Labour Supply Responses to Recent Fiscal Reforms in Portugal

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Summary

• Microsimulation tools:

- EUROMOD: "first-order" static income impacts
- EUROLAB: behavioural labour supply + demand equilibrium

• Policies implemented:

- PIT schedule reform: 7→9 brackets, new middle rate (*regressive* in distributional terms)
- Raised minimum untaxed income (*progressive*, benefits lower-income households)
- Enhanced child benefits: floors, higher rates, complementary transfer (*progressive*, targets poorest)

• Key results:

- PIT reform: small positive employment effects
- Untaxed income reform: negligible net labour change
- Child benefit reform: modest disincentives for low-income single parents

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- Are these small behavioural effects economically meaningful given frequent minor fiscal tweaks?
- e How would results change with post-pandemic data?
- What changes could mitigate disincentives for low-income or single-parent households?
- Sould active labour market policies counterbalance negative effects?
- Technical issues

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Q1. Are these small behavioural effects economically meaningful given frequent minor fiscal tweaks?

- Cumulative impact of sequential reforms
- Cost-benefit analysis
- $\bullet\,$ The analysis on welfare and efficiency indicators is interesting \Rightarrow I would expand it

Q2. How would results change with post-pandemic data?

- Updated EU-SILC (2022–23) captures pandemic labour shocks
- More generally, amid the cultural shock induced by the pandemic, do these estimates remain valid for more recent years?
- Role of remote work & sectoral shifts on labour supply responses

Discussion: Policy Refinements for Vulnerable Groups

Q3. What changes could mitigate disincentives for low-income or single-parent households?

• You find that the child benefit reform led to a reduction in labour supply, epseically for these groups of HH

Why?

- Means-tested supplements conditional on job search
- Integration with childcare support and active labour programs (NRRP)
- Policy Relevant Treatment Effect (PRTE; Heckman, Vytlacil, 2005)

Discussion: Complementary Active Policies

Q4. Could active labour market policies counterbalance negative effects?

• "Our findings suggest that income support measures could be complemented with policies that promote employment...".

However, barriers remain, so ALMP may be relevant:

- Training subsidies, wage subsidies, job matching services
- Conditional cash transfers tied to program participation
- Fiscal budget reallocation: ex-ante costs vs long-term employment gains

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Q5. Some aspects deserve a more detailed explanations

- Did you use weights?
- I expected the labour supply elasticity derived along the lines of a Marginal Treatment Effect (**MTE**; Carneiro and Lee, 2019)
- What is the sensitivity of the results to labour demand elasticity?

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Thank you!

Domenico Depalo

Implemented Fiscal Measures

• PIT Schedule Reform (2022–23)

- Brackets increased from 7 to 9
- Middle-income rate lowered, indexation by 5.1

• Minimum Untaxed Income

• Tax-free threshold raised to avoid full taxation around minimum wage

• Child Benefit Reinforcements

- $\leq 100/mo$ floor for extreme poverty
- Higher rates for first two child brackets
- Expanded upper-income cutoff
- Additional €50/child complementary transfer

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Modelling Approach

EUROMOD

- Static "day-after" impacts on disposable income
- Data: 2020 Portuguese EU-SILC

EUROLAB

- Discrete-choice labour supply model
- Gumbel error \rightarrow logit probabilities
- Demand-side elasticity (-0.5) for equilibrium

- PIT reform: gains in upper deciles (regressive)
- Untaxed income lift: benefits deciles 1-7 (neutral)
- Child benefit: targets bottom deciles 1-3 (progressive)
- Combined: slight net progressivity

- PIT reform: +0.18% hours, +0.10% participation
- Untaxed income: 0 net change
- Child benefit: -0.17% hours, -0.20% participation
- Largest impact on lowest quintile single parents

- \bullet PIT reform $\rightarrow +0.16\%$ employment; wage –0.30%
- \bullet Child benefit \rightarrow –0.28% employment; wage +0.60%
- $\bullet~$ Untaxed income $\rightarrow~$ negligible change
- $\bullet~$ Combined $\rightarrow -0.09\%$ employment

Assumes labour demand elasticity -0.5