THE HEALTH-CARE SYSTEM AND ITS FISCAL IMPACT IN COLOMBIA

Sergio Clavijo and Camila Torrente*

This document analyzes the structure of the health-care system in Colombia with the aim of establishing the magnitude of the public fiscal deficit generated by such a system. We first explain its complex funding structure (full of “cross-subsidies”) and then we run simulations to establish the public sector financial gap. Based on these results we compute the Net Present Value (NPV) of the health-care service’s (actuarial) liability, as the system increases coverage from the current 86 per cent to the recently announced target of universal coverage by year 2012. Our base-case scenario shows an estimate of a NPV of public liabilities of about 97 per cent of GDP (of year 2007) over the period 2007-50, which is of similar magnitude to the pension system liability established after recent “parametric reforms” to the pay-as-you-go system.

1 Introduction

The literature of labor economics identifies at least three salient stages regarding social security developments at the global level. The first era was born in Germany in 1883: Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck had a visionary idea that initiated a compulsory savings system allowing the State to guarantee universal pension benefits. Hence, as the population aged, citizens had access to the deferred savings accumulated during their working days and the State avoided dealing with poor, out-of-work individuals (Clavijo, 2003).

In the second stage, this system expanded throughout Europe with minor idiosyncratic differences and even reached across the Atlantic to the United States, where several labor compensation packages were developed over the years 1901-28. With the arrival of the Great Depression in 1929-31, the desire to enlarge and secure these labor benefits grew substantially, leading to the well-known New Deal (1935-36) impelled by Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The New Deal not only increased unionization but formalized unemployment insurance and made pension and health benefits part of regular labor arrangements (Krugman, 2007, p. 35).

Initially, the funding of such programs relied on the financial muscle of large firms. These firms perceived benefits packages (not subject to taxes) as a means of attracting highly sought-after skilled labor. This was deemed preferable to an open “wage war”, which would entail a significant increase in direct labor costs, especially in an environment in which union affiliations had increased from 10 to nearly 30 per cent between 1930 and 1947.

It is also worth noting that, during the 1940s, the US government mandated “progressive” wage adjustments (with a premium for lower-strata workers), recognizing that market competition for skilled labor was taking place solely through the expansion of social security benefits. This combination of government intervention and free market competition ended up generating substantial improvements in the income distribution of the United States and better living standards

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for an enlarging middle class. Krugman (2007, p.48) has termed this social improvement (in relative and absolute terms) as the period of the “great compression” of income differentials, where cementing social security benefits would mark an era perceived as the “American Dream”.

However, American firms could afford to provide benefits packages only as long as technological advantages allowed them to maintain superiority over worldwide competition. With global competition reaching new heights in the 1980s and 1990s, US firms were hamstrung by the massive social security costs on their balance sheets. This change in the competitive landscape compelled the rise of a third stage in social security development, which could well be termed the era of the outsourcing and off-shoring. This stage, unfortunately, has resulted in increasing labor informality and the loss of prized social security protection in both developed economies and so-called emerging markets, which had attempted to replicate the successful path followed by the US in the golden period of 1935-50. Health-care coverage linked to company payrolls fluctuated between 57 and 65 per cent during 1993-2001 (just before the recession) due to the normal economic cycle in the United States. Yet more recently (2005-07), coverage has dwindled to less than 60 per cent with a markedly declining path. Moreover, globalization, free-trade agreements, and abundant immigration into the US have combined to generate acute market competition; many corporations, including well-established multinationals, have responded by looking to cut labor and social security costs.

During this third stage (from the early 1990s onwards), much debate has arisen in the United States – where health-care coverage currently stands at only 85 per cent – regarding the best way to propel drastic health reform aimed at providing universal coverage. While diverse, most proposals are based on taking advantage of synergies in a mixed public/private system, which should look for ways to deepen Medicare and Medicaid, at a marginal cost of about 4 per cent of GDP (Krugman, 2007, p. 237).

Despite the potential for market failure extant in this and any other health-care system (most notably due to adverse selection and “moral” hazard), Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany have demonstrated that public/private systems can mitigate the elevated costs stemming from such market imperfections. Nevertheless, the case of Singapore, with the Quality Years System (Qualy), where citizens possess “individual health-care accounts” similar to pensions, also merits examination (Harford, 2007, p. 125ss).

The trajectory of US social security development (first, the attempted establishment of universal pension benefits; second, compulsory wage increases; and now in the third stage, the drive toward universal health care) possesses much in common with the path followed by Latin America. In the specific case of Colombia, compulsory wage increases came first with the movement toward unionization (1940-50); the attempted establishment of universal pension benefits, through the creation of the Instituto Colombiano de los Seguros Sociales (ISS), followed in 1967.

However, this pay-as-you-go system quickly dissolved into crisis as a consequence of low participation rates – only 23-25 per cent of the labor market contributed. In response, the government carried out Law 100 of 1993, creating a dual public/private competitive system in which new generations were given the opportunity to migrate to defined contribution private accounts run by the so-called Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP), partially mimicking some elements of the Chilean reform of the early 1980s.

The aforementioned Law 100 of 1993 also ambitiously set the goal of attaining universal health coverage in Colombia, based on a very complex system of “cross-subsidies”. Paradoxically, what has taken the “advanced countries” more than a century to pursue is now being attempted by
Colombia after just 40 years, albeit at a much higher fiscal cost (with the exception of comparisons to the US economy).

