Discussion

Profit-shifting Frictions and the Geography of Multinational Activity

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The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and **do not** necessarily represent the views of the Bank of Spain and the Eurosystem.

□ Super interesting topic with a massive policy *market*

Research Question

How do firms decide where to produce and shift their profits?

Main Elements

- Quantitative model of multinational production with corporate taxes and profit-shifting.
- Estimation of elasticities of production location and profit-shifting wrt tax rates and bilateral profit-shifting frictions.
- Counterfactual welfare exercise of different tax reform settings

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Model

 \square Firms with HQ at *i* choose production location *l*, serve market *n* and shift profits to *h*.

Joint decision shaped by:

- \triangleright Potential revenues from market n (monopolistic competition).
- \triangleright Cost of producing abroad γ_{il} and cost of shifting profits α_{lh} (variable costs).
- $\triangleright~$ Firm-specific productivity φ_{lh} of producing in l and shifting profits to h
 - Multivariate Frèchet with elasticities of location $(
 u_1)$ and profit shifting $(
 u_2)$
- □ The model provides gravity equations for tax base (X_{ll}) and profit-shifting (X_{lh}) used to estimate ν_1 and ν_2

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Policy Analysis

- ▷ Welfare measure with private consumption and public good provision.
- $\hfill\square$ Unilateral tax reform. US statutory tax rate from 40% to 38%
- Global minimum tax rate
- Destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT)

Trade-off of reducing profit sharing:

- Production efficiency (location choice is based on "production fundamentals" not "tax optimization").
- ▷ Public good provision vs. entry and real income (optimal taxation issue).
- ▷ Distributional effects across countries.

Comments

Endogenous decission to serve a market

□ Firms decide to entry in country *i*, to locate in country *l* and shift profits to country *h*...

but all destination countries n are served by assumption (no fixed cost).

 \Box This could underestimate the welfare losses of more stringent regulation and affect the estimation of tax income elasticity at country n.



Firm size and profit sharing ability

- □ (Even within MNCs) Profit sharing activity is highly skewed to larger firms.
- Should we think of profit-shifting effort as variable or fixed cost?
 Size (or productivity) cuttoff for profit shifting à la Antràs and Helpman
- $\hfill\square$ Relevance for public policy debate
 - Do stringer regulations favor large exporters?

Comments

Sector specific estimates?

Likely) easier to *hide* digital services than heavy industries' output.
 Where is Europe? Is *regulatory aggresiveness* correlated?

High wealth individuals income-shifting

 Is individual wealth in tax heavens correlated with your bilateral firm profit-shifting estimates? (Alstadsæter, Johannesen & Zucman, 2018)

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