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**Risk-adjusted forecasts of oil prices**

by P. Pagano and M. Pisani



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# RISK-ADJUSTED FORECASTS OF OIL PRICES

by Patrizio Pagano\* and Massimiliano Pisani\*

## Abstract

This paper documents the existence of a significant forecast error on crude oil futures, particularly evident since the mid-1990s, which is negative on average and displays a non-trivial cyclical component (risk premium). We show that the forecast error on oil futures could have been explained in part by means of real-time US business cycle indicators, such as the degree of utilized capacity in manufacturing. An out-of-the-sample prediction exercise reveals that futures which are adjusted to take into account this time-varying component produce significantly better forecasts than those of the unadjusted futures and random walk, particularly at horizons of more than 6 months.

Keywords: Oil, Forecasting, Futures.

JEL classification: E37, E44, G13, Q4.

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## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Although the dependency of global economic activity on crude oil has fallen steadily over the last thirty years, the oil price baseline assumption remains an important variable for all the macroeconomic forecasts of both national and international institutions. Making a forecast of future oil prices is the first step in finding the optimal instrument rate plan, because they enter the construction of inflation and output-gap forecasts (Svensson, 2005).

The increase in oil prices in recent months (Figure 1), which has surprised most analysts by its rapidity and intensity, prompts a new call to investigate the validity of the forecasting assumptions.<sup>2</sup>

A commonly used approach to forecast oil prices is based on futures contracts. The notion that the futures price might be the optimal forecaster of the spot price is a by-product of the financial market efficiency hypothesis: the requirement that the average forecasting error is zero is consistent with both efficiency in financial markets (the absence of profitable arbitrage opportunities) and the unbiasedness property of the forecaster (zero forecasting error on average).

However, the possibility of a systematic forecast error of oil futures cannot be excluded if a positive risk premium exists in the oil market. In fact, since the oil spot price covaries positively with overall economic activity, this creates an undiversifiable risk for holders of oil who, as a reward, will expect over the holding period an average spot price higher than futures price currently quoted. As a consequence, futures oil prices forecast would yield a significant ex post error.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Recently, nominal oil prices reached new peaks. In October 2004 the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil spot price rose to over \$56, nearly 80 per cent above average prices in the first half of 2003. After retreating to as little as \$41 in mid-December, oil prices rose again to a new nominal record high of almost \$70 in early September 2005.

<sup>3</sup> The benefits of holding oil stocks, usually referred to as “convenience yield”, arise from the use of inventories to reduce production and marketing costs and to avoid stock-outs (for more details, see Pindyck, 2001). The size of the convenience yield determines whether the futures price is greater or smaller than the spot price. When

Building on a methodology introduced by Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) to explain the excess return on federal funds futures, we document the existence of systematic ex post forecast errors and the fact that these errors have, since the second half of the 1990s, a non-trivial counter-cyclical component that could in part be predicted by using the level of utilized capacity in US manufacturing (a proxy of the conditions of the business cycle).

We also assess the forecasting performance of our approach on the basis of an out-of-the-sample prediction exercise. Results show that forecasts adjusted to take into account the time-varying risk premium (so called “risk-adjusted forecasts”) display lower mean and root-mean squared errors than the unadjusted futures, the simple constant-adjusted futures and the random walk, particularly at horizons of over 6 months.

The intuition for our results is that currently low (high) levels of utilized capacity signal an increase (decrease) in capacity utilization into the future and therefore – given input complementarity – a rising (decreasing) demand for oil.<sup>4</sup> Hence, when oil demand is bound to increase, this will put pressure on the spot price, and the risk premium required on oil futures is correspondingly high. In turn, when oil demand is expected to remain put or to decrease, the risk premium will be low or even negative.

There are several studies on the efficiency of the oil futures market and the forecasting properties of the futures. Not surprisingly, they reach quite diverse conclusions. For instance, Chinn et al. (2005) find that over the period January 1999-October 2004 futures prices are unbiased predictors of crude oil, even if futures typically explain only a small proportion of the variability in oil price movements.<sup>5</sup> However, using the same methodology as Chinn et

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the convenience yield is sufficiently high for the spot price to exceed the futures price, the market is described as being in *backwardation*. As emphasized by Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2004) the notion of backwardation should involve a comparison of the futures price to the *expected* spot price in the future, which is unobservable when the futures price is set. In the practice of commodity trading backwardation is commonly used to describe the position of futures prices in relation to *current* spot prices. While backwardation in the former sense is equivalent to the existence of a positive risk premium, backwardation in the latter sense is not. The two definitions of backwardation are often used interchangeably as if they were equivalent. But only backwardation in the first sense refers to the notion of a positive risk premium to investors in commodity futures. “Where the futures contract trades relative to the *current* spot does not directly speak to the presence of a risk premium” (Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2004, p.25).

<sup>4</sup> In a study on the effect of energy price increases on economic activity, Finn (2000) emphasizes the complementarity between capacity utilization and energy consumption.