At this point, there are two key elements worth highlighting regarding social security coverage projections. The first element involves the early warnings provided by Colombian economists in the mid-1990s about the forthcoming exhaustion of actuarial reserves within the pay-as-you-go system, as younger generations migrated toward the AFPs. In fact, the public system began using general taxes to pay for pension benefits as early as 2004 (less than four decades after the launching of the pay-as-you-go system). Because the system continues to involve only 25-27 per cent of the labor market and a very regressive social scheme, the central government was forced in 2007 to allocate about a third of total tax revenue (equivalent to almost 5 per cent of GDP) to covering the pension benefits for just one million retirees (6 per cent of the Colombian employed population).

The second element deals with the “contingent liabilities” inevitably generated by expanding the health-care system, particularly as the Colombian population begins to age and demand for both medical attention and medicines expands (with no apparent limit). The population census conducted in 2005 indicates that, by the year 2050, the percentage of the total population comprised of people over 60 years of age will have tripled to 18 per cent.

Given previous experience with social security overruns and the recognized burden of an expanded health-care system, it is astonishing that official figures in Colombia lack a “consistent” estimate of the fiscal impact of instituting universal health coverage, though some progress has been made with respect to understanding public/private health expenditures (Baron, 2007). This lack of consensus might be attributable to the complexity of the accounting system, as it deals with multiple public layers (national government vs. local governments; contribution systems vs. compensation systems) and multiple private layers (the insurance component known as EPSs vs. the service component known as IPSs).

This document analyzes the structure of the health-care system in Colombia with the aim of establishing the magnitude of the fiscal deficit generated by such a system. After explaining its labyrinthine system of compensations and “cross-subsidies”, we run simulations with the intention of approximating the financial costs implied by arriving at universal coverage from the current measure of 86 per cent. Finally, based on these results, we compute the Net Present Value (NPV) of the fiscal deficit likely to be generated over the period 2007-50. Our base-case scenario shows an estimated NPV of public liabilities of about 110 per cent of GDP (using year 2006 figures), which is of a similar magnitude to the pension system liability established after recent “parametric reforms” of the pay-as-you-go system.

From the outset, this result seems consistent with coverage rates and the funding scheme. The budget for the health-care system presently relies on governmental subsidies for approximately 2/3 of its funds, instead of the 1/3 originally planned back in 1993, meaning its fiscal impact is already significant (Clavijo and Torrente, 2007; FEDESARROLLO, 2005). Furthermore, the contributed (non-subsidized) portion of the health-care budget relies on payroll taxes amounting to only 12.5 per cent of wages. Unfortunately, the fiscal imbalances common in health-care systems tend to be corrected through restriction of service, potentially through augmented “waiting lists” and/or through decreased quality: thus, both providers and patients stand to lose.

This has proved the story in developed countries, in spite of wide differences in the efficiency of health-care systems. For example, while the US economy shows health-care expenditures of about 12-16 per cent of GDP and coverage of 85 per cent, the UK exhibits expenditures in the range 6-8 per cent of GDP and quasi-universal coverage (Harford, 2007,
Health-care expenditures in Colombia have recently been estimated at 8 per cent of GDP but coverage remains low at 86 per cent, indicating a system that replicates the deficiencies of the US system while possessing few of the virtues of the British system.

In effect, our preliminary calculations (holding constant epidemiological factors currently being studied by DNP) indicate that the fiscal deficit caused by the Colombian health-care system is on the order of 1.1-2.0 per cent of GDP annually, depending on crucial assumptions regarding supplementary healthcare expenditures (in addition to the “compulsory health-care plan”, POS). With the structural fiscal imbalance of the central government approximated at 4 per cent of GDP, the figure of 2.0 per cent of GDP seems consistent with macroeconomic figures.

Supporting this relatively low estimate is the fact that the period 2007-12 will likely witness an increase in health-care system contributions collected through payrolls as labor dynamics improve and labor informality is reduced. Open unemployment has diminished from an average of 17 per cent during the difficult years of 1998-2003 to 11 per cent in 2007; it even dropped to almost 9 per cent at the end of 2007, though high payroll taxes (about 37 per cent for firms) and an inflexible labor market (particularly due to onerous severance payments) are likely to impair further sustainable improvements. Moreover, the level of social security contributions has marginally improved to 39 per cent of the labor market by the end of 2007, partly as a result of the recently instituted surveillance system known as PILA (yet this figure is about half of the contributions rate observed, for example, in Chile).

On the other hand, health-care expenditures will also be increasing due to the aging of the population and increased life expectancy (currently 72 years in Colombia and 75-78 years in developed economies). The net outcome of these two countervailing effects, according to our calculations, will be an increase in the fiscal deficit caused by health-care expenditures from the current level of 2.1 per cent of GDP to 3.8 per cent by 2035; a stabilization will occur thereafter with the percentage of GDP falling to 1.8 per cent in 2050.

Given this fiscal trajectory, we have estimated the NPV of future health-care liabilities to be 110 per cent of GDP (of year 2007), a figure similar to the calculated NPV of pension liabilities (in the range of 140-160 per cent of GDP), taking into account the 1993 and 2003-06 “parametric” reforms. However, as is well known, health care represents a uniquely challenging fiscal case in that its expenditure side cannot be easily bounded and, on the revenue side, estimates of contingent fiscal obligations are likely to force governments to continue increasing tax collections through different means (Clavijo, 2004).

