# A Field Experiment on Labor Market Speeddates for Unemployed Workers

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## Motivation

Speeddating as matching technology

- Mostly associated with seeking a partner
- Reduction in search costs
- Also applicable in the labor market?
- .. and temporary work agencies
  - Make up growing share of labor market in many countries
  - Flexible, fast mediation of vacancies
  - Often associated with lower pay/less fringe benefits

# This paper

Novel job matching program ("Speeddates") in the Netherlands

- Meetings between unemployed and temporary work agencies
- Short, direct and inexpensive intervention
- No direct assistance of UI office

Randomized experiment to evaluate effectiveness

- Do speeddates increase job finding rates?
- Does temporary work have a persistent impact?
  - Stepping stone effect
  - Crowding out effect
- Do speeddates affect job search behavior?

#### Literature

Job search assistance

- Many programs have moderate impact (Card et al., 2010; 2015; Kluve, 2010)
- Activation schemes increasingly complex and costly (Sianesi, 2004; Rosholm, 2008; Graversen and Van Ours, 2008)
- Mixed results on cost effectiveness (Crépon et al., 2013; Behaghel et al., 2014)

Temporary work

- Evidence for stepping stone effect (Katz et al., 1999; Booth et al., 2002; Heinrich et al., 2005; De Graaf-Zijl et al., 2011)
- Evidence for detrimental impact (Autor and Houseman, 2010)

## Institutional background

Unemployment insurance in the Netherlands

- Replacement rate: 75% in first two months, 70% afterwards
- Benefit duration depends on number of working years (min: 3 months, max: 38 months)
- Some job search requirements

Temporary work agencies in the Netherlands

- Large share of labor market  $(\frac{1}{3} \text{ of unemployed workers mediated}; 6,000+ agencies})$
- Temporary contracts (3/6/12 months); at most 6 consecutive contracts or 4 years
- Provide less fringe benefits
- No work guarantee

## Speeddates

- Organized by local UI offices
- Participation not compulsory but counts as job search activity
- Can be general or sector-specific
- Size of events ranges from 20 to 700 participants
- On average, participants talk 7-8 minutes with 4 agencies



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## Experiment

- 1. Pre-selection of eligible job searchers by UI administration
- 2. Randomization into treatment and control group
- 3. Job seekers in treatment group receive invitation to participate in speeddate




Figure: Timeline experiment

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#### Overview speeddates

#	Location	Date	Туре	Size	Treatment	Show up
1	Doetinchem	4-Jul-14	General	188	51%	19%
2	Doetinchem	5-Sep-14	Technical	170	48%	17%
3	Leeuwarden	17-Sep-14	General	4132	76%	21%
4	Eindhoven	18-Sep-14	Technical, Transport, Logistics, Industry, Security, Construction, ICT	936	50%	24%
5	Leeuwarden	12-Nov-14	General	2942	82%	29%
6	Venlo	22-Jan-15	General	314	80%	38%
7	Zwolle	4-Feb-15	General	350	80%	13%
8	Groningen	19-Mar-15	Commercial services	478	80%	19%

Note - Further speeddates (Jun 2015 - Feb 2016) will be added to analysis.

Data from UI and tax administration (sample size: 8,361)

- Income spells (UI benefits, labor earnings before taxes)
- Job characteristics (working days, type of contract)
- Individual characteristics (age, gender, education, marital status)
- Time range: up to 3 months before and 12 months after speeddate

## Data

Survey data (sample size: 1,931)

- Online questionnaire (duration: 6-8 min) sent by email 2 weeks after matching event
- Response rate: 23% (balanced between treatment/control group)
- Questions about job search behavior (motivation, # applications, reservation wages, etc.) and, if applicable, speeddate
- Data weighted by demographics of full sample to account for selective response

# Balancing table

	Control group	Treatment group	<i>p</i> -value
Female	0.39	0.38	0.34
	(0.49)	(0.49)	
Age	40.42	40.60	0.55
	(11.87)	(11.87)	
Married	0.42	0.42	0.53
	(0.49)	(0.49)	
Primary/lower secondary edu.	0.20	0.20	0.43
	(0.40)	(0.40)	
Higher secondary education	0.59	0.58	0.19
	(0.49)	(0.49)	
College/university education	0.21	0.22	0.42
	(0.41)	(0.41)	
Benefits (prev. 3 months)	1475.16	1380.71	0.10
	(2305.66)	(2142.68)	
Earnings (prev. 3 months)	2440.57	2457.96	0.86
	(3690.55)	(4290.46)	
Workdays (prev. 3 months)	21.31	21.72	0.47
	(22.38)	(22.51)	
Perm. contract (prev. 3 months)	0.09	0.08	0.09
	(0.29)	(0.27)	
Observations	2,124	6,237	

Note – All estimates are weighted by inverse treatment assignment probabilities. Columns (2) and (3) report means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Column (4) shows p-values of two-sided difference-in-means tests.

