#### **NGFS Scenarios:**

Available data and portals

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#### Agenda

- NGFS long-term scenarios: Data access, resources and focus on Italy
- NGFS short-term scenarios: Data access, tools, resources and examples
- NGFS short vs long-term scenarios: main differences



# NGFS long-term scenarios: <u>Data access, resources and focus on Italy</u>



# Overview of resources on NGFS long-term scenarios

The NGFS long-term scenario documentation and data can be accessed via the following platforms:



Web resources

NGFS Portal



#### **Explanatory material**

- Presentation and overview of the long-term Scenarios
- NGFS Scenarios Technical Documentation
- Note on damage functions & others
- User Guide
- Q&A and/or FAQ



#### Data


- NGFS IIASA Scenario Explorer
- NGFS Climate Impact Explorer




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#### **IIASA Scenario Explorer**

The IIASA portal offers workspaces to select and visualize scenario data, and allows for bulk downloads of all data and documentations










#### From modelling framework to data sources

# Physical risk, transition risk and macro-financial impacts are modelled separately (but consistently), producing various data sources

- Transition variables are separately produced by the three Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs): GCAM, MESSAGE and REMIND. These flow into the economic modelling.
- Chronic physical risk variables are sourced from a damage function, which is aligned with the IAMs based on the temperature pathways they produce
- Acute physical risk variables are generated by various Natural Catastrophe Models. They are provided to the macroeconomic model NiGEM by Climate Analytics (Phase IV)
- Macro-financial variables are produced by the econometric model NiGEM, based on respective IAM and physical risk inputs.






#### Data Available | Summary


#### A wide variety of variables is available across multiple data sources


Transition			Chronic Physical			Acute Physical			Macroeconomic									
REMIND MESSAGE GCAM				Damage function			Climate Analytics (CA) and			NiGEM								
	Cour	ntry-leve	l downs	caling		RE- MIND	MES- SAGE	GCAM	ETH - Natural Catastroph Models			ophe	IAMs (REMIND, MESSAGE, GCAM)  Damage & ETH				&	
Climate	Energy	Energy usage	Agriculture	Prices	Economic	GDP Chronic	GDP Ch	GDP Ch	60 <sup>th</sup> – 99 <sup>th</sup> percentile					Ac- ute				
	capacity	usage	ture		nic	Integrated run  Chronic	Chronic	Chronic	GDP Droughts	GDP Heatwaves	GDP Cyclones	Floods	Economic activity output	Economic activity consumption	Trade	Prices	Interest rates	GDP




#### Italy: GHG and sectoral emissions











Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)


Net Zero 2050



#### Italy: Primary energy







■ Share of Brown energy


Share of Green energy







#### Italy: Final energy

Losses and macroeconomic variables are (usually) shown relative to a 'baseline' scenario, which is a fictional scenario with no physical, nor transition risks.












## Italy: Final energy mix














## Italy: Final energy prices














#### Italy: Transition & chronic physical risks


Macroeconomic variables are shown relative to a 'baseline' scenario, which is a fictional scenario with no physical, nor transition risks.

GDP losses from transition & chronic physical risks ( % diff. from baseline)



The academic paper underpinning the chronic physical risk estimates in Phase V (Kotz et al., 2024) has received critiques in a post-publication review by Nature. The paper has since been substantially revised and is now subject to a new peer-review process. Users are advised to take this revision into account, especially considering that estimated losses in Phase IV were significantly lower than those in Phase V. Results related to transition risks (i.e., from IAM or NIGEM transition risk only) or acute physical risks are not affected by this revision.


#### GDP losses from transition risks in 2050 (% diff. from baseline)





\*Model used: NiGEM with REMIND inputs, considering both transition and (chronic) physical risks. Data for Italy.



#### Italy: GDP, inflation and interest rate (transition)









Macroeconomic variables are shown relative to a 'baseline' scenario, which is a fictional scenario with no physical, nor transition risks.

Current Policies
 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)
 Net Zero 2050




#### Italy: (Tail) acute physical risks





Worst case damages in 2050 by hazard: GDP (% diff. from baseline, 99th perc.)