In the second part of this study we will describe the current institutional framework of the health-care system in Colombia, including the reforms occurring 1993-2007 and, notably, the possible effect of “integration limits” ratified in Law 1122 of 2007. The third section presents fiscal simulations and NPV computed over the period 2007-50. Finally, chapter four is devoted to concluding remarks.

2 Health insurance system structure in Colombia

2.1 Law 100 of 1993: cross and demand subsidies

The Health-Care Social Security System (HCSSS), introduced by Law 100 in 1993, effected fundamental changes in the industrial organization and day-to-day functioning of the health-care system in Colombia. The main objective of creating a general insurance system was to achieve universal health-care coverage. It is worth noting that at the beginning of the 1990s, just 28 per cent
of the population possessed health-care coverage. Furthermore, it has been estimated that the private sector directly accounted for nearly 45 per cent of hospital admissions and about 40 per cent of medical appointments, suggestive of a relatively expensive health-care system with extremely limited coverage.

Before Law 100, the health system was divided in three sub-systems: 1) a social security area, in which the ISS tried to handle simultaneously the insurance and health services provision tasks for its members; 2) a public network consisting of a complex and inefficient regional hospital structure; and 3) a private system, expensive in per capita terms and inclusive of only the highest socioeconomic strata.

Law 100 dismantled this disjointed system and constructed in its place a single insurance system based on the principle of “cross-subsidies” between two components: the Contributive System (CS) and Subsidized System (SS). The Contributive System divides the insurance cost between the employer and the employee, provided the employee has adequate financial resources. The Subsidized System includes only individuals who lack the financial wherewithal to cover health-care contributions; the government assumes these costs.

Fundamentally, Law 100 based the health-care system on Empresas Promotoras de Salud (EPS), the insurance component firms. The EPS were commissioned with health-care risk redistribution as well as with managing the mandatory basic health-care plan known as Plan Obligatorio de Salud (POS), while the supply of services of this plan was to be provided via the service component, Instituciones Prestadoras de Salud (IPS). The EPS were permitted to create their own IPS, thereby integrating the entire insurance/health-care services process.

The Fosyga (Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía), a public institution affiliated with the Ministry of Social Protection, serves as the principal mechanism for distributing funds to the EPS and SS, by means of the aforementioned “cross-subsidies”. After receiving the revenue generated by payroll taxes, Fosyga allocates the nominal value of the POS per person (known as the Unidad de Pago por Capacitacion, or “UPC”) to each EPS, for every individual that particular EPS covers; the remaining funds Fosyga has taken in from payroll tax revenue are then directed to the SS. The gap between these funds and the total projected expenditures of the SS must then be supplied by the government.

The mandatory basic health plan represented by the POS differs between the two systems, as the plan offered in the CS is more extensive. Moreover, within the SS there are two different POS: the full subsidy and the partial subsidy; the full subsidy comprises a more complete service scheme. With time, it was expected that the number of members of the SS proportional to total contributing workers would decline, thus allowing the SS POS to get better in terms of both quantity and quality, eventually reaching the level of the CS POS. In theory, the contributive system was to have financed 2/3 of health-care costs, with the remainder coming from the government.

As we will demonstrate, this hasn’t been the case: in fact, the health-care system’s sustainability is being threatened (under the current structure) by the fact that roughly 55 per cent of costs are financed on the non-contributive side (i.e., by the government) (see Figure 1). Furthermore, this fiscal burden has prevented the UPC from being raised, therein restraining the possibilities for improving and expanding the basic health services represented by the POS. However, it is worth noting the improvements in health-care coverage this fiscal burden has made possible: at the end of 2006 about 86 per cent of the population had health insurance. Public spending on health care has also remained at such high levels in part because of special health-care programs that still exist outside of the system described above, including the programs of the National Army, the National Petroleum Company (“Ecopetrol”) and the National Council.
Another crucial change brought about by Law 100 resided in the realignment of the system underlying subsidies from the supply side to the demand side. In other words, instead of directly assigning public resources to the public hospital network and other health entities, Law 100 directed these resources toward the users of health-care services with the intention of stimulating competition among the renderers of such services.

The regional public health-care entities faced serious difficulties in learning how to alter billing procedures with this new mandate, resulting in a slow transition from the “supply system” to the “demand system”. The private sector, on the other hand, has successfully adopted the new system, vertically integrating the insurance and services components (EPS-IPS) as well as the Administradoras de Riesgos Profesionales (responsible for health-care insurance coverage on the job accidents, ARP), therein gaining important synergies. This proved such a success to highly integrated providers that vertical integration between EPS-IPS was restricted by Law 1122 of 2007 (to 30 per cent of services contracted by EPS), with the intent of controlling quality and continuing to stimulate competition among health-care service providers.

With regard to Fosyga, it administers four subordinate accounts: solidarity, compensation, promotion and prevention, and catastrophe and traffic accident risk (ECAT). The compensation sub-account manages the contributions from members of the CS to the EPS; the solidarity sub-account handles the joint financing resources of the CS and the SS that fund the “cross-subsidies,” and correspond to 1.5 per cent of the total health-care contributions made by firms and self-employed workers. In 2007, Law 1122 raised the obligatory contribution of the special health-care programs (National Army, etc.) to the solidarity account by 0.5 per cent.