<sup>5</sup> They regress the change in spot prices between time  $t$  and  $t - k$  on a constant and the “basis” (defined as the difference between futures subscribed at  $t - k$  expiring at  $t$ , and spot at  $t - k$ ). The efficiency of the futures is then tested with the joint hypotheses of a zero constant and a slope equal to 1.

al. (2005), over the April 1989-December 2003 period, Chernenko et al. (2004) find mixed evidence on the existence of risk premia associated with oil futures. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2004) show that commodity futures risk premium has been equal in size to the historical risk premium of stocks (the equity premium) and has exceeded the risk premium of bonds. Moosa and Al-Loungani (1994), focusing on the properties of spot and futures prices in the context of co-integration, find that futures prices are not unbiased forecasters of spot prices and that there is a time-varying risk premium that can be adequately modelled by a GARCH process. Consistently with this result, Considine and Larson's findings (2001) suggest that crude oil inventory assets contain risk premiums that rise sharply with higher price volatility. Coimbra and Esteves (2004) document a downward bias in oil futures, which also appears correlated with market expectation errors on world economic activity.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next Section we document the size of the ex post forecast errors on oil futures, showing that these display a non trivial error component. In Section 3, we document the presence of a structural break in the mid-1990s. In Section 4 we estimate the relationship linking oil futures forecast errors to business cycle conditions over the period starting from the mid-1990s and conduct some robustness analyses. In Section 5 we propose a method to adjust the forecast based on oil futures and evaluate the performance of the risk-adjusted forecasts with respect to the futures and other alternatives. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.

## 2. Forecast errors on crude oil futures

In the following analysis we use oil price futures on the WTI grade. They trade on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and are settled each month. The contract provides for the physical delivery of 1,000 barrels of oil at any point during the settlement month. Any one of several different types of crude oil can be delivered, but WTI is usually chosen. The trading began in 1983 initially with a delivery period of up to six months, which was later gradually extended in line with a substantial increase in the volume of contracts traded.

Let  $f_t^{(n)}$  denote the oil price implicit in the futures contract expiring in month  $t + n$ ; we will refer to  $n$  as the  $n$ -month-ahead contract. Let also  $p_{t+n}$  denote the ex post realized spot oil price in month  $t + n$ .

We can define the ex post realized forecast error as:

$$fe_{t+n}^{(n)} = f_t^{(n)} - p_{t+n}. \quad (1)$$

Under the expectations hypothesis  $f_t^{(n)} = E_t(p_{t+n})$ , that is futures are equal to the expected future spot prices. Equation (1) therefore represents the forecast error. Alternatively, it can be thought of as (minus) the risk premium, making clear how the futures-based forecasts should be adjusted for taking risk-premia into account.

To compute forecast errors we take the simple average of futures daily quotations in the third week of each month  $t$ . The choice is suggested to avoid possible daily outliers. The week selected is the third because, as will be clearer below, it was the closest to the release of relevant business-cycle indicators. However, all the results also hold true when we sample the data on a particular day (the 15<sup>th</sup>) of each month.

## 2.1 Bias

If the futures is an unbiased predictor of subsequent oil prices then the average forecast error should be zero.

We check this by running the following regression on all the contract horizons up to twelve months:

$$fe_{t+n}^{(n)} = \alpha^{(n)} + \varepsilon_{t+n}^{(n)}, \quad (2)$$

where  $\alpha$  is a constant measuring the average ex post realized forecast error and  $\varepsilon$  is an error term.

We estimate regression (2) over the sample period for which futures data are available at all maturities up to one year, that is from January 1986 to December 2004.

Given that futures contract overlap induces heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, we compute standard errors using the Newey-West procedure, allowing for a  $n - 1$  Bartlett window.

Table 1 presents the results: the value of the constant at each forecast horizon  $n$  is significantly negative, ranging from 15 cents to \$3.1, and longer-horizon contracts display larger forecast errors.

In the framework of the marginal convenience yield, on the basis of estimates of the oil risk-adjusted discount rate, Pindyck (2001) estimates that the 6-month futures contract should under-predict the realized spot price by around 3 to 4.5 per cent. The simple average forecast errors displayed in Table 1 imply a stronger result: a six-month contract under-predicts the realized spot by \$1.8, or around 8 per cent if evaluated at the mean price of the sample.

## 2.2 Capacity utilization

Up to this point we have documented the presence of a significant forecast error in oil price futures. As suggested by a large literature on financial markets (e.g. Cochrane, 2005, for a survey) this could be reconciled with the presence of a risk premium, which could also be time-varying. For instance, a number of studies (e.g. Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005) show that excess returns on US treasuries are high in recessions and low in booms. As suggested by other works (Moosa and Al-Loungani, 1994; Coimbra and Esteves, 2004) excess returns on oil may display time-varying risk premia too.

