The poor, the rich, and the credit channel of monetary policy by M. Delis, A. Ferrando, K. Mulier, and S. Ongena

> **Discussion by Efi Adamopoulou** ZEW and University of Mannheim

1st Banca d'Italia Annual Research Conference on Monetary Policy Rome, June 12-13 2025 • One reminder

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 - Private wealth acts as (implicit) collateral. Expansionary monetary policy increases loan approval rates for less wealthy entrepreneurs.

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 - Sharp RDD around the **credit score cutoff** of loan applicants.
- One main result
 - Private wealth acts as (implicit) collateral. Expansionary monetary policy increases loan approval rates for less wealthy entrepreneurs.
- One macro implication
 - Monetary policy easing boosts future income of less wealthy entrepreneurs, thus reducing wealth inequality.

Adamopoulou (ZEW)


Discussion of The poor, the rich, and the credit channel of monetary policy

• Nice paper on a policy-relevant topic.

• Plausible identification strategy.

• Well written paper, enjoyable to read.

Comments on the identification: Balancing 1/2



This Figure shows the effect of the bank's decision to grant the loan (credit score above the 0 cutoff) on the loan applicant's wealth 3 years onward. The figure displays one single cutoff point and a clear discontinuity on the cutoff.

How similar are groups below and above the credit score cutoff (window - 0.3 to 0.3)?

Adamopoulou (ZEW)

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	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.	Mean diff.	Std. error
	0.00	0.11			0.00-	0.01.
Apply	0.26	0.44	0	1	0.007	0.014
Granted	0.66	0.27	0	1	1	0
Shadow rate	-0.19	3.28	-6.40	4.28	0.017	0.016
Monetary policy shock	0.02	2.31	-7.10	4.74	0.004	0.008
Wealth	11.50	0.60	7.21	13.97	0.020	0.026
Income	10.69	0.30	9.73	11.49	0.027	0.026
Education	2.13	0.99	0	5	0.033	0.021
Age	44.80	15.86	20	76	0.238	0.252
Dependents	1.86	1.47	0	6	0.004	0.036
Gender	0.81	0.39	0	1	0.009	0.006
Firm size	12.72	0.40	9.96	14.09	0.011	0.007
Firm leverage	0.20	0.03	0.15	0.74	0.002	0.002
Firm ROA	0.06	0.09	-0.40	0.49	0.005	0.020
Firm cash holdings	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.16	0.000	0.001
Number of applications	7.22	1.48	1	9	0.091	0.070
Credit score	0.06	0.16	-0.30	0.30	0.300^{***}	0.002
Default	0.04	0.11	0	1	0.000	0.003
Δ Wealth	0.02	0.57	-1.89	2.22	0.001	0.007
Δ Income	0.02	0.44	-1.26	1.32	0.001	0.006
Δ Firm size	0.01	0.41	-1.27	1.14	0.003	0.006
Δ Firm leverage	0.00	0.08	-0.08	0.11	0.000	0.002
Δ Firm ROA	0.00	0.14	-0.19	0.24	0.003	0.011
Δ Firm cash holdings	0.00	0.01	-0.13	0.1	0.000	0.001

• No differences in the observed applicant and firm characteristics between the groups below and above the cutoff.

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- **1. Firm age** (absence of financial records in early-stage firms)
 - Hochmuth (2025). Financial Constraints, Firm Age, and the Labor Market, WP.

• Different loan approval rates due to **soft** information?

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- **1. Firm age** (absence of financial records in early-stage firms)
 - Hochmuth (2025). Financial Constraints, Firm Age, and the Labor Market, WP.
- 2. Sector of activity (wealth may be misreported in some sectors)
 - Artavanis, Morse, Tsoutsoura (2016). Measuring Income Tax Evasion Using Bank Credit: Evidence from Greece, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.

- **Gender** is used as an instrument to address self-selection into loan application.
- Exclusion restriction: gender affects **application probability** but **not loan origination or terms** in the countries under consideration (AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, and NL-Delis et al., 2022).
- Alesina, Lotti and Mistrulli (2013). Do Women Pay More for Credit? Evidence from Italy, *Journal of the European Economic Association*.
 - Women in IT pay more for credit than men, despite similar risk and borrower characteristics
- Worth studying **cross-country heterogeneity.**

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- SMEs make up about 99% of all firms in AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, NL.
 Large firms although few in number, they account for over one-third of employment (Source: Eurostat)
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 Large firms although few in number, they account for over one-third of employment (Source: <u>Eurostat</u>)
- SMEs heavily depend on **bank loans** as their primary source of external finance. Large firms often have access to **capital markets** (bonds, equity).
- Findings are relevant for some EU countries, but transferability to market-based economies (US) or economies where large firms are also loan-dependent (Italy) may be limited.
- Adamopoulou, De Philippis, Sette, Viviano (2023). The Long-Term Earnings Effects of a Credit Market Disruption, *WP*
 - Credit shocks in Italy affect more capital-intensive firms and their workers.

- The paper is somewhat long (30 pages of text) and presents many results (16 tables).
- The second identification strategy using SAFE data is less plausible due to the **lack of credit score information**
 - It mainly serves as a robustness check and could be moved to the Appendix.
 - The authors find that SMEs' private wealth matters more for banks with lower liquidity and capital, which is interpreted as supply-side channel. However, this could also reflect assortative matching between firms and banks.

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