2.2 Health coverage progress

Important progress was made between 1995 and 2006 with respect to health-care coverage. The number of SS members rose from 4.8 million (12.4 per cent of the population) to nearly 20 million (about 46 per cent of the population), whereas CS membership tripled from 5 million (13 per cent of the population) to almost 17 million (40 per cent of the population). Hence,
86 per cent of the Colombian population nowadays has health insurance, with 55 per cent of those belonging to the SS and the remaining 45 per cent to the CS. This statistic of 86 per cent coverage represents a major improvement over the 28 per cent coverage level reported before the enactment of Law 100 of 1993. Moreover, the aforementioned special health-care programs (e.g., for the Military) cover an additional 5 per cent of the population, such that total health-care coverage actually reaches around 90 per cent of the Colombian population. Thus, Colombia continues drawing nearer to universal coverage, though the mandatory basic health plan’s (POS) service quality and quantity still has substantial room for improvement.

The annual cost of providing health-care coverage to the 6 million people currently uncovered is projected at $1.3 billion (2006 prices) while estimates from the Ministry of Social Protection show that maintaining universal coverage would likely be on the order of $6.5 billion (2006 prices). Although Law 797 of 2003 and Law 1122 of 2007 increased the payroll tax destined for health-care expenditures from 12.0 to 12.5 per cent, this implies additional tax revenue for the government of just $400 million annually, resulting in a total of $1.5 billion. Thus, the staggering remainder of $4 billion ($6.5 – $1.5), equivalent to 1.6 per cent of annual GDP, must come from the fiscal budget. Additionally, raising taxes stimulates labor informality and therefore means higher costs will be borne specifically by the subsidized system.

### 2.3 Fiscal decentralization in the health-care system

Fiscal decentralization in the Colombian health-care system was implemented by Law 60 of 1993 and Law 715 of 2003. Each piece of legislation extended the so-called Sistema General de Participaciones (SGP), which determines the regional and local transfers made by the central government.

The main objective of Law 715 was to reduce the volatility in the financial resources designated for social investment, given the variable nature of the government’s income at the time. The nation distributes 15 per cent of the SGP, previously known as the “Situado Fiscal”, to different regional entities and the remaining 85 per cent to the particular expenses of users of education and health-care services; of the funds represented by this 85 per cent, 60 per cent must be committed to education, 25 per cent to health care, and the remaining 15 per cent to the sector with the more urgent needs.

Figure 2 illustrates how the SGP resources were distributed in 2006, among education (60 per cent), health (25 per cent) and general purposes (15 per cent). Total resources committed to the health-care sector added up to $3.5 billion, a sum which in turn was allocated as follows: 48.3 per cent for demand subsidies to maintain the current coverage level; 38.3 per cent to supply subsidies; 10.3 per cent for public health awareness (funding, for example, campaigns for disease prevention), and 2.3 per cent for attempts to raise coverage.

As we explained previously, one of the principle objectives of Law 100 of 1993 was the reallocation of resources from the public hospital network to demand subsidies. However, statistics show this transition has not occurred as rapidly as hoped. For example, while supply-side subsidies fell from 42.7 to 26.9 per cent of total subsidies between 1996 and 2003, demand subsidies only increased from 6.4 to 14.5 per cent during the same period. Nevertheless, CS expenses increased to 58.5 per cent of total health-care expenditures in 2003, up from 50.9 per cent in 1996.

### 2.4 Health expenses composition and international comparisons

In 2003, Colombia spent the equivalent of 7.7 per cent of GDP on health care after averaging
8.5 per cent of GDP from 1998-2002. These expenses surpass those of Chile (5.9 per cent of GDP) and Mexico (5.7 per cent). In addition, when compared to other Andean countries, Colombia’s health-care expenses seem even higher: in recent years, Ecuador allocated only 4.8 per cent of GDP and Venezuela, 5.4 per cent of GDP, to the health-care sector.

When compared to developed world allocations, though, it could be argued that the allocations to health care of other Latin American countries, particularly Colombia’s Andean compatriots, are far too low. Indeed the average health-care expenses for the period 1998-2002 for Britain added up to 7.3 per cent of GDP and 7.6 per cent for Japan. According to Baron (2007), Colombia has recently witnessed one of the most pronounced increases in health-care spending, going from 6.2 to 7.7 per cent of GDP between 1993 and 2003. In parallel, health insurance coverage rose from 28 to 83 per cent over the same period.

Disaggregating total health-care expenditures shows that between 1998 and 2002, public spending accounted for

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**Figure 2**

National Health-care Transfers by Sources and Uses  
*(percent, 2006)*

**Figure 3**

Health Care Expenditure in Colombia, 1993-2003  
*(percent of GDP)*
78.3 per cent of total health-care expenditures. Cuba was the only country with a greater level of public spending (85.7 per cent), while other Latin American countries such as Chile (41.2 per cent), Mexico (46.0 per cent), and Venezuela (50.3 per cent) recorded public expenditures far below the Colombian level. In the United States and Switzerland, both developed countries, public spending between 1998 and 2002 amounted to, on average, 47 and 56 per cent of total health-care expenditures respectively.

The Colombian case, as we noted above, has shown a slight decline in total health-care expenditures starting in 1998 and stabilizing at around 7.7 per cent of GDP. This is due, in part, to the economic crisis of 1998-2002, when a diminution of government revenues reduced regional transfers, adversely affecting the SS; increased unemployment and labor informality also contributed to the decline in spending (see Figure 3).