Macroeconomic variables are shown relative to a 'baseline' scenario, which is a fictional scenario with no physical, nor transition risks.



#### Climate Impact Explorer

# Through the Climate Impact Explorer, climate-related data consistent with NGFS scenarios can be consulted and visualized



Access to the Climate Analytics Climate Impact Explorer



2020



# NGFS short-term scenarios overview (first vintage) Data access, tools and resources, examples



#### Overview of resources on NGFS short-term scenarios

The NGFS short-term scenario documentation and data can be accessed via the following platforms:



Web resources

NGFS Website



**Explanatory material** 

- Presentation Short-term Scenarios
- NGFS Scenarios Technical Documentation
- Q&A and/or FAQ



Data

- IIASA portal
- NGFS EnTry Toolkit



#### Short-term scenarios key assumptions

The impact of physical and transition risk in short-term scenarios is driven by the level of policy ambition and coordination, investments, technology levers, and expectations.

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
	Scenario Transition shocks		International cooperation	Physical risk shocks	Investments	Financial markets		
	Highway to Paris	Carbon tax to reach net- zero	High None		Carbon revenues <b>fully recycled</b> into R&D and subsidies for clean energy technologies	Rise in capital costs and risk premia for polluting sectors		
	Sudden Wake- Up Call	<u>Delayed</u> carbon tax to reach net-zero	Low None		Carbon revenues only <b>partially recycled</b> (in line with baseline) for clean energy technologies	Sudden rise in capital costs and risk premia for polluting sectors		
-	Disasters and Policy Stagnation*	None	N.A.	Region-specific disasters with international spillovers, compound shocks	Decreased consumption and investments	Rise in capital costs and risk premia in sectors and countries exposed to physical risk		
	Divergent Realities	Carbon tax to reach net- zero selected regions	Low	Region-specific disasters occurring consecutively, compound shocks	Decreased consumption and investments	Rise in capital costs and risk premia in sectors and countries exposed to physical risk or to implemented transition policies		


Macro-financial risk perspective Lower risk Moderate risk Higher risk



#### Economic impacts of climate-related risks - World

The baseline scenario is calibrated using the October 2023 IMF World Economic Outlook projections and accounts for climate targets pledged by January 2023





Diverging Realities

Disasters and Policy Stagnation

**Probabilities of Default - World** 

The *Disasters and Policy Stagnation* scenario has 6 different regional variants, with each variant showing the effect of extreme weather events affecting one region of the world and the global economy through trade and financial linkages. Those 6 variants **are individual and alternative scenarios**.




#### Investments and sectoral production - World


# Transition efforts create 'winning' and 'losing' sectors, while extreme weather events tend to affect productive sectors more homogenously.

• Investments rise globally in *Highway to Paris*, supported by the recycling of carbon tax revenues into the green transition. In *Sudden Wake-Up Call* investments decline due to lack of carbon revenue recycling. Physical risk scenarios cause a decline in investments, driven by lower economic activity, with longer-lasting effects in a *Diverging Realities* scenario.

 Sectoral output decreases in transition risk scenarios for high-emitting sectors, whilst increasing for green sectors, driven by higher green investments. This is partially reflected in *Diverging Realities*, where advanced economies proceed with the green transition. In *Disaster and Policy Stagnation*, economic sectors are more evenly affected by physical asset destruction and lower productivity levels.





#### Sectoral production, World Cumulative difference from baseline in % (2024-2030)







#### Country-specific GDP impacts of climate-related risks














\*The Disasters and Policy Stagnation scenario has 6 different regional variants (one per regional physical shock) that should be used in isolation. For simplicity, the GDP value shown here is an average of country total impacts from those 6 individual (and alternative) regional shocks. For prices, a GDP Weighted average is used to reflect the size of each region in forming the world aggregate.

## Economic impacts of climate-related risks - Italy








DAPS\_EUR = Considers European physical shocks
DAPS\_ave = average impacts from 6 (alternative) regional shocks


## Financial market dynamics in 2 scenarios - Italy

#### Transition risk leads to a concentration of financial risks within highemission sectors.

#### Probabilities of Default, Selected Sectors - Italy pp difference to baseline

 Credit risk significantly increases for highemission sectors in Highway to Paris and Sudden Wake-Up Call due to higher capital costs. In contrast, credit risk for green sectors decreases in Highway to Paris driven by higher investments in these industries.