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## Estimation strategy

$$Y_{is} = \mu_s + \delta T_i + X_{is}^{'}\beta + u_{is}$$

- *Y*<sub>is</sub>: outcome, *T*<sub>i</sub>: treatment, *X*<sub>is</sub>: pre-treatment characteristics, μ<sub>s</sub>: speeddate fixed effects
- Using treatment assignment as instrument for participation, we obtain LATE ( $\hat{\delta}_{IV}$ )
- Because there are no always-takers, LATE estimates the *average treatment effect on the treated* (ATET)
- Replacing *T<sub>i</sub>* by treatment assignment in the equation above, we obtain the *intention to treat effect* (ITT)

#### First-stage estimates

Attendance	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment assignment	0.237***	0.237***	0.241***	0.238***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.019)
Sector-specific $ imes$ treatment			-0.018	
			(0.023)	
Invitations ( $ imes 10^4$ ) $ imes$ treatment				-0.003
				(0.061)
Control group mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Characteristics	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
F-statistic (on excl. instruments)	615.81	639.13	319.86	319.53

Note – N = 8,361. All regressions include speeddate fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; \* significant at 10% level, \*\*\* significant at 5% level, \*\*\* significant at 1% level. Compliant to Nevertakers

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# **UI** benefits




Figure: Impact on collecting UI benefits

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# **UI** benefits

	Col	lecting benef	its	An	Amount monthly benefits			
	+1m	+1m +6m +12m +1		+1m	+6m	+12m		
Intention-to-Treat E	Estimates (l'	TT)						
Invited	-0.027**	-0.034***	-0.002	-47**	-62***	2		
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(21)	(23)	(17)		
Treatment-on-the-7	reated Estir	nates (ATET	-)					
Attended	-0.114**	-0.142***	-0.008	-197**	-262***	10		
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(92)	(99)	(72)		
Control group mean	and standa	ard deviation	of outcome	s				
Mean	0.63	0.38	0.28	803	575	332		
Standard deviation	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.45)	(890)	(995)	(666)		

Note – N = 8,361; outcomes are measured one ("+1m"), six ("+6m") or twelve ("+12m") months after the speeddate. All regressions control for speeddate fixed effects as well as a set of individual characteristics and previous job characteristics; \* significant at 10% level, \*\*\* significant at 5% level, \*\*\* significant at 1% level.

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## Employment and earnings

		Working		Am	ount month	nly earnings
	+1m	+6m	+12m	+1m	+6m	+12m
Intention-to-Treat E	stimates (	ITT)				
Invited	0.022*	0.026**	0.009	49*	62**	-2
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(25)	(30)	(29)
Treatment-on-the-T	reated Est	imates (AT	ET)			
Attended	0.092*	0.111**	0.038	206*	263**	-7
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(108)	(127)	(123)
Control group mean	and stand	lard deviat	ion of outc	omes		
Mean	0.41	0.57	0.63	662	1034	1195
Standard deviation	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.48)	(1029)	(1193)	(1250)

Note – N = 8,361; outcomes are measured one ("+1m"), six ("+6m") or twelve ("+12m") months after the speeddate. All regressions control for speeddate fixed effects as well as a set of individual characteristics and previous job characteristics; \* significant at 10% level, \*\* significant at 5% level, \*\*\* significant at 1% level. • Graph

# Type of work

	Worl	k at temp ag	gency		Other work			
	+1m	+6m	+12m	+1m	+6m	+12m		
Intention-to-Treat E	stimates (	ITT)						
Invited	0.018*	0.030***	0.006	0.007	0.002	0.005		
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)		
Treatment-on-the-T	reated Est	imates (ATE	ET)					
Attended	0.074* 0.125***		0.026	0.028	0.008	0.021		
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.052)		
Control group mean	and stand	lard deviatio	on of outcom	nes				
Mean	0.21	0.24	0.26	0.21	0.35	0.39		
Standard deviation	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.41)	(0.48)	(0.49)		

Note – N = 8,361; outcomes are measured one ("+1m"), six ("+6m") or twelve ("+12m") months after the speeddate. All regressions control for speeddate fixed effects as well as a set of individual characteristics and previous job characteristics; \* significant at 10% level, \*\* significant at 5% level, \*\*\* significant at 1% level.