To investigate whether business cycle phases help in explaining realized futures-based forecast errors on oil prices, we run the following regression:

$$fe_{t+n}^{(n)} = \alpha^{(n)} + \beta^{(n)}UCap_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{t+n}^{(n)}, \quad (3)$$

where  $UCap$  is the degree of capacity utilization in US manufacturing. In practice, we add to the basic regression (2) a variable that is a proxy of the US business cycle. Note that we want a variable known to market participants at the time the future contract is subscribed, that is in month  $t$ . Since capacity utilization values are released by the Federal Reserve around the 15<sup>th</sup> day of each month for the previous month, we date our  $UCap$  variable as  $t - 1$ . Furthermore, these figures are subject to several backward revisions; so, to use in our regressions the values known to investors at the time of the contract subscription, we use a real-time series.<sup>6</sup> Table 2 reports the results based on these real-time data. Forecast errors and

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<sup>6</sup> See the data appendix for further details.

utilized capacity in US manufacturing are positively related. The estimated slope coefficient increases with the maturity of the contract and is statistically significant from the 4-month horizon on, and particularly so from the 5-month horizon on.

### 3. Structural stability

The main point of this paper is to forecast oil prices. Since the reliability of forecasts crucially depends upon the stability of the model, we need to check for it. The test is made necessary also by the events that have characterized the oil market.

In this Section we argue that in the mid-1990s there was a break in the size and cyclical behavior of futures-based forecast errors, which can be ascribed to some structural change that occurred on the oil market in that period. In what follows, we first point out some stylized facts and then provide statistical evidence on the break.

#### 3.1 *Business cycle and oil price volatility: some stylized facts*

Partly reflecting greater pressure to increase profitability, in the 1990s the oil industry moved to what is referred to as “just-in-time inventories”; as a consequence, the average inventory level dropped sharply in late 1995 (Figure 2) to below the level of the mid-1970s and swings in demand, even predictable seasonal swings, started to be met by price changes.<sup>7</sup>

There are two stylized facts regarding oil prices in the 1990s: the first is the increase in the sensitivity of oil prices to the business cycle; the second is the increase in oil price volatility.

Table 3 reports the pair-wise contemporaneous correlation coefficients between changes in oil prices and changes in capacity utilization in manufacturing. As can be seen, in the period 1986-1995 there is no significant correlation between the two variables, while afterwards the correlation coefficients are always positive, and significantly so, at any horizon. At longer horizons the correlation between changes in oil prices and in capacity utilization tops 70 per cent.

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<sup>7</sup> This point is forcefully emphasized in Lynch (2002).

Evidence about the second stylized fact is in Figure 3: up to 1995 – leaving the period of the Kuwait invasion aside (August 1990-February 1991) – the oil price is roughly stable; on the contrary, afterwards there are both periods of sharp price decreases and periods of very rapid increases. The one-month moving average of daily percentage changes increased from an average of 1.2 per cent in the period 1987-1995 to 1.8 per cent afterwards. The null hypothesis of no difference in the two average values is strongly rejected at any conventional level by a standard  $F$ -test.

As a final remark, note that the high volatility of the spot price that characterizes the oil market from the mid-1990s is consistent with the evolution of the oil spot price during the same period: a more volatile spot price implies a larger risk for the owners of oil stock, who, as a reward for that risk, expect a higher average spot price than the current futures price; as a result, on average the oil spot price increases over the period 1996-2004.<sup>8</sup>

### 3.2 Empirical evidence on the mid-1990s break

To find statistical evidence on the break in the cyclical behavior of forecast errors we recursively estimate equation (3) using the first 60 observations to initialize the regression. Figure 4 shows recursive residuals with the upper and lower 2 (recursively generated) standard error bands when the 3, 6, 9 and 12-month ex post futures forecast errors are used as dependent variable. In order to leave aside the episode of the Kuwait invasion we add as a regressor a dummy equal to one for that period. Residuals outside the bands could be used as an indication of a structural break. It is evident that up to the mid-1990s residuals lay strictly inside the bands. On the contrary, the first time when residuals evidently cross the bands is in late 1995.<sup>9</sup>

We make a more formal analysis on the break by testing for the existence of a structural change in the coefficients of equation (3) across the periods before and after 1995. We run the following regression on all the available contract horizons:

$$f e_{t+n}^{(n)} = \alpha_1^{(n)} D_{86-95} + \alpha_2^{(n)} D_{96-04} + \beta_1^{(n)} D_{86-95} UC ap_{t-1} + \beta_2^{(n)} D_{96-04} UC ap_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{t+n}^{(n)}, \quad (4)$$

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<sup>8</sup> For more details on the relationship between first and second moments of oil spot price see Pindyck (2001).

<sup>9</sup> Recursive residuals on other horizons display a similar behavior.

where  $D_{86-95}$  and  $D_{96-04}$  are dummy variables equal to 1 in the sub-periods 1986-95 and 1996-2004, respectively.

As can be seen in Table 4, the  $F$ -tests strongly reject the assumptions that the coefficients are stable across the two sub-periods. The hypotheses that the two intercepts and the two slope coefficients in equation (4) are equal in the two sub-periods are rejected at the 5 per cent confidence level at horizons larger than 2, and at the 1 per cent at horizons larger than 3, both singularly and jointly.

