	0.24	0.19	15562	0.11	0.85	0.04	17151
LT	0.77	0.11	0.12	3170	0.05	0.69	0.26	3659
LU	0.55	0.23	0.22	2365	0.06	0.76	0.18	2498
LV	0.77	0.10	0.13	2104	0.02	0.77	0.21	2706
NL	0.39	0.20	0.41	3534	0	0.83	0.17	3866
NO	0.45	0.31	0.24	2519	0	0.58	0.42	2752
PL	0.53	0.36	0.11	9377	0.11	0.80	0.09	10347
PT	0.61	0.31	0.08	3057	0.35	0.61	0.03	3375
SE	0.50	0.29	0.21	535	0.01	0.79	0.20	2435
SI	0.61	0.27	0.11	2623	0.04	0.87	0.09	3011
SK	0.72	0.14	0.14	4070	0	0.90	0.10	4461
UK	0.62	0.24	0.13	2780	0.50	0.16	0.34	5421
Total	0.57	0.26	0.17	103001	0.10	0.75	0.15	118452

The columns of this table show the following statistics: 1. percentage of individuals who have at least one of the parents employed in the categories 8000 and 9000 of the ISCO88 classification; 2. percentage of individuals who have at least one of the parents employed in categories from 5000 to 7000 of the ISCO88 classification; 3. percentage of individuals who have at least one of the parents employed in categories 1000 to 4000 of the ISCO88 classification (see the text for further details); 4. number of observations available for the parental occupation variable; 5. percentage of individuals who have both parents with no education; 6. percentage of individuals who have at least one of the parents with primary or secondary school degree; 7. percentage of individuals who have at least one of the parents with post-secondary or higher degree; 8. number of observations available for the parental education variable.

Table 7: Tax rate in Denmark

<u>Taxable income in euro</u>	<u>tax rate</u>
0 - 3250	0
32501 - 6500	13.3
65001 - 9750	19.2
97501 - 13000	24.1
130001 - 16250	27.6
162501 - 19500	28.7
195001 - 26000	30.4
260001 - 32500	32.7
325001 - 39000	34.5
390001 - 45500	36.2
455001 - 52000	38.9
520001 - 65000	42.3
650001 - 97500	48.4
975001 - 130000	53
130001	59.2

Source: [www.skm.dk](http://www.skm.dk).

Table 8: Tax rate in Finland

<u>Taxable income in euro</u>	<u>tax rate</u>
12200 - 17000	9
17001 - 20000	14
20001 - 32800	19.5
32801 - 58200	25
58201 -	32.5

Source: [www.vero.fi](http://www.vero.fi).

Table 9: Tax rate in Hungary

<u>Taxable income in euro</u>	<u>tax rate</u>
1 - 5960	18
5961 -	38

Source: [www.worldwide-tax.com](http://www.worldwide-tax.com).

Table 10: Tax rate in the Netherlands

Taxable income in euro	tax rate
1 - 16265	0
16266 - 29543	7.95
29544 - 50652	42
50653 -	52

Source: OECD.

Table 11: Tax rate in Norway

Taxable income in NOK	tax rate
lower limit	tax rate
0	0.0
29600 - 43022	25.0
43023 - 65999	7.8
66000 - 102580	35.8
102581 - 185160	27.1
185161 - 380999	35.8
381000 - 799999	47.8
800000	51.3

Source: www.Taxnorway.no.

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