3 Health-care fiscal deficit estimation and its Net Present Value (2006-50)

Two types of factors determine health-care cost evolution (Oliveira, de la Maisonnueve and Bjornerud, 2006). Demographic factors are those such as population growth and the epidemiological profile of the population, while non-demographic factors may include income and technology. This paper will focus on the effects of the non-demographic variables such as institutional arrangements in the health-care system. This will enable us to establish the fiscal deficit evolution between 2007 and 2050 in Colombia and its (approximate) NPV.

Leaving constant the epidemiological profile is consistent with the hypothesis that life expectancy increases in parallel with healthy-life years. Thus, an increase in the proportion of the population over 60 years of age does not necessarily mean a relative increase in health-care costs. Furthermore, as the number of individuals with health insurance grows, per capita costs stabilize. Additionally, OECD studies have shown that health-care spending increased at annual rate of 3.6 per cent between 1981 and 2002; 0.3 per cent of the growth is explained by demographic factors, 2.3 per cent by income factors, and the remainder by institutional and political variables.

According to the calculations of DANE and DNP, in 2006 the total population of Colombia measured approximately 43.4 million. That number is expected to reach 50.8 million by 2020, as the population grows at an annual rate of 1.18 per cent from 2006 to 2010, 1.13 per cent the following five years, and 1.09 per cent between 2016 and 2020. We assume that the population will grow at a steady annual rate of 1.0 per cent in the years 2020-50, and that life expectancy will remain constant at 72.6 years of age (see Table 1).

In 2006, about 78 per cent of the 43.4 million people comprising the Colombian population were considered of working age, defined as 12-65 years old, and about 53 per cent of this working age population (WAP) was employed. In general, the WAP/Population ratio has remained constant in Colombia, and resultantly, we will use this scenario in our calculations. It is also worth noting that the ratio of Employed/ WAP plays a key, non-demographic role in affecting the demand for health-care services.

Also in 2006, the number of active contributors to the Contributive System measured around 7.4 million people. Therefore the relationship contributors/employed was approximately 40 per cent, evincing the high informality level and demonstrating the significant pressure on public health spending. As explained previously, the volume of contributors governs the spending power of the health-care system by funding the POS and any additional health expenses, thereby dictating the private sector’s equilibrium (or lack thereof).
One of the key economic policy variables in this model comes from the goal of health-care coverage set by the government. As noted above, Law 100 of 1993 ended up placing the burden of the system on public resources, and it is expected that this situation will worsen between 2007-12. Indeed the government’s objective is to raise health insurance coverage in the SS to 24.8 million people, while increasing membership in the CS to 17.8 million. Given these expectations and the estimated population growth of 1.18 per cent per annum, health-care coverage would reach approximately 94 per cent in 2010, with nearly 60 per cent belonging to the SS and only 40 per cent to the CS. This paper will assume that the government’s goals will be achieved by 2011 and therefore, that the SS Members / CS Members ratio will in turn be determined by the contributors/employed ratio.

Health-care coverage will then be determined by the relationship between the number of contributors to the CS and relative family density, a ratio which in the past five years has averaged 2.26. Ideally, the members of the CS contribute enough such that after redistribution by Fosyga the UPC of all contributors is covered. However, the relative family density implies the existence of unaccounted for dependents: for every contributor of the CS, the system actually faces the cost of attending 2.26 individuals; moreover, these costs are faced at the real POS value, not the arbitrarily defined UPC.

### 3.1 Sources and uses of health-care system funding

The contributions to the CS represent the main source of income for the Health-Care Social Security System (HCSSS). Taxes going to health-care contributions accounted for 12.5 per cent of the worker’s monthly wage, where 8.5 per cent is assumed by the employer and 4.0 per cent by the worker. Additionally, 5.0 per cent of the “parafiscal contributions” (payroll taxes, equal to 4.0 per cent of the worker’s wage, allocated to endeavors of social security) made to the Cajas de Compensación Familiar (CCF; subsidized non-governmental entities aimed at social welfare) will be spent on financing the demand subsidies of the SS.

CS’s contributors are distributed in three wage ranges: high, medium and low. The high rank contributors have salaries between 10 and 20 times the Legal Minimum Wage (LMW); they represent 1 per cent of total contributors; and they possess an average monthly wage of 12 times LMW. The medium rank represents 12 per cent of total contributors and on average earns 6 times LMW. Finally, the low range consists of 87 per cent of contributors and has an average monthly wage of 2 times LMW (see Table 2).
The Health Care System and its Fiscal Impact in Colombia

The system’s expenditures consist of: 1) the mandatory basic health plan (POS); 2) out-of-pocket expenses; and 3) parafiscal contributions. The cost of the POS is supposed to coincide with the CS UPC value, which in 2006 equaled $408,000 approximately 8.3 per cent of the LMW calculated annually. In the SS, demand subsidies are divided between: a) full subsidies (91 per cent of the SS population is affiliated through this modality); and b) partial subsidies (9 per cent of the SS population). The UPC value of the full subsidy represents 4.4 per cent of the LMW, calculated annually.

