

Credit Constraints, Firms' Precautionary Investment, and the Business Cycle

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This paper

- * Modern macroeconomic model of financial frictions
- * Firms face financing constraints
- * Entrepreneurs face limited insurance markets against idiosyncratic shocks

Key finding from my point of view

- * The model can deliver quantitatively significant results
→ financial constraints matter even in the long run

My main point

* The models with financial frictions have difficulties mattering quantitatively in the long run

- can deliver interesting theoretical predictions

- Most of the models following Kiyotaki-Moore

* Main reason \rightarrow backloading of incentives

- In the long run \rightarrow firms would accumulate significant collateral or promised utility so the constraints would not bind in the long run

* So, where is a "smoking gun" in this model?

- many parts, but what drives amplification?

- why does this model matter quantitatively?

Bringing all the models to one common denominator

* Financial frictions models have many bells and whistles but

- key question: how to provide incentives (resolve frictions) dynamically

* Consider a dynamic principal-agent model

- the same argument for financial friction models (one sided commitment, borrowing frictions, collateral constraints, etc.)

- key: principal and agent have the same discount rates

* Agent provides some effort which is unobservable

Optimal way to provide incentives

- * Consider perturbation: Provide a bit more consumption (increase promised utility tomorrow)
- * Cost: intertemporal (Euler equation) distortion
- * Benefit:
 - relaxes constraint tomorrow
 - but also relaxes constraint today (and all the dates before today)

Backloading

- * Increasing profile of promises makes constraints not bind eventually
- * In the financial friction models:
 - accumulate collateral to relax frictions
- * Super general result (e.g., Ray's Econometrica paper)

So ...

* In general dynamic financial frictions models cannot generate quantitatively important implications in the long run

Smoking gun

- * How to break the unavoidable backloading?
- * Differential discount factors:
 - Agent is less patient than the principal
 - Perturbation is less potent
 - More stuff in the future helps with relaxing constraints but the agent does not care
- * If the financial frictions models delivers quantitatively, there must be something with discounting.

Here

- * Many moving parts
- * My guess is that backloading is broken because of the finite-life of the entrepreneurs
- * Otherwise, backload and resolve all the frictions

Overall – today's conference

* Look out for backloading.