

China's Exchange Rate Policy: Evolution, Latest Developments, and Future Directions

Li-Gang Liu – Head of China Economic Research

Nov 2010



China exchange rate regime – Historical Evolution

Period		Exchange Rate Policy Target	Foreign Trade Regime	Characteristics of the RMB Exchange Rate
Pre-reform Period (before 1978)	1949-1952	Encourage export and beneficial for overseas remittances	Private company predominantly	- Linked to internal and external price index; - changed frequently.
	1953-1972	Long term stability and balance the foreign exchange receipts and expenses	State-owned specialised foreign-trade corporations	- Pegged to USD; - non-trade payment on agreement rate of exchange with former Soviet Union and others; - undervalued mostly; - used RMB for quoting prices and settling accounts since 1968.
	1973-1978	Keep RMB strong and maintain balance of exchange income and expense	State-owned specialised foreign-trade corporations	- RMB pegging to a basket of currencies; - overvalued mostly; - changed frequently.
Reform Period (1978-1994)	1979-1984	Encourage exports and limit imports	Responsibility system of operation on contracting base in foreign trade sector	- RMB pegging to a basket of currencies; - dual Exchange rate regime (interal settlement rate); - mainly focused to the rate of earning exchange in terms of exports of products.
	1985-1993	Encourage exports and limit imports	Encourage FDI and domestic exporting firm competition	- Dual exchange rate regime (swap exchange rate); - mainly focused to the rate of earning exchange in terms of exports of products.
Reform Period (1995-2010)	1994-2004	Keep stability of exchange rate and serve to economic growth	Free competition	- Single conventional pegged exchange rate regime; - stable and appreciated steadily.
	2005-2010	Improve the mechanism of exchange rate base on market supply and demand	Free competition	- Managed float exchange rate regime; - appreciated substantively.
	Beyond 2010	Increase flexibility of exchange rate system and effectiveness of monetary policy	Free competition	- From managed float exchange rate regime to more flexibility of exchange rate regime



Source: Fengming Qin, "The Evolution of Renminbi Exchange Rate Regime and Its Policy Implications," School of Economics, Shandong University



Evolution of the RMB exchange rate, spot, NEER, REER

3


- **The RMB exchange rate had been on a depreciation trend until 1994, moving from a value from around 1.8 per USD in 1981 to 8.3 per USD in 1994.**
- **The exchange rate then stabilized for the period between 1994 to 2005, before embarking upon a gradual appreciation path until now, except for a period of USD peg from Sep 2008 to Jun 2010.**
- **The unification of the dual exchange rate system on 1 Jan 1994 led to one step large depreciation (from 5.4 to 8.3). China was accused to have sown the seed for the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.**
- **However, empirical evidence suggests that 1) China's foreign trade, occupying 80% of the dual exchange rate system, was already trading at the swap rate of around RMB8.3/USD before 1994. 2) China's NEER and REER had subsequently appreciated sharply largely owing to relatively higher CPI inflation in comparison with foreign ones.**




Source: BIS, Bloomberg

Controversies surrounding the RMB exchange rate started in 2003


China - Trade Surplus




China - Trade Balance (USD, bn)



China - Sterilisation (RMB bn)



China - Foreign Reserves




Source: CEIC, ANZ Economics



China's productivity growth was faster than its trading partners, but REER did not seem to match the productivity gains

- **Both Chinese TFP growth and labour productivity rose at a fast pace for the period between 2000 and 2008. TFP growth was more than twice of the its trading partners and labour productivity in both trade and non-tradable sectors was about 4 times as fast as its trading partners.**
- **However, such a sharp productivity gain did not seem to have led to sharp appreciation in China real effective exchange rate, possibly led by domestic distortions (mostly factor price distortions and the weak wage bargaining power of labour).**
- **This provides evidence that the RMB is possibly under valued. Since 2003, the RMB exchange rate has become the most hotly-debated international economic issue.**

Productivity Differentials (2000-2008)			
	Average productivity		Cummulative Difference
	China	Trading partners	
TFP growth	2.8	1.2	14.9
Labor productivity			
Tradable sectors	9.3	2.3	62.7
Nontradable sectors	4.7	0.6	36.4
Real Effective Exchange Rate			2.8



Source: IMF, CEIC, ANZ Economics




What does empirical evidence on the RMB undervaluation?