As a final exercise we also test for the stability of the variance of regression (3). Results of the Goldfeld-Quandt test on heteroscedasticity of residuals (Goldfeld and Quandt, 1965) and the Hansen test (Hansen, 1992) on stability of the variance of the regression are reported in Table 5. The Goldfeld-Quandt tests whether the variance of residuals in 1986-1995 equals that in 1996-2004: it fails to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at the 5 per cent level only at horizons 3 and 4. The Hansen test fails to reject the null hypothesis of stable variance on the whole sample at horizons 2-4. When performed in each sub-sample, the latter test indicates that while the period 1986-1995 still displays some variance instability, the period 1996-2004 appears much more stable, especially with respect to the whole sample. In fact, in 1996-2004 it fails to reject the null hypothesis of variance stability at all horizons larger than 3.

Overall, we take all the above evidence as suggesting that there is a break in the relationship between futures-based ex post forecast errors and business cycle conditions in the sample considered. The larger average error and the significantly higher sensitivity to business cycle conditions from the mid-1990s on lead us to focus the analysis on this sub-period.

#### **4. The last decade**

In this Section we focus on the sub-period starting in January 1996. Table 6 reports the results of regression (3).

As in the whole sample, the slope coefficients become larger with the maturity of the contract and are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level or lower from the 3-month horizon on. The  $R^2$  suggests that the percentage of the variance of the forecast error on oil futures explained by this specification is not trivial, especially at longer horizons. For instance,

the model with utilized capacity explains almost 40 per cent of the forecast error on the oil futures contract with 12-month maturity (see Figure 5).

To gauge the robustness of these results we perform some checks.

First of all, we run the same regression using two other alternative cyclical variables, whose data are available at real time: non-farm payrolls and industrial production. For brevity we report results only for the regression using year-on-year growth in non-farm payrolls; those obtained using industrial production growth are qualitatively similar.<sup>10</sup> As can be seen in Table 7, employment growth is positively associated to the ex post realized forecast error, even if estimated coefficients display larger standard errors than those of the regression estimated using utilized capacity. This is not surprising, given the closer complementarity of utilized capacity in manufacturing and oil consumption.

Second, given that we use the current degree of capacity utilization to proxy for variation of capacity utilization in the future, we check if more explicitly forward-looking indicators might do a better job in capturing the cyclical variability of the risk premium. To tackle this issue we run equation (3) using as cyclical variable alternatively the Conference Board leading indicator, the growth rate of non-defense orders, and the ISM manufacturing index. Unfortunately, none of these is available with real time data. Results – not reported for brevity but available on request – show that these variables have some explanatory power with respect to oil forecast errors at medium horizons (around six months), but overall do not out-perform the degree of capacity utilization.

Finally, another possible driving factor of the forecast error of oil futures could be related to the booming oil demand originating from developing countries. Unfortunately, we lack timely statistics of such countries' business cycles, but in order to capture the boost to world oil demand coming from China – which has become the second largest world oil consumer – we add to equation (3) the growth rate of Chinese industrial production. Since for the third week of each month we have revised data up to the month before last, we date this series  $t - 2$ . Results in Table 8 show no correlation at all between Chinese industrial production and oil futures forecast error.

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<sup>10</sup> Results are available on request.

## 5. Predictability of oil prices in real time

Having documented the presence of a significant and cyclical forecast error, in this Section we evaluate the forecast of oil prices based on unadjusted futures.

We compare four alternative methodologies to forecast oil prices:

- A. a random walk, which implies  $E_t [p_{t+n}] = p_t$ ;
- B. the unadjusted futures:  $E_t [p_{t+n}] = f_t^{(n)}$ ;
- C. the constant-adjusted futures, based on rolling-endpoint OLS estimates on a constant:  
 $E_t [p_{t+n}] = f_t^{(n)} - \hat{\alpha}^{(n)}$ ;
- D. the risk-adjusted futures, based on rolling-endpoint OLS estimates on a constant and the index of utilized capacity in US manufacturing at time  $t - 1$ :  $E_t [p_{t+n}] = f_t^{(n)} - \hat{\alpha}^{(n)} - \hat{\beta}^{(n)} UC_{ap_{t-1}}$ .

Given futures prices, the methodology we suggest in order to take into account the time-varying risk premium implies that – since estimates of  $\beta$  are positive – the lower is utilized capacity the higher is the oil price expected for  $n$ –periods ahead. The intuition is that when utilized capacity is low, it is expected to grow in the following  $n$ –periods, that is its expected change is positive.<sup>11</sup> In turn, as already shown in Table 3, the larger the change in capacity utilization, the larger the increase in oil prices.

Figure 6 shows forecasts of oil prices in two illustrative months, January 1997 and September 2003, obtained with the different methodologies.

