#### Trade Credit and Relationships

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### Trade Credit is a Central Source of Finance

#### What is trade credit?

Suppose a firm sells to another firm. The buyer can pay:

- Before delivery: cash in advance
- After delivery: trade credit

Trade credit is used widely across developed and emerging economies:

- Most important source of short-term finance for U.S. firms: non-financial sector had \$5.2 trillion USD in 2021 (24 percent of U.S. GDP)
- Trade credit dominant in domestic transactions (Ellingsen et al. (2016)) and international transactions (Ahn (2014), Demir and Javorcik (2018))

Theory: Build a model combining two channels:

- Commitment problem and learning (as in Antras and Foley (2015)).
- Financing cost advantage (as in Garcia-Marin et al. (2020)).

Empirics: In Colombian (and Chilean) transaction-level data:

- Trade credit increases with relationship age.
- Learning effects stronger for differentiated products and source (destination) countries with stronger (weaker) rule of law.
- Commitment problem dominates in the short run; financing cost channel dominates in the long run.

### Related literature

International Payment Choice:

 Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), Ahn (2014), Antras and Foley (2015), Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017), Demir and Javorcik (2018), Garcia-Marin et al. (2023)

▷ Importance of relationships and learning for payment choice.

Trade Relationships (two-sided data):

• Blum et al. (2012), Eaton et. al (2014), Heise (2015), Bernard et al. (2018), Carballo et al. (2018), Benguria (2021), Monarch (2022)

▷ Link relationships to payment choice.

Advantages of trade relationships:

- Monarch and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2018): more trade, higher survival, more resilient in crisis.
- Heise: sharing of exchange-rate risk.
- Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015): overcome enforcement frictions.

▷ Relationships allow using more trade credit, saving financing costs.

## Theory

### Financing Cost Channel

- Positive markup: P > C
- Financial friction:  $r_b > r_d$



• Trade credit has a financing cost advantage over cash in advance.

#### Trade is risky

- Trade credit: Buyer may not pay.
- Cash in advance: Seller may not deliver.

#### Buyers and sellers learn about each other's type:

- Probability that partner is reliable increases with history of no defaults.
  - $\Rightarrow$  Enforcement friction declines with learning.
- Financing cost advantage dominates in the long run.
  - $\Rightarrow$  Firms switch to trade credit over time.

- Trade credit increases with relationship age.
- Learning effects stronger for more complex products and for source (destination) countries with stronger (weaker) rule of law.
- Commitment problem dominates in the short run.
- Financing cost channel dominates in the longer run.

## Data and Empirical Results

#### Data

#### Colombian Customs data (2007-2016)

- Transaction-level import data
- Importer and Exporter ID, 10-digit HS code, FOB value and volume
- Payment form
- Chilean National Customs Service (2003-2007)
- Annual National Industrial Survey (ENIA)
  - Detailed plant-product level information for markup and productivity estimation

#### Additional data sources:

- WB Worldwide Governance Indicators: rule of law
- IMF IFS: deposit and lending rates (home + foreign)



# **Empirical Evidence**

### Financing Terms and Relationship Age



- Most transactions are trade credit or cash in advance.
- Trade credit provision increases with relationship age.
- Trade credit mostly increases at the expense of cash in advance.

### Financing Terms: Transition Matrix

Transition Probability Between Payments Forms (%)

	Payment term in $t + 1$ :		
	Trade	Cash in	Letter of
	Credit	Advance	Credit
Payment term in t:			
Trade Credit	99.1	0.8	0.1
Cash in Advance	7.0	92.9	0.2
Letter of Credit	7.6	1.2	91.2

 $\triangleright$  Exporters often switch from cash in advance to trade credit, but rarely away from trade credit.

#### Financing Terms and Relationship Age I

	(1)	(2)
ln(Relationship Length)	0.412***	0.387***
	(0.016)	(0.049)
Sample	All	Balanced
Importer-Exporter-HS10 FE	Yes	Yes
Source Country-Year FE	Yes	Yes
Importer-HS10-Year FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,164,470	956,301
R <sup>2</sup>	0.83	0.83

▷ Trade credit dynamics are within relationships.

#### Financing Terms and Relationship Age II



Trade Credit and Relationship Length: Semi-Parametric Estimation (Chile)

#### > Trade credit dynamics consistent with Bayesian learning.

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### **Relationships and Contract Enforcement**

A. Colombian Imports	(1)	(2)
$ln(Rel. Length) \times Low ROL Exp.$	0.367***	0.332***
	(0.018)	(0.070)
$ln(Rel. Length) \times High ROL Exp.$	0.461***	0.452***
	(0.018)	(0.066)
B. Chilean Exports		
$ln(Rel. Length) \times Low ROL Imp.$	1.164***	1.068***
	(0.178)	(0.346)
$ln(Rel. Length) \times High ROL Imp.$	0.684***	0.199
	(0.164)	(0.266)
Sample	All	Balanced
Exporter-Destination Country-HS8 FE	Yes	Yes
Destination Country-Year FE	Yes	Yes
Exporter-HS8-Year FE	Yes	Yes

#### Relationship Length and Contract Enforcement

▷ Learning effects are stronger for source (destination) countries with stronger (weaker) rule of law.

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### Relationships and Trade Credit by Product Type

#### Relationship Length and Trade Credit by Product Type in Chilean Exports

	(1)	(2)
$ln(Relationship Length) \times Differentiated$	1.093***	1.150***
	(0.242)	(0.414)
ln(Relationship Length) × Non-Differentiated	0.825***	0.310
	(0.130)	(0.244)
Sample	All	Balanced
Exporter-Destination Country-HS8 FE	Yes	Yes
Destination Country-Year FE	Yes	Yes
Exporter-HS8-Year FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	604,843	47,177

▷ Learning effects are stronger for more complex products.

### Trade Credit, Markups and Learning

	(1)	(2)	(3)
ln(Relationship Length)	0.623***	1.277***	0.0702
	(0.151)	(0.156)	(0.355)
ln(Markup)	6.738**	1.858	11.44**
	(3.233)	(5.261)	(5.124)
First-Stage F-Statistic	75.3	118.3	22.5
Relationships	All	<10 trades	$\geq 10$ trades
Exporter-Destination Country-HS8 FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination Country-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	202,507	109,950	92,557

Trade Credit, Markup and Relationship Length in Chilean Exports: 2SLS Results

# ▷ Commitment problem dominates in the short run; financing costs channel dominates in the longer run

Relationships are central for trade credit:

- Results indicate importance of learning about trading partners.
- In the short run, enforcement and learning are key.
- In the longer run, financing cost advantage of trade credit dominates.

New benefit of long-term relationships:

• Reduce commitment problems, ease the use of trade credit, and lower financing costs.

# **Thank You!**

### Exporter, Importer and Relationship Learning

	(1)	(2)
ln(Relationship Length)	0.915***	0.706***
	(0.045)	(0.050)
ln(Importer Experience)	-0.245***	0.097
	(0.033)	(0.100)
ln(Country–Specific Importer Experience)	-0.014	-0.058
	(0.009)	(0.058)
ln(Exporter Experience)	-0.478***	-0.412***
	(0.045)	(0.119)
Sample	All	Balanced
Importer-Exporter-HS10 FE	Yes	Yes
Source Country-Year FE	Yes	Yes
Importer-HS10-Year FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	12164470	956301
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.83	0.82