Summary of RMB Valuation Studies

Author	Methodology	Findings and Conclusions
<p>William R. Cline (2010) "Renminbi Undervaluation, China's Surplus, and the US Trade Deficit" Peterson Institute for International Economics</p>	<p>Using lagged real effective exchange rates in a CGE framework to estimate the effects of the RMB exchange rate</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - strength of the RMB does effect China's external balance, as well as the bilateral trade balance with the US - 2010 scale, a 10ppt real effective appreciation would reduce China's current account surplus by about USD170bn to USD250bn
<p>Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, Eiji Fujii (2007) "The Overvaluation of Renminbi Undervaluation" National Bureau of Economic Research</p>	<p>Exploiting the relationship between deviations from absolute purchasing power parity and real per capita income, this paper addresses the question of where China's real exchange rate stands relative to the "equilibrium" level.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - although various analytical results show that the RMB is undervalued, the deviation is mostly not statistically significant - estimating an "equilibrium real exchange rate" is often difficult - thereby, assessing the degree of RMB undervaluation is also difficult
<p>ANZ China Economic Research (2010)</p>	<p>Using a long-term trade regression model to estimate the necessary RMB appreciation to achieve a balanced trade flow</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - there is still a sizable upside for the RMB exchange rate going forward - a slow pace of RMB appreciation (<3% against a basket of currencies per year) will not be effective in reducing China's trade surplus - only a relatively aggressive appreciation (6-10% per year) could help balance China's trade account to within USD40bn by 2018.

China - Market Valuation of RMB Exchange Rate




Source: Bloomberg, ANZ Economics




China's exchange rate regime during the GFC has also created tensions domestically


China - GDP Growth (y/y)




China - New Loans



China - Commodity Building Selling Price



China - Inflation Expectation




Source: CEIC, ANZ Economics



QE II will continue to add pressure on the RMB exchange rate in the near term

9

- **The Fed is not achieving neither of its policy goals set by the Congress: maximizing employment and maintaining price stability.**
- **The Fed fund rate is likely to stay at historical low for an extended period due to a high unemployment rate in the US and the risk of deflation. It is likely that the Fed will not raise the benchmark interest rate before Q2 2012.**
- **Because the Fed can not move interest rate to negative, it can only use quantitative easing to create more relaxed monetary conditions and generate inflation expectations.**
- **The QE II announced in early Nov also put more pressures on the USD exchange rate over the medium to long term. USD yields are expected to remain low. These factors will encourage USD carry trade in the foreseeable future .**
- **Weak US means high global commodity prices, which implies that China will have to import inflation.**





Source: Bloomberg, ANZ Economics



History suggests that a weak US dollar is always associated with high commodity prices

- **The US dollar has three periods of large depreciation (1973-1979, 1985-1995 and 2002-present). Global commodity prices also climbed due to the weak dollar.**
- **Japan was the “world factory” in 1970s. Because of very high reliance on external resources, there was a close relationship between global commodity prices and Japan’s CPI inflation.**
- **The oil crisis in 1973 had pushed Japan’s inflation to as high as 25% in 1974 and 1975, despite the fact that JPY appreciated by 50% from 1972 to 1978.**




Source: Bloomberg, ANZ Economics




China's trade tensions with the rest of the world have also risen

WTO Anti-Dumping Complaints Received



WTO Complaints Filed Against China (1995-2009)



Sources: WTO, ANZ Economics



A Sino-US trade war scenario can lead to a sharp drop of China's exports

Impact of a 25% Import Tariff on China's Exports


	Assumption	Effect
Model 1: Exports		
Scenario 1	60% pass-through	-12.1%
Scenario 2	50% pass-through	-8.5%
Average		-10.3%
Model 2: Ordinary Exports		
Scenario 1	60% pass-through	-14.3%
Scenario 2	50% pass-through	-10.4%
Average		-12.4%
Model 3: Processing Exports		
Scenario 1	60% pass-through	-4.9%
Scenario 2	50% pass-through	-3.1%
Average		-4.0%

If the US were to impose a 25% punitive tariff on Chinese exports, as suggested by Paul Krugman, how damaging would it be?

We find that a 25% punitive tariff will bring about a double-digit decline in China's overall exports. This assumes that the G3 growth rate will be 2.5% for the next three years and that the pass-through effects of tariffs are partial (60% in Scenario 1, and 50% in Scenario 2).

Specifically, a 25% import tariff would likely reduce China's total exports by 8.5% to 12.1%, with an average value of -10.3%. The impact on China's ordinary exports will be highest, falling by 12.4% on average. In contrast, the impact on China's processing exports is smaller, but still sizeable, at 4.0%.

Do external pressures affect the pace of RMB appreciation?