## Financial sector dynamics in 2 scenarios - Italy

Financial risks increase for high-emission sectors, driven by higher costs and investor expectations. Early and coordinated transition mitigates financial risks for green sectors by fostering investment stability and

market confidence.

- High-emission sectors experience higher capital costs and higher probabilities of default, driven by
  - (i) increased expenses stemming from (shadow) carbon prices and
  - (ii) investors adapting their expectations to the high cost of transition of these sectors.
- In Highway to Paris, green subsidies lead to a reduction in capital costs for green sectors.
- This development is absent in **Sudden Wake-Up Call** due to low carbon revenue recycling in this scenario. As a result, a larger portion of the required funding must be raised by the private sector. This, alongside the restrictive monetary policy environment, leads to higher associated capital costs.





## Short vs long-term scenarios: main differences

# NGFS short- and long-term scenarios should be compared with caution as they explore different narratives and employ different modelling frameworks.

- Narrative assumptions: Different narratives, policy storylines and applied shocks. Transition narratives may partly align, but the timing differs.
- Modelling frameworks and transmission channels: Different suites of models and transmission channels.
- The baseline: The baseline for the short-term scenarios are calibrated based on the IMF's October 2023 World Economic Outlook, whilst the Phase V long-term scenarios also on the SSP2, NIESR baseline projections.
- Physical risk and geographical locations: In the short-term scenarios, physical risk is driven by specific acute compound events occurring in selected years and affecting each continent individually, while also accounting for trade and financial linkages.
- Variables definitions: Availability and definitions of the variables might differ.

NDCs: includes all pledged targets even if not backed up by effective policies.

Compare with STS baseline: use only LTS transition risk results.

Consider that some NDCs also include pledged (not legislated) policies.

**Net Zero 2050:** Gradual and globally coordinated transition. **Compare with STS HWTP:** use only LTS transition risk results.

Delayed Transition: Disorderly transition starts in 2030, countries with Net Zero targets achieve 80% of them.

Compare with STS SWUC: limited due to the different timing of the transition and CO<sub>2</sub> emission outcomes; use only LTS transition risk results.





# **Appendix**




# Italy: Private and Government investment (transition)








#### Government investment (transition - % diff. from baseline)



Macroeconomic variables are shown relative to a 'baseline' scenario, which is a fictional scenario with no physical, nor transition risks.

Current Policies Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) Net Zero 2050







### Issues for discussion: uncertainty on mitigation



#### 1. Uncertainty on technologies to remove, capture and storage C02

- Achieving ambitious emission target necessitates the employment of technologies to capture and store durably the CO2 in excess from the atmosphere or at the emissions sources
  - Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) from the atmosphere (i.e. reforestation, Direct Air Carbon Capture and Storage (DACCS))
  - Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) of CO2 at emissions source
- The still limited utilization of these technologies casts doubt on the realistic attainment of the targets
  - Estimates on the required volumes of CDR by 2050 range from 1.5 to 10 billion of tonnes per year
  - The NGFS Net Zero 2050 scenario makes **an optimistic assumption** on their availability within the range identified in the literature assuming that CCS technologies will cover about 6 billion of tonnes in 2050









#### Issues for discussion: uncertainty on mitigation



#### 2. Uncertainty on the development of renewable energy

- The orderly scenarios imply an uptake of renewable energies and electrification never seen before
  - Data are updated to take into account latest trends in renewable energy technologies and energy markets
  - Still, several factors might slow down the deployment of renewable energy
  - For instance, high policy rates, geopolitical risks, the decreasing likelihood of continued cost reduction in renewable energy technologies (IMF, 2023) and supply chain constrains on critical minerals









#### Issues for discussion: physical risk and policies

#### 3. Fiscal and monetary policies do not react to physical risks

It can be helpful to look at transition and physical impacts on macro variables separately