Health-care expenditures supplementary to the POS are represented by out-of-pocket spending. This estimate is based on sample results from 2001, in which the high wage range spent 1.3 per cent of the LMW calculated annually, the medium wage grade, 2.4 per cent, and the low grade, 1.6 per cent. Studies from the OECD have confirmed that the income elasticity of health-care expenditures is greater than 1; thus, assuming out-of-pocket health-care spending to be constant over time appears to be a consistent supposition. It is consistent as well, with the hypothesis that the high wage range has access to supplementary health-care plans representing a small fraction of their total income. For the SS members, out-of-pocket health-care expenditures are approximated by the expenses of the SGP and the Fosyga. Given that, in 2006, health-care supply-side subsidies accounted for $3.2 billion, we have inferred per capita spending (taking into account both the SS population and non-members) of $120,000 per annum.

Finally, it is well known that the government injects money into the health system by means of capital contributions to public hospitals and state health enterprises. Our decomposition of spending includes such contributions: in 2006 these expenditures summed $300,000 million on average, a cost of $100,000 per member of the ISS (20 per cent of the total CS members).

As mentioned above, Fosyga, manages four sub-accounts; for the purposes of this study, however, we will focus only on the Compensation, Solidarity and ECAT accounts. We will leave out the Promotion-Prevention account (0.4 per cent of the UPC value) and take into account these resources via UPC expenses. The budgetary support for populations displaced by violence (approximately 2.6 per cent of the total population) represents a supply-side subsidy but is administered through the Fosyga.

Lawsuits presently compose a substantial fraction of today’s health-care obligations borne by the State (by way of the Compensation and Solidarity sub-accounts). Preliminary data suggest that nine of every ten lawsuits are resolved in favor of the patient, and the Fosyga must reimburse the EPS for these losses from the national budget. In addition, these two accounts must cover other health-care expenses not included in the UPC and are compelled by law to offset the deficits of EPS, should these businesses suffer losses.

### Table 2

**Contributive System by Wage Range**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of people (millions)</th>
<th>Representation (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (&gt; = 2 LMW)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (&lt;2-10 LMW)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (&lt;10-20 LMW)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Superintendencia Financiera and ANIF calculations.
Table 3

Baseline and Alternative Scenario Assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Improved Formality</th>
<th>Status quo Formality</th>
<th>High Formality Improvement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS contributors/employed (percent) (millions)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCSSS coverage (percent) (millions)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>98</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health-care sector deficit (percent of GDP)</td>
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<td>–3.3</td>
<td>–1.8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANIF calculations.

3.2 Base scenario – Improved labor formality

Taking into account the evolution of both non-demographic and demographic factors, we have constructed three scenarios where the key policy variables are the government’s coverage goal and the ratio contributors/employed.

The baseline scenario assumes: 1) population growth for five year periods as described previously (1.18 per cent between 2006-10; 1.13 per cent between 2011 and 2015; 1.09 per cent between 2016 and 2020; and 1.0 per cent thereafter), reaching in 2050 an estimated total population of 68.5 million; 2) between 2006 and 2050, health coverage will increase gradually from 86 per cent to 98 per cent of the population; and 3) during the same period, the contributors/employed ratio will increase from 40 to 50 per cent, corresponding to a rise from 7.4 million contributors to 14.2 million (see Table 3).

As a proxy for the labor market formality that Colombia could potentially reach by 2050, we compared the correlation between GDP per capita and labor formality during the years 1979-2003 for, among other countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico (see Figure 4). Starting in 2007 at a GDP per capita of US$6,378 (PPP) for Colombia, and assuming GDP growth at 3 per cent per annum, we determined that it would take about 50 years for GDP per capita to double. In other words, Colombia’s GDP per capita in 2056 would be similar to Chile’s in 2007, US$13,000 (PPP). Taking into account the positive correlation between labor formality and GDP per capita, we deduced that by 2050, Colombia could achieve a contributors/employed ratio of 70 per cent, a ratio comparable to that currently present in Chile. Based on these results, we have constructed three scenarios in which the contributors/employed ratio varies from 40 to 60 per cent.

The baseline year estimation corresponds to 2006, when total parafiscal health-care contributions added up to $11.9 billion, including contributions to the so-called Cajas de Compensación Familiar (CCF). The contributions to CCF accounted for a mere 1.5 per cent of total contributions. By salary ranges, contributions were distributed as follows: 67 per cent ($7.9 billion) came from the low range (6.4 million contributors earning, on average, two times the LMW); 28 per cent from the medium range; and 5 per cent from the higher range.
Total expenses consist of all expenditures made by the CS and the SS. In 2006, both POS and non-POS (out-of-pocket expenses) CS expenses added up to $10.8 billion. The POS spending accounted for $6.9 billion, of which $6.0 billion was allocated to workers in the lower wage rank, largely due to the high proportion of members categorized in this wage range (14.8 million, or about 87 per cent of all CS members). Non-POS expenses equaled $3.9 billion. In per capita terms (taking into account only CS affiliates) the POS expenses represent two times the Non-POS ($406.000 vs. $229.000).

In 2006, SS expenses added up to $7.2 billion, almost $356.000 per SS member. Total expenditure via demand subsidies accounted for 57 per cent while the remainder was spent via supply subsidies (including direct fiscal donations to the ISS).

