ECB-RESTRICTED



Discussion of:

"Fiscal Rules and Discretion with Risk of Default"
by Chiara Felli, *Facundo Piguillem*, Liyan Shi
"Moral Hazard with Risk-Sharing and Safe Debt"
Ramon Marimon, Adrien Wicht, *Luca Zavalloni*

XXII Banca d'Italia Public Finance Workshop



5 September 2024

Jacopo Cimadomo (European Central Bank)

# Piguillem et al.'s paper

- The paper studies the optimal fiscal and default rules when governments can default on their debt obligations.
- A continuous-time model that encompasses hyperbolic discounting (myopia) and political economy frictions → rationale for debt overaccumulation

## Piguillem et al.'s paper


- 1. When the myopia is mild, eliminating all spending constraints is close to optimal
- $\rightarrow$  Low government myopia limits to over-spending and leads over-default.
- 2. When there is severe myopia fiscal rules should be as tight as possible
- $\rightarrow$  Excessive government myopia leads to over-spending and under-default.
- → To solve this problem, the planner imposes tighter debt limits, which takes the form of force default in certain areas (debt limit).
- 3. Optimal default rules are more important than spending rules: the welfare gains of regulating default are at least one order of magnitude larger than controlling spending.


### **Operationalizing the debt default rule**


- Either the constitution or some special law that forbids default when the debt level is below a certain threshold  $b < \overline{b}$ , or forces it when  $b > \overline{b}$ .
- A rule that forces default is de-facto a **debt limit rule**.
- Empirical illustration: debt limit at 125% of GDP
- Authors: "these kinds of rules are rare, if not completely absent, in the currently observed set of fiscal rules."
- Their unusual existence "should not be a deterrent to future implementation"

## Piguillem et al.'s paper


- Very elegant and fascinating paper, I have really enjoyed reading it!
- Default is a viable option and can be welfare improving under some circumstances (Adam and Grill, 2017)
- Trade-off between commitment (rules) and flexibility (discretion)
- What about domestic lenders?
- My main comment is on the "real life" implementation of debt default rules (e.g., debt limit), especially for the EU and other advanced economies (see debate on SDRM, e.g., Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018)







www.ecb.europa.eu ©



www.ecb.europa.eu ©

Successful introduction of a debt default rule (in advanced economies):

- Very high threshold (*useful?*)
- Overnight announcement and implementation (*de facto, discretion*)
- Suspension in a transition period for high-debt countries, until they have reduced their debt levels significant below the threshold (*problematic enforcement*)
- Outright reduction of national debt via the introduction of a common EU vehicle (Marimon, Wicht, Zavalloni, 2024; Amato et al. 2024) and/or stronger risk-sharing mechanisms, as e.g. in Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018, (politically difficult)

#### Discussion of:

#### "Moral Hazard with Risk-Sharing and Safe Debt"

by Ramon Marimon, Adrien Wicht, Luca Zavalloni

### Zavalloni et al.'s paper

- Introduce a Financial Stability Fund provides long-term credit and insurance contracts to sovereign countries making their debt liabilities safe, without ever incurring in expected losses (see also Callegari et al., 2023)
- However, this can exacerbate moral hazard problems.
- Two contributions:
- 1. Mechanism design, with incentive compatibility (IC) constraints, can overcome these problems
- 2. Some form of conditionality can be a substitute for, or a better instrument than, IC constraints

# Zavalloni et al.'s paper

- The Financial Stability Fund (Fund) is modelled as a long-term contract between a Fund (lender) and an individual partner (country or borrower) who is the government of the small open economy.
- The Fund contract chooses a state-contingent sequence of consumption, leisure and effort that maximises the life-time utility of the borrower given some initial level of the borrower's debt.
- A certain share of debt is taken over by the Fund when the country joins the scheme
- The country may exercise effort ex-ante to be eligible for a better contract

### Zavalloni et al.'s paper

- Great paper!
- It combines elements of the literature on optimal contracts with elements of the literature about sovereign debt and defaults

# **Comments and questions**

- Callegari et al. (2023): if the Fund does not have enough absorption capacity to be able to take all the new sustainable debt of a sovereign, the Central Bank (CB) might step in 'to purchase whatever else is needed', e.g. → perfect complementarity between the Fund and the CB. What are the implications of removing the CB (in Marimon et al., 2024)?
- 2. How one can operationalise such scheme, e.g., in the EMU?
- 3. Would the Fund still able to issue bonds at a risk-free rate when it takes over national (high-risk) debt?
- 4. Would countries contribute to the scheme in case of positive technology shocks (rainy day fund)?

# Beetsma, van Spronsen, Cimadomo (EER, 2024)

- How can risksharing be improved with limited risk for moral hazard?
- A Central Fiscal Capacity targeting area-wide, national and regional shocks




Figure: Growth rate of per capita GDP at the NUTS3 regional level in the EA

### Beetsma, van Spronsen, Cimadomo (EER, 2024)

 Such CFC generates considerable stabilisation achieved with borrowing limit comparable to the EU's RRF: about 40% of regional shocks smoothed with 500 billion borrowing limit (per year)




Figure: aggregate disbursement of the CFC in every year, in response to the three shocks

# Thank you!

## **Other comments and questions**

- Implication of adding *domestic* lenders (sovereign-bank nexus)
- Dynamic model and forward-looking financial sector
- What are the implication of imposing a debt default rule (on national debt) in a monetary union?

# **Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanisms (SDRMs)**

Earlier proposals in the EU:

- Bénassy-Quéré et al., CEPR Reports (2018, 2019): mitigating the economic and financial disruptions of debt restructuring (EU safe asset, stronger risk-sharing, reducing home bias)
- Sapir and Schoenmaker (2017), Scheubel and Stracca (2016), Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer (2017)