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## Job search behavior

What are mechanisms?

- Job offers by temp agencies
- Information on labor market opportunities
- Changes in job search behavior
- $\Rightarrow$  Use survey data to complement analysis

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## Job search behavior


	Job search motivation (1-5 scale)	# applications sent (last 4 weeks)	<pre># job talk invitations (last 4 weeks)</pre>	Reservation wage (month, in euros)
Intention-to-T	reat Estimates	(ITT)		
Treatment	0.139**	-0.153	0.052	-92*
	(0.069)	(0.232)	(0.064)	(47)
Treatment-on-	-the-Treated Es	timates (ATET)		
Attendance	0.378**	-0.415	0.142	-251*
	(0.190)	(0.630)	(0.173)	(128)
Control group	mean and star	ndard deviation of	<sup>c</sup> outcomes	
Mean	3.88	6.21	0.67	2217
SD	(1.11)	(3.82)	(1.04)	(1045)

Note – N = 1,931. Observations are weighted by inverse probability weights to account for selective response. All outcomes are measured 2 weeks after the speeddate. If individuals are employed at time of survey, outcomes are measured for last job search period. All regressions control for speeddate fixed effects as well as a set of individual characteristics; \* significant at 10% level, \*\* significant at 5% level, \*\*\* significant at 1% level. Pleterogeneous effects

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## Complier earnings distributions



#### Figure: Earnings (in euros) after 1 month

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### Compliers vs never-takers

	Never-takers	Compliers	<i>p</i> -value
Female	0.37	0.40	0.04
	(0.48)	(0.49)	
Age	39.23	44.88	0.00
	(11.65)	(11.54)	
Married	0.39	0.50	0.00
	(0.49)	(0.50)	
Primary/lower secondary education	0.21	0.17	0.00
	(0.41)	(0.38)	
Higher secondary education	0.59	0.55	0.03
	(0.49)	(0.50)	
College/university education	0.20	0.28	0.00
	(0.40)	(0.45)	
Benefits (prev. 3 months)	1342.67	1499.89	0.02
	(2083.56)	(2314.86)	
Earnings (prev. 3 months)	2593.76	2032.48	0.00
	(4619.07)	(3000.71)	
Workdays (prev. 3 months)	23.23	16.98	0.00
. ,	(22.52)	(21.84)	
Perm. contract (prev. 3 months)	0.08	0.08	0.92
	(0.27)	(0.27)	
Observations	4,715	1,522	

Note – N = 6,237. All estimates are weighted by inverse treatment assignment probabilities.

Column (1) and (2) report means, with standard deviations in parentheses.

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# Heterogenous effects (ATET estimates)

	Туре о	of event		Gender		Α	lge		
	General	Sector	Fer	nale	Male	< 40	$\geq 40$		
After 1 month	0.077	0.149	0.1	0.133*		0.259**	-0.011		
	(0.055)	(0.110)	(0.0	078)	(0.064)	(0.107)	(0.051)		
After 6 months	0.056	0.336***	-0.	022	0.191***	0.180*	0.054		
	(0.056)	(0.122)	(0.0	080)	(0.066)	(0.102)	(0.055)		
After 12 months	-0.023	0.282**	-0.	075	0.104	0.084	-0.004		
	(0.056)	(0.120)	(0.0	(0.081)		(0.100)	(0.055)		
Observations	6,982	1,379	3,2	3,204		,204 5,157		4,082	4,279
	Unem	ployed		Education		Scope	of work		
	< 3 mo.	$\geq$ 3 mo.	Low	Medium	High	Part-time	Full-time		
After 1 month	0.106*	0.027	0.094	0.104	0.068	0.117	0.076		
	(0.057)	(0.100)	(0.125)	(0.068)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.060)		
After 6 months	0.115**	0.106	0.287**	0.129*	-0.045	045 0.124	0.107*		
	(0.058)	(0.109)	(0.136)	(0.069)	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.061)		
After 12 months	0.042	0.027	0.281* <sup>*</sup>	-0.002	-0.035	-0.011	0.059		
	(0.057)	(0.107)	(0.137)	(0.069)	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.060)		
Observations	6,769	1,592	1,683	4,872	1,806	2,669	5,692		