The revenue and expenditure balance (CS+SS) in 2006 showed a $6.2 billion deficit (1.9 per cent of GDP), in which the CS surplus ($0.86 billion) only minimally offset the SS deficit ($7.2 billion). It should be noted that the SS deficit is, quite simply, equivalent to its expenses, given that this system does not receive wage contributions. It is also worth mentioning that while both the higher and medium wage range groups of the CS were in relative equilibrium, the volume of lower range workers produced a deficit of $480.000 million, a shortfall of $33.000 per member in the low wage range.

The private sector produced a slight $0.4 billion surplus (0.1 per cent of GDP) in 2006, as contributions ($11.2 billion) surpassed total expenses ($10.8 billion). By contrast, the public sector recorded a $7.1 billion deficit (2.2 per cent of GDP). In revenue terms, the public sector makes contributions to the HCSSS on behalf of one million employees (6 per cent of all employed workers). These contributions, in turn, are divided between regional employees (5 per cent) and central government employees (95 per cent), the latter of which includes teachers and police.

The SS demand subsidies are funded by either the specific regional institution (which in practical terms is equivalent to the same nation’s budget) or Fosyga. At present, regional or local authorities contribute 15 per cent of the partial subsidy and 60 per cent of the full subsidy with the remainder funded by the Fosyga, though some special cases, such as the prison population, exist. Unfortunately, as information about local and regional spending is virtually nonexistent, we will assume that the principle of fiscal decentralization supply subsidies, introduced by Law 715 of
2001, has been successfully implemented; this implies the assumption that SS Non-POS spending is fully funded by the SGP.

As a result of the foregoing, we have determined that in 2006, the health-care sector in Colombia likely generated a $6.7 billion deficit, equivalent to 2.1 per cent of GDP; this seems in accordance with the “structural” fiscal deficit level of 4 per cent of GDP reported by the Central Government (CG).

3.3 Health-care deficit: trend and forecast 2006-50

Using this 2.1 per cent of GDP deficit in 2006 as a foundation, we have considered different population and employment variables, according to the criteria described above. Under the baseline scenario (gradual decrease of informality, corresponding to an increase from 40 to 50 per cent in the contributors/employed ratio), the public health-care deficit will reach a peak of 4.3 per cent of GDP by year 2038; thereafter, it will stabilize in the range 3.0-3.5 per cent of GDP through 2050.

Figure 5 shows the deficit course between 2006 and 2050. Three important phases merit identification. The first phase, covering the years 2006-10, is the HCSSS’s expansion phase, responsible for rapid fiscal deficit deterioration from 2.1 to 2.8 per cent of GDP. In this stage, the government’s ambitious coverage goal (4.7 million additional affiliates to the SS for a total of 24.8 million and 0.5 million to the CS for a total of 17.8 million) overwhelms the earnings contributions growth (0.7 per cent of GDP in the four-year period).

In the interval 2010-35, steady deterioration in fiscal performance is projected, attributed mainly to the system’s organic expansion. The health-care deficit would rise from 2.8 per cent of GDP to a maximum of 3.8 per cent of GDP. This behavior is explained by the estimated growth in the affiliated population, predicted to jump from 42.6 million to 56.7 million even though the total population growth is assumed to slow to 1 from 1.09 per cent. Thus, the coverage increases from 94 to 96 per cent, generating more expenses. On the revenue side, the relationship contributors/employed will remain in the 40-47 per cent range, improving contributions only marginally.

Finally, in the 2036-50 period, the
system stabilizes itself, reversing course and reducing the deficit from 3.8 to 1.8 per cent of GDP, converging towards a value of 2 per cent of GDP. This convex effect on health deficit is explained by the increase in CS contributors, thanks to marginal gains in labor formality: we assume the ratio contributors/employed will increase from 47 to 50 per cent over the course of these years.

Another reason potentially explaining this “U” shaped health-care deficit trajectory is the projected equilibration of membership in the SS and CS systems: SS and CS members should each account for 50 per cent of all covered individuals at this point. Thus, our simulations highlight something obvious in terms of health insurance: the expansion of membership tends to correct structural imbalances in the long term. Indeed, as the population and labor formality grow (the contributors/employed ratio increases from 40 to 50 per cent), and contributions rise, the fiscal deficit declines. However, our model suggests this increase is insufficient to compensate for total health-care expenditures, resulting in a “structural health care” deficit of 1.8 per cent of GDP in 2050.

It is necessary to mention that if SS affiliates are calculated as the difference between the total population covered and total CS members (where total CS members is defined as contributors • family density), the demand subsidies/SS expenditure ratio increases from 57 to 61 per cent, while supply subsidies decrease from 42 to 39 per cent.

3.4 Scenario 2: Status quo labor formality

In this scenario we assume: 1) population growth is the same as stated in the baseline scenario; 2) health-care coverage will increase gradually from 86 to 98 per cent during 2006-50, and 3) the ratio contributors/employed will remain constant at 40 per cent, implying an absolute increase in contributors from 7.4 to 11.3 million (i.e., the number of contributors is 2.9 million less than in the baseline scenario; see Table 3).

Under this scenario of minimal informality improvement, severe fiscal deterioration results, with excess health-care spending reaching 3.8 per cent of GDP in 2020, about 50 basis points higher than the deficit recorded in the baseline scenario. Moreover, no phase of stabilization is ever reached, meaning that in 2050 the health-care deficit will account for 6.8 per cent of GDP (see Figure 5).