RMB spot rate and RMB NDF tend to appreciate more aggressively when external pressures on RMB intensify





14

	G20 Summit in Toronto	Lawrence Summers visits China	US House of Representatives' Ways and Means Committee Currency-reform Bill	G20 Summit in Seoul and APEC Summit in Yokohama	Average
RMB Spot Rate, Daily Change					
Start date of event	26 Jun	05 Sep	24 Sep	11 Nov	
End date of event	27 Jun	08 Sep	29 Sep	14 Nov	
Preceding week					
Mean	-	-0.0006	-0.0088	-0.0060	-0.0051
Standard Deviation	-	0.0076	0.0036	0.0066	0.0059
Week of event					
Mean	-0.0076	-0.0070	-0.0029	-0.0074	-0.0062
Standard Deviation	0.0169	0.0114	0.0096	0.0114	0.0123
Following week					
Mean	-0.0035	-0.0091	-	0.0034	-0.0031
Standard Deviation	0.0063	0.0052	-	0.0076	0.0064
Memorandum					
Sample Mean					-0.0017
Sample Standard Deviation					0.0086
NDF, Daily Change					
Start date of event	26 Jun	05 Sep	24 Sep	11 Nov	
End date of event	27 Jun	08 Sep	29 Sep	14 Nov	
Preceding week					
Mean	-0.0043	0.0009	-0.0131	-0.0018	-0.0037
Standard Deviation	0.0121	0.0092	0.0097	0.0103	0.0083
Week of event					
Mean	-0.0014	-0.0103	-0.0028	0.0051	-0.0019
Standard Deviation	0.0106	0.0158	0.0145	0.0197	0.0121
Following week					
Mean	-0.0011	-0.0052	-0.0070	0.0003	-0.0026
Standard Deviation	0.0052	0.0079	0.0140	0.0152	0.0085
Memorandum					
Sample Mean					-0.0016
Sample Standard Deviation					0.0128

Source: Bloomberg, ANZ Economics



A stronger RMB is also conducive to China's structural change in the medium term



Source: CEIC, World Bank, Eurostat



Recent RMB reform: Referencing to a basket of currencies?

16

- **Notably, the correlation between RMB spot rate and a basket of currencies has been rising significantly. Our analysis shows that the correlation coefficient between RMB and the currency basket was only 0.193 during 21 Jun and 3 Sep, suggesting that the RMB spot rate is not much correlated with the currency basket.**
- **However, the correlation coefficient between CNY spot rate and currency basket has been rising since Sep, above 0.8, indicating that the PBoC has started to allow the RMB to be traded based on market conditions.**
- **This will also provide a good reference for forecasting RMB's exchange rate going forward.**



Correlation Coefficient between CNY spot rate and a basket of currencies

	Correlation Coefficient
Jun 21 - Sep 3	0.193
Sep 3 - Current	0.823

Recent RMB Reform: Referencing to a basket of currencies?


- The Chinese authorities preferred to reference the RMB to a basket of currencies, in other words, RMB is to partly de-peg to the USD.
- A trade-weighted index (TWI) is the most commonly used methodology to monitor the movements of one currency.
- Considering that demand for one currency is not only decided by the trade flows among economies, but also the financial flows, such as FDI and foreign debt, we sum up the trade flows, FDI figures and foreign debt between Mainland China and its major trading partners, in an attempt to better reflect the total demand.

ANZ CNY TWI

17

11 Major currencies and weights


WEIGHTS	
USD	0.3419
EUR	0.2246
JPY	0.1487
KRW	0.1015
SGD	0.0312
GBP	0.0250
MYR	0.0290
AUD	0.0274
THB	0.0216
CAD	0.0191
RUB	0.0299



What is the preferable exchange rate regime for China at this stage?

- **Given that financial sophistication, capital account liberalisation and exchange rate flexibility are not there, China is likely to adopt a managed floated exchange rate regime, with the rate more determined by the market demand and supply and the two-side volatilities rising significantly.**
- **In this case, pegging to a currency basket is still the second best choice as it provides a reliable reference for both market and the monetary authorities. This mechanism also brings transparency and removes the suspicion of currency manipulation.**
- **RMB trading band will need to be progressively enlarged as well in order to break one way bet on RMB's exchange rate.**

CNY Spot Rate



Market Volatilities of major currencies

Unit: %	EUR	GBP	JPY	AUD	THB	SGD	MYR	CAD	RUB	KRW
Max Daily Flucuation	6.20	6.70	7.56	12.80	7.91	3.13	2.58	6.00	5.17	17.16
2010 average	1.08	1.06	1.03	1.34	0.51	0.53	0.62	1.07	0.76	0.84
5 year average	0.93	0.98	1.02	1.34	0.53	0.50	0.47	1.02	0.62	0.96
Average since 2000	0.90	0.84	0.91	1.17	0.52	0.45	0.23	0.79	0.37	0.77