Note – All regressions control for speeddate fixed effects as well as a set of individual characteristics and previous job characteristics; educational levels are defined as follows: elementary school or less (low), high school or/and secondary vocational school (medium), college or university (high); \* significant at 10% level, \*\* significant at 5% level, \*\*\* significant at 1% level.

## Differences by complier propensity (ATET estimates)

Are compliers more likely to benefit from speeddates?

- Estimate complier propensity based on observables
- Test effect heterogeneity wrt propensity score

	After 1 month	After 6 months	After 12 months
Attendance	0.245	0.403**	0.206
	(0.158)	(0.161)	(0.159)
Compl. prop. $ imes$ attendance	-0.518	-0.984**	-0.565
	(0.439)	(0.448)	(0.443)
Complier propensity	0.002	-0.307	-0.834**
	(0.420)	(0.429)	(0.424)

Note – N = 8,361. Estimates are obtained through IV regressions using treatment assignment as an instrument for attendance. All regressions control for speeddate fixed effects as well as a set of individual characteristics and previous job characteristics; \* significant at 10% level, \*\*\* significant at 5% level, \*\*\* significant at 1% level. (Go Back

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# Cost-benefit analysis (after 12 months)




Figure: Cumulative UI benefits

- Benefits: reduction in UI payment
- Costs: personnel costs UI administration ( $\sim$  4 euros per assigned job seeker); no compensation for temp work agencies
- <u>Net present value</u> (assuming a discount factor of 10%): 405 euros per invited job searcher

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## Conclusion

Speeddates effective and inexpensive instrument

- Considerable impact on job finding in the short run
- Effects last for about one year
- Agency work has no stepping stone effects & no crowding out either
- Meetings influence job search behavior
   ⇒ Lower reservation wages, higher motivation
- Considerable reduction in benefit payments, while administrative costs are low
- Effects are largest for unemployed with lowest propensity to attend

#### Outcomes


	Control group	Treatment group	<i>p</i> -value	Observations	
Attendance	0.00	0.24	0.00	8,361	
Administrative	outcomes (4 w	eeks after speedda	ite)		
Collecting benefits	0.63	0.60	0.02	8,361	
-	(0.48)	(0.49)			
Amount monthly benefits	802.56	744.93	0.01	8,361	
-	(889.93)	(885.95)			
Working	0.41	0.43	0.08	8,361	
-	(0.49)	(0.50)			
Amount monthly earnings	662.27	710.67	0.06	8,361	
, ,	(1029.34)	(1072.33)			
Work at temp agency	0.21	0.23	0.02	8,361	
	(0.41)	(0.42)		,	
Survey response	0.23	0.23	0.99	8,361	
Survey outco	omes (2-3 week	s after speeddate	)		
# temp agencies registered	3.41	3.72	0.05	1,931	
	(2.96)	(2.94)			
Job search motivation (1-5 scale)	3.88	4.02	0.01	1,931	
· · · · ·	(1.11)	(1.02)			
# applications sent (last 4 weeks)	6.21	6.05	0.43	1,931	
	(3.82)	(3.54)			
# job talk invitations (last 4 weeks)	0.67	0.70	0.57	1,931	
	(1.04)	(1.01)			
Reservation wage (month, in euros)	2216.53	2092.15	0.02	1,931	
- ( )	(1045.27)	(913.16)			

Note – All estimates are weighted by inverse treatment assignment probabilities. All survey outcomes are additionally weighted by inverse probability weights to account for selective response. Column (2) and (3) report means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Column (4) shows *p*-values of two-sided difference-in-means tests.