3.5 Scenario 3: High labor formality improvement

This scenario assumes: 1) population growth is the same as stated in the baseline scenario; 2) health-care coverage will increase gradually from 86 to 100 per cent during 2006-50, and 3) the contributors/employed ratio will rise faster than in the baseline scenario, increasing from 40 to 60 per cent in 2006-50, or, in absolute terms, from 7.4 million to 16.7 million contributors (2.5 million more than in the baseline scenario; see Table 3).

Under these conditions, the health-care sector would reach its maximum deficit of 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2024, a peak almost 60 basis points of GDP less and reached 11 years earlier when compared with the maximum deficit projected in the baseline scenario. Thus, in this alternative scenario, the “growth phase” would have a shorter length (2010-24) and the “stabilization phase” would begin much sooner, in 2028. Even more propitiously, the health-care sector would actually record a 1.9 per cent of GDP surplus in 2050 (see Figure 5).
This favorable result is explained by the greater degree of labor formality, which significantly augments the number of contributors. Indeed, with such high formality of labor, it would be possible to attain universal health coverage and actually turn a surplus of 1.9 per cent of annual GDP (assuming no unforeseen epidemiological risks come into play). The importance of unifying membership data through the surveillance systems PILA and BDUA – and therein preventing evasion of contributions – is thus underscored: increased contributions are capable of correcting the structural fiscal deficit that results from health-care expenditures.

4 Health sector contingent liabilities estimation, 2006-50

In order to estimate the present health-care obligations of the Colombian government on a 50-year horizon, we proceeded to calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) of the obligations projected by the baseline scenario described above.

Two scenarios were created with different interests rates. The first scenario considers a 4 per cent long-term interest rate. This long-term passive rate is equal to the opportunity cost of the State’s health-care obligations accumulated between 2006-50. Under this scenario, the State’s gross health-care obligations (corresponding to public spending) between 2006 and 2050 equate to 110 per cent of 2007’s GDP (see Table 4). Once income is deducted, the net public duties are reduced to 97 per cent of GDP (2007); on the other hand, the private sector would show a surplus of +35 per cent of GDP (2007) in the period 2006-50. Adding the public sector deficit and the private sector surplus thus gives the health-care sector’s NPV stock: –61.4 per cent of GDP (2007).

Preliminary calculations have shown that the contingent liability of Medicare in the United States, excluding medicines, measures approximately 90 per cent of year 2007 GDP. Including medicines, the liability increases to 259 per cent of GDP (see Figure 6). In other words, if the US government continues to spend US$ 2 trillion annually on health care, an additional gap of US$600 million will be generated each year.

Given the substantial inefficiency that characterizes the health-care system in the United States, it seems consistent to think that the contingent liabilities in the USA (including the Medicaid component), surpass those of Colombia. We also believe that our result of a NPV around 110 per cent of GDP (2007) is consistent, for example, with the Colombian pension fund system’s liabilities of approximately 160 per cent of GDP. Incidentally, this implies a Health-care Liabilities/Pension System Liabilities ratio inferior to that of the United States (61 vs. 221 per cent).

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health Care NPV by Type of Obligations</th>
<th>$i=4.0%$</th>
<th>$i=5.0%$</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross public spending</td>
<td>–107.0</td>
<td>–90.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net public duties (deficit)</td>
<td>–96.9</td>
<td>–80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net private spending (surplus)</td>
<td>+35.5</td>
<td>+27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total balance (public+private)</td>
<td>–61.4</td>
<td>–52.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANIF calculations.
When calculating health care’s NPV using a 5 per cent long-term interest rate, the net public obligation was found to be 80.1 per cent of GDP (2007). This is 17 percentage points less than that obtained with the 4 per cent rate. In this case, the NPV Health/Pensions relationship would fall to 50 per cent.

5 Conclusions

The aim of this study was to estimate, preliminarily, the health-care sector’s contingent liabilities in Colombia. To do so, we initially established that in 2006 the health-care sector showed a 2.1 per cent of GDP shortfall. We then created a baseline scenario with a gradual labor informality correction, raising the contributors/employed ratio from 40 to 50 per cent over the span of 2006-50. Despite the advantageous effect this improved ratio would have on total contributions from individuals, the public health-care deficit would nevertheless rise to 3.8 per cent of annual GDP in 2035 and then stabilize in the range 1.8-2.0 per cent of GDP around 2050.

Then, based on these presumed health-care cash flows, we estimated Colombia’s health-care NPV during the period 2006-50. Under the baseline scenario, the State’s gross obligations due to health-care expenditures (equal to public spending) would amount to 110 per cent of GDP in 2007. Once revenues are deducted, the net public duties would be reduced to 97 per cent of GDP (2007).
On the other hand, the private sector would show a surplus equivalent to 35 per cent of GDP (2007), as a result of the nature of the insurance business. Thus, when adding together the public sector deficit and the private sector surplus, the health sector’s stock NPV would be equivalent to –61.4 per cent of GDP (2007).

Preliminary calculations have shown that the contingent liability of Medicare in the United States, excluding medicines, measures approximately 90 per cent of year 2007 GDP. Including medicines, the liability increases to 259 per cent of GDP. Given the substantial inefficiency that characterizes the health-care system in the United States, it seems consistent to think that the contingent liabilities in the USA (including the Medicaid component), surpass those of Colombia. We also believe that our result of a NPV around 97 per cent of GDP (2007) is consistent, for example, with the Colombian pension fund system’s liabilities of approximately 160 per cent of GDP.
REFERENCES