In the upper panel data show that in January 1997 the spot oil price was around \$26 and, according to the futures, oil prices were expected to decline to just over \$20 by January 1998. Demand was very high and utilized capacity in manufacturing was running well above the historical average, at almost 83 per cent: margins for further increases in capacity utilization were limited and, therefore, the risk premium required over the futures would have been very low and the risk-adjusted forecast virtually indistinguishable from the futures itself. The constant-adjusted forecast would have signaled roughly constant prices. The realized spot did indeed decline (to \$16.3).

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<sup>11</sup> For instance, a regression of the 12-month change in capacity utilization on its initial level and a constant yields an estimated slope coefficient of -.29 and a standard error of .06. Similar results hold on the other horizons.

In summer 2003 (Figure 6, lower panel) oil prices were stable at around \$30. In September the futures signaled a weak decline in the price to just below \$26 in the following 12 months. The recovery out of the recession in 2001 was not yet firmly established and the capacity utilization index was still relatively low, at around 73 per cent. Margins for a pick up in demand were correspondingly high and the risk premium was relevant: the risk-adjusted forecast would have signaled an oil price as high as \$38.4 by September 2004. Note that not taking into account the cyclical factor – as the constant-adjusted forecast does – would have yielded just slightly increasing oil prices. Indeed oil prices did rise and at the end of the horizon were at around \$45.

In order to assess to what extent realized forecast errors on oil price could be predicted by real-time US business-cycle indicators, such as the degree of utilized capacity in manufacturing, we perform a set of rolling “out-of-sample” regressions.

To obtain rolling-endpoint real-time (or expanding window) forecasts we initialize our estimates using the first 30 observations. We then compute forecasts up to the 12-month horizon, add a new observation and so on.

Since we show that forecast errors are on average negative one could expect adjusted oil price forecasts to lie above those implied by the futures. Usually, this is so. Yet, if one uses the risk-adjusted forecast it may well be that the expected price could go below the futures: this will happen if  $UCap_{t-1} > -\left(\hat{\alpha}^{(n)}/\hat{\beta}^{(n)}\right)$ . For instance, at the 9-month horizon this threshold is equal to 82.4, an historically high level of utilized capacity, which corresponds to the 90th percentile in the distribution in 1996-2004 (the mean value is 78.3 per cent). What is the intuition for these results? When currently utilized capacity is already very high, further increases in capacity utilization – and, therefore, further oil demand pressures – are hardly expected: if anything, utilized capacity will revert towards the mean. Hence the premium required over oil futures will be low and the risk-adjusted forecast will be close to the futures.

On the other hand, when demand pressures are still scarce (compared to the historical norm), rising demand can be expected and therefore the risk premium required over the futures will be correspondingly high. In this case expected and futures prices should display very different values.

In sum, the results in Table 6 imply that the adjustment to be made over the futures will be smaller during booms and higher during slacks: that is, to obtain risk-adjusted forecasts we add to the futures a counter-cyclical term.

To gauge a quantitative measure of how different these four forecasting methodologies are, in Table 9 we report some summary statistics on forecast errors. It can be noted that the mean error of the cyclical risk-adjusted forecast is the lowest one, both at short and long horizons.

For instance at the 3-month horizon the mean risk-adjusted error is just 45 cents, compared with \$1.3 with the constant adjustment, \$1.4 with the random walk and almost \$2 with the unadjusted futures. At the 9-month horizon the mean forecast error committed by the risk-adjusted futures is still low, 29 cents, compared with more than \$4 for the random walk, \$4.35 for the constant-adjusted futures and almost \$7 for the unadjusted futures.

A similar conclusion can be drawn on the basis of root mean squared errors, which for the risk-adjusted forecast are typically below those implied by the other three forecasting techniques considered; this is always true from the 4-month horizon on.

To check whether these root mean squared errors are also statistically significantly lower than their counterparts obtained with the other three methodologies we perform a Diebold-Mariano test (Diebold and Mariano, 1995) by running regression (3) on a moving window of 30 observations. P-values of the test statistics based on a pair-wise comparison of root mean squared errors are reported in Table 10.<sup>12</sup> Root mean squared errors of the cyclical adjusted futures are lower than those of the unadjusted futures after  $n = 3$ , and lower than those of the constant-adjusted futures and of the random walk after  $n = 4$ : the risk-adjusted forecast statistically out-performs the constant-adjusted at the 10 per cent or lower level from horizon 6 on, the unadjusted futures from horizon 7 on and the random walk from horizon 8 on.

Finally, Table 9 also reports the  $n$ -th autocorrelation ( $\rho_n$ ) for the  $n$ -month-ahead forecast, which for an efficient forecast should be as close to zero as possible. Here results are just a little less clear cut: risk-adjusted forecasts are less autocorrelated than the constant-adjusted

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<sup>12</sup> The Diebold-Mariano test-statistic is the “t-stat” in a regression of the differences in the root mean squared errors for two alternative forecasts on a constant.

and the unadjusted futures in 10 out of the 12 horizons, while with respect to the random walk risk-adjusted forecasts display smaller autocorrelation in 7 horizons and larger in 5.