Concluding remarks

19

- **Given China's capital controls and unsophisticated financial system, an exchange rate regime that references to a basket of currencies with a wide trading band appears to be a second best strategy.**
- **Despite China's capital controls remain, China has started the internationalization of the RMB. Hong Kong is a place that can use RMB to make loans, interbank lending, and financial derivatives products.**
- **However, China's capital controls do not intend to stay forever, as China has already decided to make Shanghai an international financial centre in 2020. This then entails capital account liberalization and the convertibility of the RMB exchange rate. China's remaining capital account controls could be relaxed much fast then expected, probably within 5 years.**
- **The key for the RMB to become a floating exchange rate will also require some careful policy sequencing:**
- **This starts with interest rate liberalization and building sophisticated financial system and deep domestic bond market; followed by gradual liberalization of capital account by removing restrictions on portfolio, equity, and short-term capital flows; and the PBoC will also need upgrade its monetary policy instruments from relying on both money aggregates and interest rate to relying mainly on the interest rate tool.**

Important Notice

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited is represented in:

AUSTRALIA by:

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited ABN 11 005 357 522
100 Queen Street, Melbourne, Victoria, 3000, Australia
Telephone +61 2 9226 4647 Fax +61 3 9273 5711

UNITED KINGDOM by:

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited
ABN 11 005 357 522
40 Bank Street, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5EJ, United Kingdom
Telephone +44 20 3229 2121 Fax +44 20 7378 2378

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA by:

ANZ Securities, Inc. (Member of FINRA [www.finra.org] and SEC)
6th Floor 1177 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036, United States of America
Tel: +1 212 801 9160 Fax: +1 212 801 9163

NEW ZEALAND by:

ANZ National Bank Limited
Level 7, 1-9 Victoria Street, Wellington, New Zealand
Telephone +64 4 802 2000

- This document ("document") is distributed to you in Australia and the United Kingdom by Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited ABN 11 005 357 522 ("ANZ") and in New Zealand by ANZ National Bank Limited ("ANZ NZ"). ANZ holds an Australian Financial Services licence no. 234527 and is authorised in the UK and regulated by the Financial Services Authority ("FSA").
- This document is being distributed in the United States by ANZ Securities, Inc. ("ANZ S") (an affiliated company of ANZ), which accepts responsibility for its content. Further information on any securities referred to herein may be obtained from ANZ S upon request. Any US person(s) receiving this document and wishing to effect transactions in any securities referred to herein should contact ANZ S, not its affiliates.
- This document is being distributed in the United Kingdom by ANZ solely for the information of its eligible counterparties and professional clients (as defined by the FSA). It is not intended for and must not be distributed to any person who would come within the FSA definition of "retail clients". Nothing here excludes or restricts any duty or liability to a customer which ANZ may have under the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 or under the regulatory system as defined in the Rules of the FSA.
- This document is issued on the basis that it is only for the information of the particular person to whom it is provided. This document may not be reproduced, distributed or published by any recipient for any purpose. This document does not take into account your personal needs and financial circumstances. Under no circumstances is this document to be used or considered as an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy.
- In addition, from time to time ANZ, ANZ NZ, ANZ S, their affiliated companies, or their respective associates and employees may have an interest in any financial products (as defined by the Australian Corporations Act 2001), securities or other investments, directly or indirectly the subject of this document (and may receive commissions or other remuneration in relation to the sale of such financial products, securities or other investments), or may perform services for, or solicit business from, any company the subject of this document. If you have been referred to ANZ, ANZ NZ, ANZ S or their affiliated companies by any person, that person may receive a benefit in respect of any transactions effected on your behalf, details of which will be available upon request.
- The information herein has been obtained from, and any opinions herein are based upon, sources believed reliable. The views expressed in this document accurately reflect the author's personal views, including those about any and all of the securities and issuers referred to herein. The author however makes no representation as to its accuracy or completeness and the information should not be relied upon as such. All opinions and estimates herein reflect the author's judgement on the date of this document and are subject to change without notice. No part of the author's compensation was, is or will directly or indirectly relate to specific recommendations or views expressed about any securities or issuers in this document. ANZ, ANZ NZ, ANZ S, their affiliated companies, their respective directors, officers, and employees disclaim any responsibility, and shall not be liable, for any loss, damage, claim, liability, proceedings, cost or expense ("Liability") arising directly or indirectly (and whether in tort (including negligence), contract, equity or otherwise) out of or in connection with the contents of and/or any omissions from this communication except where a Liability is made non-excludable by legislation.
- Where the recipient of this publication conducts a business, the provisions of the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ) shall not apply.