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# Working



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#### Having worked since speeddate




Figure: Impact on having ever worked since speeddate

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#### Partial unemployment

- · Job searchers with full-time UI claim may take up part-time job
- · Benefits are proportional to remaining hours of unemployment

	Neither working nor benefits		C	Only benefits		Only working			Working and benefits			
	+1m	+6m	+12m	+1m	+6m	+12m	+1m	+6m	+12m	+1m	+6m	+12m
Intention-to-Treat	Estimate	s (ITT)										
Invited	0.005	0.005	-0.001	-0.027**	-0.032***	-0.008	0.022**	0.028**	0.003	-0.000	-0.002	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Treatment-on-the-	Treated E	stimates	(ATET)									
Attended	0.021	0.022	-0.005	-0.114**	-0.133***	-0.032	0.093**	0.120**	0.014	-0.000	-0.009	0.024
	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Control group mea	n and sta	andard dev	viation of ou	tcomes								
Mean	0.12	0.16	0.19	0.47	0.26	0.17	0.25	0.46	0.52	0.16	0.12	0.11
Standard deviation	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.50)	(0.44)	(0.38)	(0.43)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.37)	(0.32)	(0.31)

Note -N = 3,361. Outcomes are measured one ("+1m"), three ("+3m") or six ("+6m") months after the speeddate. All regressions control for speeddate fixed effects as well as a set of individual characteristics and previous job characteristics: \* significant at 10% level, \*\* significant at 5% level, \*\*\* significant at 1% level.

#### Heterogenous impact on reservation wage

	Full sample	Duration of unemployment		Gender		
	i un sumple	< 3 months	$\geq$ 3 months	Female	Male	
ATET	-250.64* (128.26)	-148.27 (150.28)	-609.05*** (223.00)	8.59 (165.87)	-424.41** (178.35)	
Observations	1,931	1,564	367	840	1,091	

Note – Observations are weighted by inverse probability weights to account for selective response. All outcomes are measured 2 weeks after the speeddate. If individuals are employed at time of survey, outcomes are measured for last job search period. All regressions control for speeddate fixed effects as well as a set of individual characteristics; \* significant at 10% level, \*\* significant at 5% level, \*\*\* significant at 1% level. <a href="#citation"></a>

# Full population vs. control group

	Full population	Control group	t-statistic
Female	0.46	0.39	5.94
	(0.50)	(0.49)	
Age	41.61	40.42	4.59
	(12.11)	(11.87)	
Married	0.43	0.42	0.73
	(0.50)	(0.49)	
Level of education	5.77	6.02	-4.39
	(2.86)	(2.61)	
Working (one month before)	0.39	0.39	-0.18
	(0.49)	(0.49)	
Working (two months before)	0.51	0.43	7.15
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Working (three months before)	0.62	0.52	9.63
. ,	(0.48)	(0.50)	
Observations	162,101	2,124	

Note - Column (1) and (2) report means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Column

(3) shows t-statistics of difference in means tests.

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## Performance at speeddates

	# agencies spoken	Average duration talk	Further contact with agency
Female	-0.131	-0.737*	-0.065
	(0.227)	(0.381)	(0.041)
Age	-0.015	-0.038*	0.004*
	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.002)
Higher secondary education	-0.136	-0.052	0.104**
	(0.246)	(0.409)	(0.043)
College/university education	-0.268	-1.847***	0.020
	(0.396)	(0.701)	(0.099)
Constant	4.383***	9.421***	0.416***
	(0.655)	(1.097)	(0.102)
Population mean	3.54	7.26	0.60
and standard deviation	(2.29)	(3.97)	(0.49)
Observations	669	672	700

Note – Observations are weighted by inverse probability weights to account for selective response. \* significant at 10% level, \*\* significant at 5% level, \*\*\* significant at 1% level.

Do treated job searcher take (in part) jobs of untreated job searchers?

- If so, control group would be worse off than without experiment
- Treatment effect would overstate actual impact

However, we find for control groups:

- 1. No significant differences by treatment share
- 2. No significant differences when compared to regions without speeddates

#### **Displacement effects**

DiD estimation comparing unaffected unemployed and control group

- Create panel of unemployed in all regions at all dates
- Unaffected unemployed matched to control group using PSM
- No significant difference in job finding  $(-0.009 \ [SE = 0.019])$

Location   Months	Doetinchem	Leeuwarden	Eindhoven	Venlo	Zwolle	Groningen
Jul-14	Х					
Sep-14	Х	Х	Х			
Nov-14		Х				
Jan-15				Х		
Feb-15					Х	
Mar-15						Х