If the forecast error could have been significantly reduced by investors exploiting available information on the US business cycle, as we have shown, the question that naturally arises is why they did not do so. The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) provides aggregate data on most of the long and short positions held in futures markets, divided into hedging and non-hedging categories. An analysis of net long positions held by non-commercial traders, usually referred to as “speculators”, reveals that both in 1999-2000 and in late 2003 these positions were largely positive, signaling expectations of rising oil prices, which effectively were realized in the following months.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, it is possible that this category of market participants was aware of this risk premium and provided an insurance to (hedging) commercial market participants. This notwithstanding, a significant part of the premium was not competed away. A possible explanation is that non-commercial traders represent a small percentage (just a little over 10 per cent) of all open interest, since they trade mainly in over-the-counter markets. Alternatively, as suggested by Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) in the context of futures on federal funds, the futures market may not be perfectly competitive or non-commercial traders may themselves be risk adverse.

## 6. Concluding remarks

This paper documents that crude oil futures display a significant ex post forecast error, which is negative on average. We also show that this forecast error has a non trivial cyclical component which can be, in part, explained by means of real-time US business cycle indicators, such as the degree of utilized capacity in manufacturing. Results appear robust to various checks such as the use of alternative US business cycle indicators and the inclusion of variables which proxy the effect of increased oil demand in China.

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<sup>13</sup> Formal analysis of energy futures markets (Sanders et al., 2004) reveals that positive futures returns Granger-cause increases in the net long positions held by reporting non-commercial traders. There is no consistent evidence that traders’ net long positions contain any general predictive information about market returns, that is net long positions do not generally lead market returns.

Adjusting the oil price forecast embedded into futures to take account of this time-varying risk premium yields “risk-adjusted” forecasts which perform extremely well in periods both of “bear” and of “bull” oil markets. More formally, with an out-of-the-sample prediction exercise we show that the risk-adjusted forecast we provide performs significantly better than the unadjusted futures, the simple constant-adjusted futures and the random walk, particularly at horizons longer than 6 months.

Our results have crucial implications for policy analysis and economic modelling. First, they point out that futures should be used with caution in predicting oil prices which, in turn, affect inflation and output gap forecasts, the two variables that, according to modern economic theory, are crucial for monetary policy decisions. Second, our results show that futures-based forecasts of oil prices, adjusted for time-varying risk premia, may be exploited to identify unexpected oil price changes (“shocks”), which are often used in the context of dynamic macro analyses. We leave this topic for future research.

## Appendix

### Data sources

WTI oil spot and futures prices: *Thomson Financial Datastream*.


Real-time indicators (capacity utilization, non-farm payrolls, industrial production):  
*Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia* ([www.phil.frb.org/econ/forecast/reaindex.html](http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/forecast/reaindex.html))

Chinese industrial production: *Thomson Financial Datastream*.


Oil stocks: *U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration*  
([www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet\\_stoc\\_wstk\\_dcu\\_nus\\_w.htm](http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_wstk_dcu_nus_w.htm))

## Tables and figures


Figure 1



Notes: Monthly observations. Each observation is the simple average daily spot prices during the third week of the month.




Notes: thousand barrels, excluding SPR.




Notes: one-month moving average absolute daily percentage changes.


Recursive residuals from regression (2) and 2-standard error bands at different horizons



Oil price ex post forecast errors and predicted errors (12-month-ahead)



Notes: Monthly observations. The forecast error is defined as in equation (1) using the average of daily futures and spot prices during the third week of each month. Predicted errors are fitted values of equation (3).



Notes: Risk-adjusted forecasts are computed using estimated coefficients as in Table 6. Constant-adjusted forecasts are computed from the estimated coefficient of equation (2) over the period starting in January 1996.

## Constant risk premia (whole sample: 1986:1-2004:12 )

<i>n</i>	constant	
1	-.15	(.15)
2	-.45*	(.25)
3	-.84**	(.35)
4	-1.18***	(.45)
5	-1.48***	(.55)
6	-1.76***	(.65)
7	-2.01***	(.74)
8	-2.24***	(.85)
9	-2.45***	(.94)
10	-2.69**	(1.11)
11	-2.98**	(1.29)
12	-3.14**	(1.38)

Notes: estimation by OLS. Newey-West HAC standard error in parentheses. \* denotes significance at 10 per cent; \*\* denotes significance at 5 per cent; \*\*\* denotes significance at 1 per cent.

## Time-varying risk premia and capacity utilization (whole sample: 1986:1-2004:12 )

$n$	constant		capacity $_{t-1}$	
1	-1.54	(3.91)	0.02	(0.05)
2	-6.77	(6.51)	0.08	(0.08)
3	-12.46	(8.35)	0.14	(0.10)
4	-18.25*	(10.09)	0.21*	(0.12)
5	-25.14**	(11.95)	0.29**	(0.15)
6	-32.09**	(13.71)	0.38**	(0.17)
7	-38.41**	(15.49)	0.45**	(0.19)
8	-44.50**	(17.50)	0.53**	(0.22)
9	-49.65**	(19.35)	0.59**	(0.24)
10	-53.63**	(21.51)	0.64**	(0.26)
11	-60.40**	(23.79)	0.72**	(0.29)
12	-64.23**	(25.88)	0.76**	(0.32)

Notes: estimation by OLS. Newey-West HAC standard error in parentheses. \* denotes significance at 10 per cent; \*\* denotes significance at 5 per cent; \*\*\* denotes significance at 1 per cent.

Correlation between changes in oil price and changes in capacity utilization: break in December 1995

$n$	1986-1995		1996-2004	
1	0.11	(0.22)	0.27	(0.00)
2	0.13	(0.15)	0.39	(0.00)
3	0.14	(0.13)	0.50	(0.00)
4	0.13	(0.18)	0.56	(0.00)
5	0.11	(0.26)	0.59	(0.00)
6	0.07	(0.44)	0.63	(0.00)
7	0.03	(0.78)	0.66	(0.00)
8	-0.02	(0.80)	0.68	(0.00)
9	-0.07	(0.46)	0.70	(0.00)
10	-0.11	(0.27)	0.70	(0.00)
11	-0.14	(0.13)	0.71	(0.00)
12	-0.16	(0.10)	0.71	(0.00)

Notes: Pair-wise correlation coefficients between the  $n$ -period change in oil price and the  $n$ -period change in capacity utilization in US manufacturing; p-values of the  $t$ -test that the correlation coefficient is equal to zero in parentheses.

## Tests of parameter stability: 1986-1995 vs. 1996-2004

$n$	constant	capacity $_{t-1}$	joint test
1	0.16	0.15	0.30
2	0.06	0.06	0.10
3	0.02	0.02	0.02
4	0.01	0.01	0.01
5	0.00	0.00	0.01
6	0.00	0.00	0.00
7	0.00	0.00	0.00
8	0.00	0.00	0.00
9	0.00	0.00	0.00
10	0.00	0.00	0.00
11	0.00	0.00	0.00
12	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: p-values of the  $F$ -test that the parameters are the same across the two sub-periods (1986-1995 and 1996-2004); based on Newey-West HAC standard errors.

## Variance stability tests

<i>n</i>	Goldfeld-Quandt	Hansen		
	1986-1995 vs 1996-2004	1986-2004	1986-1995	1996-2004
1	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.00
2	0.03	0.06	0.16	0.00
3	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.04
4	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.07
5	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.09
6	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.13
7	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.12
8	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.11
9	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.10
10	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.08
11	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.07
12	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.05

Notes: p-values. Null hypothesis of the Goldfeld-Quandt test is that the variance is stable across sub-periods. Null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the variance is stable in the period considered.

Time-varying risk premia and capacity utilization (sample: 1996:1-2004:12)

$n$	constant		capacity $_{t-1}$		$R^2$
1	-4.19	(5.28)	.05	(.07)	.00
2	-11.95	(8.39)	.14	(.10)	.02
3	-20.85*	(10.85)	.25*	(.14)	.05
4	-29.73**	(13.18)	.35**	(.17)	.08
5	-40.18**	(15.76)	.48**	(.20)	.12
6	-50.39***	(18.25)	.61**	(.23)	.15
7	-60.66***	(20.29)	.73***	(.26)	.19
8	-71.13***	(22.47)	.86***	(.29)	.22
9	-80.90***	(24.28)	.98***	(.31)	.26
10	-91.06***	(25.76)	1.10***	(.33)	.31
11	-101.17***	(27.26)	1.23***	(.35)	.35
12	-110.18***	(28.50)	1.34***	(.36)	.38

Notes: estimation by OLS. Newey-West HAC standard error in parentheses. \* denotes significance at 10 per cent; \*\* denotes significance at 5 per cent; \*\*\* denotes significance at 1 per cent.

Time-varying risk premia and employment growth (sample: 1996:1-2004:12)

$n$	constant		emp. growth $_{t-1}$		$R^2$
1	-.42	(.35)	12.15	(17.73)	.00
2	-1.24**	(.58)	37.65	(28.68)	.02
3	-2.09***	(.71)	58.91	(37.20)	.03
4	-2.92***	(.87)	84.58*	(46.75)	.05
5	-3.79***	(1.09)	112.15*	(58.78)	.07
6	-4.58***	(1.30)	139.71*	(70.95)	.09
7	-5.36***	(1.50)	168.95**	(84.21)	.11
8	-6.12***	(1.69)	197.51**	(96.68)	.14
9	-6.71***	(1.84)	217.48**	(109.04)	.15
10	-7.29***	(2.00)	238.20*	(121.28)	.17
11	-7.77***	(2.12)	252.20*	(131.68)	.17
12	-8.20***	(2.22)	264.84*	(141.15)	.18

Notes: estimation by OLS. Newey-West HAC standard error in parentheses. \* denotes significance at 10 per cent; \*\* denotes significance at 5 per cent; \*\*\* denotes significance at 1 per cent.

Time-varying risk premia and Chinese industrial production (sample: 1996:1-2004:12)

$n$	constant		capacity $_{t-1}$		Chinese ind. prod. $_{t-2}$	
1	-3.77	(5.37)	.05	(.07)	-1.73	(6.05)
2	-10.28	(8.97)	.13	(.11)	-6.91	(9.45)
3	-17.76	(11.55)	.23	(.14)	-13.00	(12.70)
4	-26.06*	(13.60)	.33**	(.17)	-15.64	(16.13)
5	-37.03**	(15.51)	.46**	(.20)	-13.70	(16.51)
6	-48.01***	(17.33)	.59**	(.22)	-10.63	(19.38)
7	-60.37***	(20.07)	.73***	(.26)	-1.37	(19.72)
8	-69.81***	(21.31)	.85***	(.28)	-6.51	(23.91)
9	-79.65***	(22.92)	.97***	(.30)	-6.92	(28.43)
10	-89.57***	(24.50)	1.10***	(.32)	-7.74	(30.28)
11	-99.49***	(26.51)	1.22***	(.34)	-9.32	(31.54)
12	-110.79***	(28.66)	1.34***	(.37)	3.68	(31.24)

Notes: estimation by OLS. Newey-West HAC standard error in parentheses. \* denotes significance at 5 per cent; \*\* denotes significance at 1 per cent

Out-of-the sample forecasts of oil price (expanding window; sample 1996:1-2004:12)

$n$	benchmark			futures based								
	random walk			unadjusted			constant-adjusted			risk-adjusted		
	ME	SE	$\rho_n$	ME	SE	$\rho_n$	ME	SE	$\rho_n$	ME	SE	$\rho_n$
1	-.40	2.90	-.14	-.43	2.96	-.13	-.27	2.97	-.13	.13	3.04	-.10
2	-.85	3.87	-.16	-1.14	3.85	-.15	-.73	3.76	-.16	-.11	3.85	-.10
3	-1.38	4.56	-.10	-1.99	4.60	-.04	-1.32	4.35	-.04	-.45	4.41	.00
4	-1.86	5.14	.00	-2.79	5.38	.09	-1.89	4.94	.09	-.65	4.93	.11
5	-2.36	5.64	.06	-3.61	6.15	.14	-2.47	5.51	.16	-.69	5.37	.13
6	-2.81	6.35	.09	-4.37	7.00	.15	-2.98	6.20	.18	-.63	5.89	.11
7	-3.21	6.95	.06	-5.06	7.77	.13	-3.45	6.82	.17	-.41	6.29	.01
8	-3.67	7.57	.01	-5.76	8.46	.09	-3.94	7.36	.13	-.09	6.61	.07
9	-4.03	8.04	-.04	-6.34	9.04	.05	-4.35	7.81	.09	.29	6.85	.05
10	-4.37	8.56	-.13	-6.86	9.58	-.01	-4.74	8.23	.02	.77	7.04	.03
11	-4.70	9.14	-.16	-7.36	10.09	-.08	-5.08	8.65	-.04	1.34	7.22	.02
12	-5.03	9.74	-.21	-7.84	10.61	-.14	-5.46	9.09	-.11	1.70	7.42	.01

Notes:  $n$  is the forecasting horizon. ME is the mean error (in US dollars), SE is the root mean squared error (in US dollars)

and  $\rho_n$  is the  $n$ th autocorrelation of the forecast error.

Out-of-the sample forecasts of oil price (moving window: sample 1996:1-2004:12)

$n$	benchmark		futures based				
	random walk SE	D-M	unadjusted SE	D-M	constant adj. SE	D-M	risk adj. SE
1	2.90	0.97	2.96	0.97	3.02	0.85	3.18
2	3.88	0.79	3.85	0.88	3.88	0.56	4.07
3	4.56	0.72	4.60	0.76	4.50	0.47	4.63
4	5.14	0.76	5.38	0.63	5.12	0.40	5.10
5	5.64	0.69	6.15	0.38	5.71	0.25	5.46
6	6.36	0.41	7.00	0.14	6.43	0.08	6.03
7	6.95	0.27	7.77	0.07	7.08	0.03	6.48
8	7.57	0.10	8.46	0.02	7.61	0.01	6.71
9	8.04	0.04	9.04	0.01	8.06	0.00	6.87
10	8.56	0.01	9.58	0.00	8.45	0.00	6.98
11	9.14	0.00	10.09	0.00	8.83	0.00	6.94
12	9.74	0.00	10.61	0.00	9.21	0.00	6.96

Notes:  $n$  is the forecasting horizon. SE is the root mean squared error (in US dollars), D-M is the P-value of the Diebold-Mariano test: the null hypothesis is no difference in the forecasting precision between the model considered and the cyclically adjusted future; the alternative hypothesis is that the cyclically adjusted future produces better forecasts. The risk adjusted root mean square error is obtained by running regression (3) on a moving window of 30 monthly observations.

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